hoy le he preguntado al chatgpeto (del que me voy a borrar) sobre la estrategia de Pedro Sanchez. Solo te digo una cosa, que este pavo no da puntada sin hilo. Nunca.
What’s “the issue” with Pedro Sánchez this week is basically two overlapping stories:
He’s been sidelined in a new EU “inner-circle” format associated with Giorgia Meloni + Friedrich Merz
He used Munich Security Conference to stake out a very public “anti-arms-race / values-first” line that reads as anti-Trump-adjacent (and increasingly as “leader of the progressive counter-current”).
1) The Meloni–Merz “conference” / pre-summit: what happened and why it matters
On the sidelines of the EU leaders’ retreat at Alden Biesen Castle, Meloni, Merz and Bart De Wever hosted an “informal working group” on competitiveness.
According to the Italian government’s readout, 19 countries + the European Commission attended, and the agenda was:
completing the single market
simplification / lowering energy prices
“ambitious and pragmatic” trade policy
plus talk of reviewing ETS/CBAM mechanisms
Spain was not in that room, and Spanish media describe Madrid as angry about the format and the exclusion, seeing it as an attempt to reshape EU power away from normal institutions (and, politically, away from the last big centre-left leader).
Italy’s side simultaneously briefed that Sánchez didn’t raise the “no invite” issue directly when he spoke with Meloni later that day.
So the “Meloni conference” difference isn’t just vibes—it’s power mechanics:
Meloni/Merz: intergovernmental “coalitions of the willing” + competitiveness/deregulation framing (and a willingness to run smaller clubs).
Sánchez: more institution-first, UN/multilateral rhetoric, and (right now) more comfortable being the visible dissenter.
2) Sánchez’s position vs the US this week: what he’s actually doing
At Munich, Sánchez went hard on arms control / anti-nuclear escalation:
He argued nuclear rearmament won’t protect Europe and pushed the “moral rearmament” line.
Spanish press reports he explicitly called for the US and Russia to negotiate a new START-type treaty after New START expired in early February, and he was pressed again on Spain’s refusal to follow the NATO-wide ramp to the higher spending target.
On the “anti-Trump front” angle, there are a couple of concrete signals beyond rhetoric:
He met Gavin Newsom in Munich—Spanish reporting frames that as Sánchez consciously building a profile aligned with US domestic opposition to Trump, not just EU partners.
In recent weeks he has also publicly rejected Trump’s “Board of Peace” initiative on multilateral/UN grounds.
And he’s already been on record warning that any US move on Greenland would be catastrophic for NATO (i.e., openly confronting a core Trump pressure point).
Meanwhile, the broader European mood at Munich is: “build a stronger European pillar, rely less on the US,” including talk of a European nuclear dimension (Merz–Macron). Sánchez is positioned against that drift into nuclear talk, even if he still supports strengthening deterrence against Vladimir Putin.
So is he trying to lead an anti-Trump front?
Yes, but in a very specific way. He’s not trying to be “anti-American”; he’s trying to be the face of a progressive, multilateral alternative to “Trump-world” politics—and he’s leaning into being the outlier inside Europe.
Spanish reporting is unusually explicit that Sánchez believes this “contracorriente” role can become politically valuable, especially if Trump weakens (e.g., via midterms) and the global mood swings again.
Predicting Sánchez’s next moves (most likely paths)
Predictions are inherently squishy, but based on what he’s signalling now, these are the highest-probability next steps:
1) Reframe European security as “arms control + resilience,” not “nuclear umbrella” (high)
Expect Sánchez to keep pushing a package like:
new arms-control diplomacy (START-style messaging)
“European autonomy” framed as rules-based order/UN legitimacy rather than pure rearmament
This is the lane he just chose at Munich, and it differentiates him sharply.
2) Force his way back into the EU “competitiveness” conversation—while delegitimising the small-club format (high)
Because Meloni/Merz plan a follow-up around the March European Council, Sánchez’s rational play is:
publicly: critique “directorate-style” clubs
privately: make sure Spain can’t be ignored on single market/industry/energy files
The club itself says it intends to reconvene in March.
3) Keep picking fights that are
symbolically anti-Trump
but
operationally low-risk
(medium–high)
Examples of this pattern:
opposing flashy US-led initiatives that bypass the UN (Board of Peace)
sharply worded lines on Greenland / tariffs / NATO pressure
building ties with US subnational leaders (Newsom-style)
4) Domestic politics overlay: “international progressive leader” as mobilisation strategy (medium)
Spanish press argues he sees foreign-policy visibility as a way to energise a demobilised left at home. If that’s correct, you’ll see more set-piece speeches, op-eds, and headline-ready positioning timed around big summits.
