Boom.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1p5u9ly/ukrainian_drone_attacks_reported_in_novorossiysk/

En edificio de civiles, dicen que interceptados por sistemas de guerra electronica.

Joder que no les den ideas los chinos a los cayetanos... que no les den ideas.

https://www.reddit.com/r/Damnthatsinteresting/comments/1p5mkag/in_china_40_cmwide_miniend_units_are_rented_for/

@elarquitecto wrote in post #282:

@lowfour wrote in post #271:@elarquitecto wrote in post #268:@lowfour wrote in post #266:A ver que se cuenta el calvo danésdice que es hora de mandar los gripen(yo os hago la traducción libre, que es ...

Yo creo que al final no es ni ideológico ni pollas, no están planificando como joder a la EU... es un tema crematístico. El Witkoff quiere pillar cacho en Rusia, contratos, casas cualquier movida y se lo han prometido a cambio de meterle esa mierda de plan de paz que más que un plan de paz es la carta de los reyes magos de Putin.

No me jodas, tiene que haber 100 y 200 y 1000 militares Usanos que han ayudado a Ucrania MUY puteados. Puteadísimos.

Los suecos ya están preparándose

The Armed Forces assess that the Russian military threat will increase by 2030 and point out important new defense initiatives.

This includes long-range missiles, more air defense and spy satellites.

Peter Wallberg/TT

Published17:33

The defense budget is set to grow from 148 billion this year to over 200 billion in 2030. The Armed Forces have now submitted their considerations to the government on what the money should be used for to meet NATO requirements and to meet an increasing threat.

It states that Russia's ability to influence or threaten Sweden through hybrid warfare and economic pressure is expected to increase, as is the Russian conventional military threat until 2030.

– We see a risk that Russia will continue its growth regardless of developments in Ukraine, says Lieutenant General Carl-Johan Edström, Chief of the Defence Staff.

– This could mean everything from increasing the number of ground troops on the Russian-Baltic border, to stronger long-range capabilities and to strengthening the Russian fleet in the Arctic Ocean.

The Armed Forces point out how Sweden's defense must be strengthened compared to the current defense decision from 2024. For example, the ability to strike targets inside Russia.

– We need to increase our long-range capability for combat in depth. Both for offensive parts of our defense and for deterrence, says Edström.

This includes long-range missiles with a range of up to 200 kilometers.

Sweden also needs to increase its ability to fight in Finland and the Baltics, for example by becoming better at drone warfare and building up larger stocks of ammunition.

NATO also requires that by the end of 2030, Sweden should be able to lead and conduct multi-domain operations nationally and together with NATO allies, that is, to have land, air, and naval forces work together. This is important, not least for NATO to be able to control the Baltic Sea.

This requires both reinforced command support systems and new systems for intelligence gathering, such as airborne Globaleye and our own satellites.

– We must be able to have a situational picture and be able to gather intelligence, sometimes on a split-second basis, from beyond the Ural Mountains to out into the Atlantic and south of the Mediterranean, says Edström.

To protect bases, infrastructure and transport on Swedish soil, more air defense and expanded fighter aircraft capabilities are needed.

Here, NATO's integrated air and missile defense plays an important role and Sweden also needs to contribute more to that.

– We need a strong air and missile defense that defends us in several different layers, against everything from long-range ballistic missiles to small flying drones, says Edström.

https://samf.substack.com/p/the-witkoff-dmitriev-peace-plan-annotated

The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated

We now know a bit more about the process which led to the new peace plan and we now have a copy of its contents, to which I will turn soon.

Yesterday I noted that the plan, which was largely drafted by Steve Witkoff and Kirll Dmitriev, neither of whom are professional diplomats, was slanted in Russia’s favour, had been leaked by Dmitriev apparently to give it a push, had not been negotiated with either Kyiv or Moscow, and that many provisions were unclear even though the stories insisted that it was to be presented to Kyiv as a fait accompli.

With more reporting since I posted it seems that the proposal is more developed and has involved more people around the Trump administration. My guess is that as people looked at the plan it was starting to get pushback (possibly from Ukrainians) and that Dmitriev leaked it to give it a higher status and invest it with momentum, but that is only a guess.

At any rate if that is what was intended it succeeded as it is now being discussed as something real and in play. But it is clearly insufficiently developed to be presented as a fait accompli, and contrary to the original leaks, that will not now happen. This is not least because the Russians have been blindsided and are unhappy with the process and some of the content. So it is up for consultation and discussion with both sides.

We can now go further because a copy of the ‘28 point plan’ is in circulation, which I assess below. In key provisions, most importantly the territorial, but also in limiting the Ukrainian army and keeping Ukraine out of NATO, it reflects a Russian ‘wish list’, but it is only to fair to acknowledge that in some respects, notably on security guarantees and reconstruction, it tries to offer something to Ukraine. The effort appears to be one of trying to come up with a package that could work for both sides, though requiring both to make concessions.

By the nature of the conflict, the most important concessions come from Ukraine as it was the victim of aggression and it is its territory and not Russia’s that is occupied. But there is a lot in this that Russia still won’t like or at least will want to reframe. As important, it’s a dog’s breakfast, with some strange provisions, leaving open many questions for contentious interpretation and potential reframing.

I’ve provided annotations, noting the issues it raises. Others I’m sure will pick up points I’ve missed.

1. Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.

2. A full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All ambiguities of the past 30 years will be considered resolved.

   [What ambiguities? Promises of non-aggression have been made before, for example in the 1997 Founding Act, so while these are good things to say it remains unclear how much they can be trusted]

3. Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further.

   [No membership of NATO for Ukraine, and also in this formulation, any other potential candidates, has been a feature of Trump plans from the start. What is ‘an expectation not to invade.’ It imposes no obligations. A simple ‘will not’ would suffice.]

4. A dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, will be held to address all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation, in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.

   [How can the US ‘mediate’ a dialogue between Russia and an alliance of which it is a part? Otherwise similar aspirations have been found in previous treaties].

   Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

   [More on this below].

5. The size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

   [This is more than envisaged under previous Russian proposals - in 2022 it was 85,000 - but why is it needed for a sovereign country? There is no mention of limitations on particular classes of weapons - aircraft, tanks etc. There are no restrictions envisaged on Russian forces.]

6. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include a provision in its charters that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

   [Ukraine aspires to join NATO. Its constitution can be changed to preclude that, though this will be contentious. It can then be changed back again at a later date. If this is referring to the 1949 Washington Treaty that was signed and sealed in 1949. It has only been amended to take account of new members. The NATO Council could certainly promise not to admit Ukraine, although it could also change its mind].

7. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

   [There goes the Coalition of the Willing (CoW), or at least the part of the plan that envisaged small European military contingents backing up Ukrainian front line forces (which would now also be limited).]

8. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

   [It’s an odd statement, as it is up to Poland, but I presume this is intended to rescue the part of the CoW plan that envisaged air support that could impose a no-fly zone. I can’t imagine Russia will be delighted by this but in practice it could happen anyway. No mention of potential role for CoW naval forces.]

9. U.S. guarantee:

• The United States will receive compensation for providing the guarantee.

[What does this mean? From whom, in what form and how much? A security guarantee is a promise to act in certain contingencies. It doesn’t cost much to make the promise. This plays to Trump’s transactional view of alliance security but it is a weird insertion in a peace treaty]

▪️ If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.

[Of course unlikely but remember that the Russian pretext for the full-scale invasion was that Ukrainian forces were ‘invading’ the Luhansk enclave]

▪️ If Russia invades Ukraine, then in addition to a decisive and coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.

[Well unless the US intends to do it all by itself ‘decisive and coordinated’ means a NATO response and not just a US one (so does NATO get compensated?). In fact this has more automaticity than NATO’s Article V. So Ukraine should be happy with this but for the same reason Russia will not. Once sanctions have been removed it will not be easy to reinstate them. If Ukrainian territories have been integrated into Russia does that mean that the US would lead a fight to get them back or just withdraw recognition?]

▪️ If Ukraine, without cause, launches a missile at Moscow or Saint Petersburg, the security guarantee will be considered void.

[But Rostov would be OK? And what would be sufficient cause to justify a missile launch? Another weird clause.]

Ukraine has the right to EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is under consideration.

That is up to EU but nice if Russia conceded as this whole wretched business began when Putin tried to stop Ukraine signing an association agreement with the EU in 2013]

11. A powerful global package for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including but not limited to:

a. Creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing sectors, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence.
b. The United States will cooperate with Ukraine to jointly restore, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage.
c. Joint efforts to rebuild war-affected territories to restore, reconstruct, and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.
f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.

[In principle all good but this will require a lot of money. (e) presumably refers to the US-agreement on minerals but it is not explicit]

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:

a. Sanctions relief will be discussed and agreed upon gradually and individually.
b. The United States will conclude a long-term economic cooperation agreement aimed at mutual development in the spheres of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, Arctic rare-earth mining projects, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia will be invited to return to the G8.

[Not surprising but Russia will worry that (a) will be a slow process, and it is very dependent upon EU and UK so they will need to agree package. This is their major leverage over the fate of this plan

Equally it is not for the US to decide alone if Russia can rejoin the G7. It has to be agreed by the other members]

14. Frozen assets will be used as follows:

US$100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led efforts for Ukraine’s reconstruction and investment. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this initiative.
Europe will add US$100 billion to increase the investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. European frozen assets will be unfrozen.
The remaining frozen Russian assets will be invested in a separate U.S.–Russia investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in designated areas. This fund will aim to strengthen relations and increase shared interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.

[I can’t believe that Russia will agree to any of this. They want their assets back. Equally Ukraine wants them as reparations for all the losses they have suffered - and even then it will not be enough. What is with the US making a profit from this?]

15. A joint U.S.–Russia security working group will be established to facilitate and ensure implementation of all provisions of this agreement.

    [At the very least Ukraine should also be part of this process, otherwise it is wholly reliant on the US to look after its interests when it has been doing the mediating. Russia will continue to accuse Ukraine of breaking provisions and Ukraine needs to be able to defend its position and point to areas of Russian non-compliance. As drafted denies Ukraine any agency over the implementation ]

16. Russia will codify a non-aggression policy toward Europe and Ukraine.

    [Following the UN Charter would be a start. I’ve no idea what this could mean. Non-aggression should not be conditional.]

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation and arms control treaties, including the START I Treaty.

    [The non-proliferation is not time limited so it does not need extension. I presume they mean New START rather than START 1, and its extension would be welcome.]

18. Ukraine agrees to remain a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be put into operation under IAEA supervision, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.

    [This assume Zaporizhzhia remains de facto part of Russia see below]

20. Both countries commit to implementing educational programs in schools and society aimed at fostering understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:

a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and protection of linguistic minorities.
b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and prohibited.

[Well good luck with all of that if it is supposed to apply to Russia. As the Kremlin has adopted its own self-serving definition of what constitutes Nazi ideology and activity (more or less anything hostile to Russia) we can only guess how this would be used. Equally interesting to see how Ukrainian rights are to be protected in Russia.]

21. Territories:

a. Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, effectively granting de facto recognition along that line.
c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

[This meets Russia’s core territorial demand, although with some strange twists. De facto is less than de jure. It normally refers to a situation that exists in reality and cannot easily be changed, but is not necessarily recognized in law. In the event of a ceasefire being agreed it was always safest to assume that the occupied territories would become de facto Russian, without being recognised as such by Ukraine or the wider international community (as with Crimea). De jure refers to situations that are legally recognised and have official status. Russia has incorporated the four claimed oblasts into its constitution and wants them officially recognised. At any rate you don’t formally recognise something as de facto - it just is. So this would be meaningless. Russia will want de jure.

Turning the remaining part of Donetsk into a neutral demilitarised zone is an odd sort of compromise. First this is full of Ukrainian defences, including minefields (there are no reference to demining anywhere in the document). Demilitarising it would be no small matter. And if it is part of Russia - even if de facto - how can it be neutral. Ukrainians also live there. Are they supposed to abandon their homes or become Russian or have some limbo status because they are in neutral territory?]

22. After future territorial arrangements are agreed, both Russia and Ukraine commit not to alter them by force. Any security guarantees will not apply if this obligation is violated.

23. Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnipro River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain through the Black Sea.

    [There were agreements on this in the past which Russia abandoned]

24. A humanitarian committee will be created to resolve outstanding issues:

a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an “all for all” basis.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages, including children, will be returned.
c. A family reunification program will be implemented.
d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of victims of the conflict.

[Hard to object but not exactly strong on detail]

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

    [There is a need for Ukrainian elections but it also requires the conditions for them to be conducted safely. Can the residents of Donetsk vote? At rate elections are up to the Ukrainians as a sovereign country. Why not include a demand for free and fair Russian elections?]

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for actions during the war and agree not to bring claims or pursue grievances in the future.

    [War crimes go unpunished].

27. This agreement will be legally binding.
    Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

    [This is modelled on Gaza. How does it relate to point 15 or indeed the other provisions on guarantees? What happens when Trump goes? Who will be on this Peace Council? What will be the terms of reference? Most peace treaties will have provisions to deal with disputes and if necessary provide for arbitration. With Gaza the Trump plan was backed by the great majority of regional states and the aim was to write Hamas out of the script. The military and political relationships were quite different.]

28. Once all parties accept this memorandum, a ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides withdraw to the agreed points for the start of the agreement’s implementation.

Wisely Zelenskyy has said he’ll work with the Americans on the plan. He might as well wait until the Russians formulate a response. For now their reaction has been muted. If the Russians just accepted it they could claim a sort of victory but it would not quite be on their terms. As I surmised yesterday and have shown above this is not a fully developed plan which could be presented, as was the Gaza plan, on a take it or leave it basis. Even then Netanyahu fiddled with the details at the end.

This is a plan that even if there was no change to the underlying principles and concessions would require a lot more work, and so will delay a ceasefire. As soon as both sides can object and amend that will lead to a protracted negotiation and so even more delay. The advantage is that having a plan set down allows one to see the pitfalls. It does not necessarily enable one to see a way though them.