Vamos, que lo de Macron no era una Boutade

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1b2d9n0/lithuanian_foreign_minister_echoes_macron_on/

Por cierto abundan los vídeos de drones que explotan en el aire y reparten una buena pedrea de bolitas (no se si de tugnsteno como los himars)... Un drone, mucha mayor kill zone.

https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1b2eq5o/fpv_drone_with_air_burst_capability_explodes_over/

Pues mirando youtube me sale que los cuatro países nórdicos han coordinado sus fuerzas aéreas bajo un mando único, para actuar al unísono. Y me ha dado por mirar los juguetes que tienen.

**Finlandia**: 55 F18C

**Suecia**: 71 Gripens y 60 pedidos.

**Dinamarca**: 72 F16 (que se van para Ukrania y los reemplazarán con F35)

**Noruega**: 32 F35 y 12 más pedidos.

Total 233 aviones.

Rusia tienen

139 SU34

118 SU35

273 SU27

Etc etc etc

Cantidades industriales de aviones. Que se caen solos. Pero muchos aviones.

Yo hasta que no vea esos puestos de trabajo en industria de 40.000 brutos al año en adelante fácilmente accesibles sin enchufe, sin ser Dios personificado y sin matarse a trabajar, no me creeré nada del Plan Von der Leyen para montar la Línea Von der Leyen.

Mientras sigan años con plazas vacantes por negarse a subir los sueldos o bajar los requisitos @Jag me lo creeré lo mismo que las grafiquitas del ladrillo.

Bueno, solo han tardado 10 años en tomar Adviidka. Igual para el 2344 llegan a Berlín.

Ostia... los rusos se plantean un escenario nuclear con un nivel mucho más bajo de lo que admiten en público:

https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7

Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike

Doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons outlined in training scenarios for an invasion by China

**Vladimir Putin’s forces have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of conflict with a major world power**, according to leaked Russian military files that include training scenarios for an invasion by China.

**The classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted**, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.

The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons.

**Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.**

“This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “**They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.**”

**Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by land or sea-launched missiles or from aircraft, are designed for limited battlefield use in Europe and Asia, as opposed to the larger “strategic” weapons intended to target the US. Modern tactical warheads can still release significantly more energy than the weapons dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945.**

Although **the files date back 10 years and more, experts claim they remain relevant to current Russian military doctrine**. The documents were shown to the FT by western sources.

**The defensive plans expose deeply held suspicions of China among Moscow’s security elite even as Putin began forging an alliance with Beijing, which as early as 2001 included a nuclear no-first-strike agreement.**

In the years since, Russia and China have deepened their partnership, particularly since Xi Jinping took power in Beijing in 2012. The war in Ukraine has cemented Russia’s status as a junior partner in their relationship, with China throwing Moscow a vital economic lifeline to help stave off western sanctions.

**Yet even as the countries became closer, the training materials show Russia’s eastern military district was rehearsing multiple scenarios depicting a Chinese invasion.**

**The exercises offer a rare insight into how Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of its defence policy — and how it trains forces to be able to carry out a nuclear first strike in some battlefield conditions.**

**One exercise outlining a hypothetical attack by China notes that Russia, dubbed the “Northern Federation” for the purpose of the war game, could respond with a tactical nuclear strike in order to stop “the South” from advancing with a second wave of invading forces.**

“The order has been given by the commander-in-chief . . . to use nuclear weapons . . . in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike,” the document said.

China’s foreign ministry denied there were any grounds for suspicion of Moscow. “The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two countries,” a spokesperson said. “The ‘threat theory’ has no market in China and Russia.”

**Putin’s spokesperson said on Wednesday: “The main thing is that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is absolutely transparent and is spelled out in the doctrine. As for the documents mentioned, we strongly doubt their authenticity.”**

A separate training presentation for naval officers, unrelated to the China war games, outlines broader criteria for a potential nuclear strike, including an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons.

The slides summarise the threshold as a combination of factors where losses suffered by Russian forces “would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression”, a “critical situation for the state security of Russia”.

**Other potential conditions include the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres.**

**Russia’s military is also expected to be able to use tactical nuclear weapons for a broad array of goals, including “containing states from using aggression […] or escalating military conflicts”, “stopping aggression”, preventing Russian forces from losing battles or territory, and making Russia’s navy “more effective”.**

Putin said last June that he felt “negatively” about using tactical nuclear strikes, but then boasted that Russia had a larger non-strategic arsenal than Nato countries. “Screw them, you know, as people say,” Putin said. T**he US has estimated Russia has at least 2,000 such weapons.**

**Putin said last year that Russian nuclear doctrine allowed two possible thresholds for using nuclear weapons: retaliation against a first nuclear strike by an enemy, and if “the very existence of Russia as a state comes under threat even if conventional weapons are used”.**

But Putin himself added that neither criteria was likely to be met, and dismissed public calls from hardliners to lower the threshold.

**The materials are aimed at training Russian units for situations in which the country might want the ability to use nuclear weapons**, said Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, rather than setting out a rule book for their use.

“At this level, the requirement is for units to maintain — over the course of a conflict — the credible option for policymakers to employ nuclear weapons,” Watling added. “This would be a political decision.”

**While Moscow has drawn close to Beijing since the war games and moved forces from the east to Ukraine, it has continued to build up its eastern defences. “Russia is continuing to reinforce and exercise its nuclear-capable missiles in the Far East near its border with China,”** said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. **“A lot of these systems only have the range to strike China.”**

Russia was still behaving in accordance with the “theory of use” of nuclear weapons set out in the documents, Alberque said. “We have not seen a fundamental rethink,” he said, adding that Russia is probably concerned that China may seek to take advantage of Moscow being distracted “to push the Russians out of Central Asia”.

The documents reflect patterns seen in exercises the Russian military held regularly before and since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Alberque, who worked for Nato and the US defence department on arms control, pointed to examples of Russian exercises held in June and November last year using nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in two regions bordering China.

**While Russia’s president has the sole authority to launch a first nuclear strike, the low threshold for tactical nuclear use set out in the documents conforms with a doctrine some western observers refer to as “escalating to de-escalate”.**

Under this strategy a tactical weapon could be used to try to prevent Russia from becoming embroiled in a sprawling war, particularly one in which the US might intervene. Using what it calls “fear inducement”, Moscow would seek to end the conflict on its own terms by shocking the country’s adversary with the early use of a small nuclear weapon — or securing a settlement through the threat to do so.

**“They talk about ‘soberising’ their adversaries — knocking them out of the drunkenness of their early victories by introducing nuclear weapons,” said Alberque. “The best way that they think they can do that is to use what they call a lower ‘dosage’ of nuclear weapons at a much lower level of combat to prevent escalation.”**

Ukrainian officials argued that Putin’s nuclear threats convinced US and other allies not to arm Kyiv more decisively early in the conflict, when advanced Nato weaponry could have turned the tide in Ukraine’s favour.

Alberque said Russia would probably have a higher threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which does not have its own nuclear capability or the ability to launch a ground invasion on the same scale, than against China or the US.

**Russian leaders believe that, whereas a nuclear strike against China or the US could be “soberising”, a nuclear strike on Ukraine would be likely to escalate the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the US or UK, Alberque said. “That is absolutely the last thing Putin wants.”**

@lowfour (post #245)

Bueh, guanazo en el horizonte. Mientras Joe esté en la casa blanca, dudo que Rusia escale nada, porque los revientan

Lo de los aviones rusos es raro de cojones, no de ahora, desde hace 2 años, tienen muchos y supuestamente buenos, pero no tienen supremacía aérea ni ejercen supresión ni nada, casi al revés, y últimamente es que les están bajando aviones a ostias

Así que tiene que salir el solomillos a lanzar bravatas de matón de barrio, como si tuviera capacidad de borrar del mapa algo... que me viene lo de dime de qué presumes y te diré de qué careces

Es curioso lo de macron porque fue uno de los que intentó mediar y se las daba de conchabeo con putin, hasta que le puso en la mesa de 9m y le humilló y tal

Pero por qué mandar tropas ahora? Qué ha pasado?

ehem. Supongo que serán spambots pero vamos... este chorizo de callejón va a elevar la tensión al máximo antes de las elecciones.

https://twitter.com/United24media/status/1763154161581826075?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1763154161581826075%7Ctwgr%5Ec572d4ab2c181bb246d6d35ffb4da15c749d874d%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.redditmedia.com%2Fmediaembed%2F1b2z6xa%2F%3Fresponsive%3Dtrueis_nightmode%3Dfalse

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/02/one-global-issue-trump-cares-about/677592/?utm_source=reddit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=the-atlantic&utm_content=edit-promo

Why Is Trump Trying to Make Ukraine Lose?

The former president isn’t in office—but is still dictating U.S. policy.

(nota: solo he leído un trozo)

@lowfour (post #250)

pues acaba de leerlo que te deja con el culo torcido

Maybe the extraordinary nature of the current moment is hard to see from inside the United States, where so many other stories are competing for attention. But from the outside—from Warsaw, where I live part-time; from Munich, where I attended a major annual security conference earlier this month; from London, Berlin, and other allied capitals—nobody doubts that these circumstances are unprecedented. **Donald Trump, who is not the president, is using a minority of Republicans to block aid to Ukraine, to undermine the actual president’s foreign policy, and to weaken American power and credibility.**

básicamente, lo que dice lo venimos comentando, solo aquí vemos más clara la sumisión de trump a putin, mientras que ellos no se terminan de creer que todo un presidente de los usa sirva vasallaje a todo un dictador como trump y encima a costa de fundirse la hegemonía usa

lo curioso de esto es que podría dar igual quién gane las elecciones (no, obviamente, pero es un poco lo que vemos) ya que los trump se dedican a atacar a todos los republicanos que no hacen lo que ellos dicen y que suele ser bloquear toda ayuda a ucrania

el panorama es chungo

por eso estamos ahora sustituyendo a usa en cuanto a ayuda bélica se refiere y tiene sentido ahora que macron diga, pues igual obuses no tenemos (aun) pero peña sí (como putin, curioso), mandemos tropas mientras no podamos mandar obuses!

y claro, si usa no está, alguien ocupará ese sitio o putin y los amigos de cinta se subirán a la chepa, a todas las chepas

@elarquibis (post #251)

En serio, pregunta para @Jag que pilota de esas cosas. COMO COÑO NO TENEMOS OBUSES pero si Leopards, drones, minidrones, SCALP, Taurus, Storm Shadows, las bombas esas bonus que son para cagarse... Pero malditos obuses no podemos fabricar?

Podemos fabricar 11 millones de coches en la UE en 2022 y no podemos fabricar 1 Millón de obuses?

VAMOS NO ME JODAS.

Lo de Macrón no fue una machada después de un patxarán de más. Lo ratifican hoy. Ojo que los frenchies y sobre todo su legión tiene bastante experiencia de combate, que siempre están metidos en movidas en áfrica y tal y no se andan con chiquitas.

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/france-explains-why-it-could-deploy-troops-in-ukraine/

>

He also clarified that if French troops are deployed to Ukraine, they will train the military, provide air defense, and protect some parts of the border.

Igual es por lo de Moldavia.

@lowfour (post #252)

acuérdate de la guerra del golfo, viste algún obus por ahí?? no, iba la aviación, aplanaba todo y ale, los abrams a pecho descubierto y tal

la artillería es la guerra en doctrina soviética, aquí eso está pasado de moda o algo así

como en ucrania no puedes usar aviación (porloquesea, pero tanto ukr como rus parece que la usan poco), pues vas a himars, artillería y cohetes y tal... hasta pavos que van con su mortero que básicamente es un tubo y poco más... por eso los drones triunfan tanto, porque puedes meter la granada por la portilla de un blindado si te das maña

@lowfour (post #254)

creo que no estamos viendo todo lo que ocurre, porque seguramente está ocurriendo tras las bambalinas y tal, pero debe de haber cierto pánico por las amenazas ruskis, y no solo desde rusia, sino desde la torre trump y tal

lo de que rusia ataca a una baltica y no pasa nada, es posible que tampoco lo dijera trump bebido o a tope de lejía anti-covid de esa... y de hecho, el pavo de la otan que alertaba de ese esceanrio (que era como muy remoto y tal) no parecía tampoco acompasar las palabas con los gestos, o sea, no es un escenario más cualquiera, es como si fuera "el" escenario sobre el que se trabaja

tiene sentido para putin invadir moldavia o alguna similar, porque en ucrania no avanzará mucho más y sin embargo en esos sitios apenas tendría oposición

y las excusas ya colaron en ucrania, había que defender a los rusos de los nazis, en transinistria llevan ya años diciendo que son rusos y que moldavia les "oprime" y tal (típico lazismo en vena)

que manden tropas igual no es para ayudar a ucrania en ucrania, sino a prevenir que rusia anexione otras regiones en frontera con ucrania y con complacencia de la otan porque nukes o algo así

está nervioso el Gnomo porque por mucho que los Ukros estén en la lona ve que su armamento es totalmente impotente contra el armamento NATO conocido... ya ni te cuento cuando suelten a los robots de Boston Dynamics con sierras eléctricas en plan Mac Max

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/29/world/europe/putin-speech-ukraine-nuclear-conflict.html

Putin Says West Risks Nuclear Conflict if It Intervenes More in Ukraine

“We also have weapons that can strike targets on their territory,” Mr. Putin said in an annual speech. “Do they not understand this?”

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said the West faced the prospect of nuclear conflict if it intervened more directly in the war in Ukraine, using an annual speech to the nation on Thursday to escalate his threats against Europe and the United States.

**Mr. Putin said NATO countries that were helping Ukraine strike Russian territory or might consider sending their own troops “must, in the end, understand” that “all this truly threatens a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore the destruction of civilization.”**

**“We also have weapons that can strike targets on their territory,**” Mr. Putin said. “Do they not understand this?”

The Russian leader alluded to comments by President Emmanuel Macron of France this week raising the possibility of sending troops from NATO countries to Ukraine, a scenario the Kremlin said would lead to the “inevitability” of a direct conflict between Russia and the Western alliance.

The United States and other Western governments have largely tried to distance themselves from Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, and Mr. Macron’s remarks about the possibility of Western troops being sent to Ukraine drew quick rebukes from other Western officials, who have ruled out such deployments.

Mr. Putin, however, considers Russian-occupied Ukraine to be Russian territory, and he seized on Mr. Macron’s remarks to amplify his threat. “We remember the fate of those who once sent their contingents to the territory of our country,” Mr. Putin said, an apparent reference to the invasions of Hitler and Napoleon. “But now the consequences for potential interventionists will be much more tragic.”

Mr. Putin’s threats on Thursday came in the opening minutes of his annual state-of-the-nation speech, a keystone event in the Kremlin calendar in which the president declares his plans and priorities in a televised address to hundreds of officials, lawmakers and other members of Russia’s ruling elite.

This year, the speech took on added significance because of Russia’s presidential elections, scheduled for March 15-17, in which Mr. Putin is running for another six-year term. He is assured of winning, but the Kremlin has mounted a concerted publicity campaign ahead of the vote, seeking to use it as a stamp of public approval for Mr. Putin’s rule, and by extension, his war.

The speech came at a geopolitically delicate time: More than two years into the war, Russia has taken the initiative on the battlefield, military aid is stalled in the U.S. Congress, and Western governments are at odds over how best to support Ukraine.

At home, Mr. Putin is showing no sign of slowing his crackdown on the opposition, which suffered a crushing blow with the death of its imprisoned leader, Aleksei A. Navalny.

“Russia’s political system is one of the foundations of the country’s sovereignty,” Mr. Putin said in his speech, suggesting he would continue to stifle what he casts as Western-organized dissent. “We will not let anyone interfere in our domestic affairs.”

Mr. Putin has repeatedly made veiled nuclear threats against the West since he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago, seeking to leverage Russia’s enormous nuclear arsenal to deter Europe and the United States from supporting Ukraine.

He had appeared to dial down that rhetoric in the past year. But on Thursday, he returned to it, coupling his threats with a claim that he was ready to resume arms-control negotiations with the United States — but only, he suggested, if Washington was ready to discuss the war in Ukraine as well.

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“Russia is ready for a dialogue with the United States on matters of strategic stability,” Mr. Putin said, a reference to arms-control talks with Washington that had been briefly underway before Russia’s invasion.

In an apparent reference to Ukraine, Mr. Putin added: “This must, naturally, be done only as a single complex, including all those aspects that affect the security of our country.”

Fyodor Lukyanov, a Moscow-based foreign-policy expert close to the Kremlin, said Mr. Putin’s warnings were probably prompted by Mr. Macron’s remark earlier in the week that “nothing should be ruled out” regarding the possibility of a NATO country sending troops to Ukraine.

More broadly, he added, Mr. Putin was responding to Western pledges to provide more powerful arms to Ukraine as Russia’s battlefield advantage grows — including sending Kyiv missiles that could reach deeper inside Russian territory.

“Macron is not the only one who’s starting to say that a Russian victory cannot be accepted,” Mr. Lukyanov said. “In the West, they’re not talking about a peace deal — they’re talking about not letting Russia succeed.”

**Mr. Putin’s goal, he said, was to avoid more direct Western involvement in the war and to “achieve negotiations on terms acceptable to Russia.” In Thursday’s speech, Mr. Putin signaled that he wanted those negotiations to encompass not just the future of Ukraine but also “equal and indivisible security in Eurasia.”**

(Está pidiendo negociaciones no? Eso comentaba alguien hoy en Times Radio, que la entrevista de Tucker Carlson de alguna forma paró su intención de pedir tiempo muerto).

Mr. Putin previously sought a sweeping security arrangement with NATO in late 2021, weeks before he launched his full-scale invasion. At the time, Western officials dismissed Russia’s proposal as a nonstarter, because it would have codified a Russian sphere of influence across the former Soviet Union.

**The White House, for its part, has rebuffed Mr. Putin’s efforts to put the United States at the center of any negotiations about the war in Ukraine. American officials have said that the United States has not and will not negotiate on behalf of Ukraine.**

Mr. Putin’s threats against the West took up only a few minutes of a speech that lasted more than two hours. Much of the address focused on bread-and-butter domestic issues like highways, health care, energy infrastructure and education.

But Mr. Putin framed all those domestic priorities as being contingent on the success of his invasion of Ukraine, which the Kremlin refers to as the “special military operation.” He offered no new details on the war’s goals or how it might end, saying only that Russia aimed to “root out Nazism” — a reference to his frequent, false claims about Ukraine being run by “Nazis.”

“I will underline the most important thing,” Mr. Putin said at the end of his speech. “The fulfillment of all the targeted plans today depends directly on our soldiers, officers, volunteers — all the military personnel fighting right now on the front.”

It was a signal that Mr. Putin intends to use his March re-election to portray Russia as committed to the war, with the overwhelming majority of the public behind it. Mr. Putin described the war’s soldiers and supporters as Russia’s “true elite,” and unveiled a training program and other measures meant to elevate veterans to management positions in civilian life in areas like government, education and business.

With just more two weeks to go until the election, the Kremlin turned Mr. Putin’s speech into a nationwide event. It was shown on billboards in Moscow and in movie theaters across the country, the Russian state media reported. And on social media, some celebrities rushed to show their fealty.

Among them: the television presenter Nastya Ivleyeva, who hosted the hedonistic, “almost naked” theme party in Moscow in December that became a reckoning for Russian stars seen as insufficiently adhering to the “traditional values” that Mr. Putin venerates.

“I watched the president’s address for the first time this year,” Ms. Ivleyeva wrote on the Telegram social messaging app. “The initiatives and projects that were announced sincerely resonate with me, and I know that I will vote for them.”

Otro tema muy interesante. El PIB de Rusia creció un 3% este año, por encima que las economías occidentales. Pero es un crecimiento dopado. Rusia hizo acopio de muchos fondos del petróleo antes de empezar su guerra. (Que por cierto, he oído hoy de uno que curraba con Putin que empezó a planear en 2003). Y meter pasta en economía de guerra da un acelerón a toda la economía, pero un economista no lo ve nada claro. Dice que Rusia va a morir por mil cortes pequeños.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/02/25/russias-economy-faces-death-thousand-cuts/

Russia’s economy faces death by a thousand cuts

Economic pressure was one of the ways in which the West hoped Russia would be brought to heel after its invasion of Ukraine. Yet last year the Russian economy grew by 3.6pc, far faster than most countries in Europe.

What’s more, this year Russia is likely to grow by about 3pc What on earth has happened? At the risk of being accused of teaching grandmothers to suck eggs, let me go back to basics. Extra expenditure unleashed by a war can give a boost to the economy.

This is what happened to Germany in the 1930s. There was also a huge increase in war production in the US, initially to meet export orders including from the UK, and subsequently to equip its own massively expanded armed forces.

This expenditure was a key factor in lifting those economies out of the Great Depression. If an economy enters a war with unemployed resources, including labour, then the extra production of war materiel is effectively free. It employs resources which would otherwise be unused.

Moreover, such a boost to demand can deliver an increase in non-war production as the recipients of extra income from war production spend their money. But these gains are limited. They can only occur in economies with unemployed resources and they end when the unemployed resources are exhausted.

One way of escaping from this constraint is to draw in extra resources by importing more from abroad or exporting less, thereby causing the current account of the balance of payments to deteriorate. But that too has its limits. Once they are reached, extra production for war purposes must come at the expense of reduced production for something else – ordinary consumption or investment.

When the Ukraine war began, Russia did have a margin of unemployed productive capacity, including labour. Extra demand was therefore able to draw forth increased production. But this margin of unemployed resources was quickly used up.

After that point, with resources fully employed, extra demand brings inflationary pressure. Last year, the Russian inflation rate averaged 5.9pc. This year it is likely to be about 7.5pc. So much for Economics 101. Now for the West’s policy stance.

It hoped to exert economic pressure on Russia through three channels. First, by stopping Russian exports to the West – especially oil and gas – it hoped to bring major financial pressure on the Russian government and make it difficult to build up and resupply the Russian military.

Second, it hoped that an embargo on financial dealings with Russia would make it extremely difficult for the Russian system to transact with the outside world. Third, it hoped that cutting Russia off from the supply of key industrial inputs would gradually grind down Moscow’s supply capacity of both war materiel and goods for ordinary domestic use.

The first of these channels has definitely not worked. Russia’s main exports, namely oil and gas and some minerals and metals, are the most fungible of all.

It is relatively easy to divert these from one set of markets to another. In Russia’s case, this has been facilitated by China and India replacing the West as a source of imports and a market for Russia’s exports, and by some other countries acting as intermediaries between Russia and third parties.

Indeed, higher prices for energy meant that in the early stages of the war, Russia’s export earnings, and hence the revenues flowing to the country’s government, soared. More recently, both prices and energy revenues flowing to the treasury have fallen back. Financial pressure has failed for similar reasons.

The Russian government has been preparing for this since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It has reduced financial dependence on the West and has increased use of the Chinese system to facilitate international payments. The effectiveness of the third channel is unclear.

As with so many other countries, there are serious doubts about the validity of official statistics – particularly so in the Russian case. On the face of it, though, there doesn’t seem to have been a major impact on Russia’s productive capacity.

What is the outlook? It seems likely that the damage to Russia’s productive capacity from the loss of western technology and key supplies will increase over time. Moreover, the medium-term outlook for its supply capacity has been severely dented by the loss of so many soldiers in the Ukraine war – and more importantly, by the exodus of so many well-qualified young people who wished to escape both the Putin regime and the prospect of call-up.

The extent of troop losses is extremely uncertain. One US estimate puts the number of Russians killed and wounded at over 350,000. Emigration because of the war is unofficially estimated at over 1 million. This amounts to a combined total of about 1pc of Russia’s population.

These losses are especially important because of Russia’s pre-existing demographic time-bomb. Its birth rate has been running at about 1.5, well below the replacement level of 2.1. Not only are the majority of casualties and emigrants young, but they are also disproportionately male, threatening a gender imbalance in Russia which will undermine overall fertility.

Meanwhile, the immediate economic outlook remains fragile. The latest Russian budget envisages a 70pc increase in defence spending this year, taking it to 6pc of GDP (The UK Government should kindly take note).

Economic pressure was one of the ways in which the West hoped Russia would be brought to heel after its invasion of Ukraine. Yet last year the Russian economy grew by 3.6pc, far faster than most countries in Europe.

What’s more, this year Russia is likely to grow by about 3pc What on earth has happened? At the risk of being accused of teaching grandmothers to suck eggs, let me go back to basics. Extra expenditure unleashed by a war can give a boost to the economy.

This is what happened to Germany in the 1930s. There was also a huge increase in war production in the US, initially to meet export orders including from the UK, and subsequently to equip its own massively expanded armed forces.

This expenditure was a key factor in lifting those economies out of the Great Depression. If an economy enters a war with unemployed resources, including labour, then the extra production of war materiel is effectively free. It employs resources which would otherwise be unused.

Moreover, such a boost to demand can deliver an increase in non-war production as the recipients of extra income from war production spend their money. But these gains are limited. They can only occur in economies with unemployed resources and they end when the unemployed resources are exhausted.

One way of escaping from this constraint is to draw in extra resources by importing more from abroad or exporting less, thereby causing the current account of the balance of payments to deteriorate. But that too has its limits. Once they are reached, extra production for war purposes must come at the expense of reduced production for something else – ordinary consumption or investment.

When the Ukraine war began, Russia did have a margin of unemployed productive capacity, including labour. Extra demand was therefore able to draw forth increased production. But this margin of unemployed resources was quickly used up.

After that point, with resources fully employed, extra demand brings inflationary pressure. Last year, the Russian inflation rate averaged 5.9pc. This year it is likely to be about 7.5pc. So much for Economics 101. Now for the West’s policy stance.

It hoped to exert economic pressure on Russia through three channels. First, by stopping Russian exports to the West – especially oil and gas – it hoped to bring major financial pressure on the Russian government and make it difficult to build up and resupply the Russian military.

Second, it hoped that an embargo on financial dealings with Russia would make it extremely difficult for the Russian system to transact with the outside world. Third, it hoped that cutting Russia off from the supply of key industrial inputs would gradually grind down Moscow’s supply capacity of both war materiel and goods for ordinary domestic use.

The first of these channels has definitely not worked. Russia’s main exports, namely oil and gas and some minerals and metals, are the most fungible of all.

It is relatively easy to divert these from one set of markets to another. In Russia’s case, this has been facilitated by China and India replacing the West as a source of imports and a market for Russia’s exports, and by some other countries acting as intermediaries between Russia and third parties.

Indeed, higher prices for energy meant that in the early stages of the war, Russia’s export earnings, and hence the revenues flowing to the country’s government, soared. More recently, both prices and energy revenues flowing to the treasury have fallen back. Financial pressure has failed for similar reasons.

The Russian government has been preparing for this since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It has reduced financial dependence on the West and has increased use of the Chinese system to facilitate international payments. The effectiveness of the third channel is unclear.

As with so many other countries, there are serious doubts about the validity of official statistics – particularly so in the Russian case. On the face of it, though, there doesn’t seem to have been a major impact on Russia’s productive capacity.

What is the outlook? It seems likely that the damage to Russia’s productive capacity from the loss of western technology and key supplies will increase over time. Moreover, the medium-term outlook for its supply capacity has been severely dented by the loss of so many soldiers in the Ukraine war – and more importantly, by the exodus of so many well-qualified young people who wished to escape both the Putin regime and the prospect of call-up.

The extent of troop losses is extremely uncertain. One US estimate puts the number of Russians killed and wounded at over 350,000. Emigration because of the war is unofficially estimated at over 1 million. This amounts to a combined total of about 1pc of Russia’s population.

These losses are especially important because of Russia’s pre-existing demographic time-bomb. Its birth rate has been running at about 1.5, well below the replacement level of 2.1. Not only are the majority of casualties and emigrants young, but they are also disproportionately male, threatening a gender imbalance in Russia which will undermine overall fertility.

Meanwhile, the immediate economic outlook remains fragile. The latest Russian budget envisages a 70pc increase in defence spending this year, taking it to 6pc of GDP (The UK Government should kindly take note).

Given this, despite surging tax revenues, the budget deficit is likely to be about 3pc of GDP this year. Admittedly, the current account is likely to record a surplus of about 4pc. But this is less impressive than it sounds because Russia needs a surplus of about 2pc to finance the continuing flight of capital.

The big vulnerability is energy prices. If they were to fall sharply then the budget deficit would balloon and the current account surplus would dwindle, putting pressure on the rouble and causing inflation to rise further. If that were to happen, then the economic screw would really tighten.

@elarquibis (post #259)

Te lo voy a decir. Trump tiene VOTOS. Y tiene votos porque la propaganda putiniana ha calado a lo bestia entre las clases más bajas. Se lo han tragado todo y son irreversibles. Viste el vídeo de los rednecks diciendo que Putin era su amigo? Que Rusia era su amiga, que solo querían la paz?

A qué te suena? Pues al spam de burbuja. Se han comido eso y también toda la propaganda a favor de Trump. El votante republicano está lobotomizado ahora mismo y Trump es su mesías (el elegido por el entorno Surkoviano imagino). De modo que tiene votos y como tiene votos no lo pueden pioletizar sanamente como hubieran hecho con cualquier otro.

Es un tema MUY chungo pero me va quedando bastante clarito de un par de años a esta parte. Rusia ha comprometido las democracias occidentales por la base.

@lowfour (post #260)

pero debe de tener algo mas, no?

supongo que el spameo ha ido calando, pero no me parece suficiente como para tener pillados a tantos

bueno, es que en el fondo no se necesitan tantos, con tener cierta masa crítica (igual un 20-25% del electorado) ya las cosa empieza a ser distópica, porque tus adversarios tienen que unirse para contrarrestarte y si los mantienes separados y a la gresca, la voz "coherente" y tal, es la tuya

vamos, estoy seguro que los del brexit no eran tantos, pero lograron convencer a los suficientes para ganar, unos porque creyeron las mentiras y otros porque pasaron de votar porque no creyeron las verdades o algo así

y que es sencillo enlodar y difamar, hoy mismo estaban diciendo que la mujer de ken estaba implicada en lo de abalos y tal, pero sin pudor (y sin una sola prueba, claro)

@lowfour (post #252)

Hace 40 años, Europa (y nosotros concretamente) tenía empresas públicas que fabricaban estos temas. Ahora no, tan sencillo como eso. Se hacen pedidos de munición en cantidades ridículas para reponer un stock muy pequeño, y lo viejo se lo hemos dado ya a Ucrania.

Macron dijo ayer que había que tornar a economía de guerra.... Tal y como han hecho los rusos. Yo no lo veo tan fácil, son décadas dejando la tecnología en manos de empresas privadas, por ejemplo, los reactores de explosivos, las radios y comunicaciones, las ópticas, las armas, tanques, todo está en manos de empresas privadas, que te pueden decir que te vayas al guano porque no son tuyas.....y en Europa hay una olla de libertad mal entendida ya lo sabéis.

Europa (pero no lo va a hacer) debiera poner en marcha un programa común de material.

Mientras tanto sólo nos queda seguir comprando a las empresas ese material.

Es el capitalismo amigos!!!! Ni tan calvo (comunismo) ni tan claro (capitalismo). En temas estratégicos hay que tener producción militar, farmacia, energía, agua.... Públicos!

@lowfour (post #253)

Es complejo, tienes que poner a un tío debajo de millones de litros de explosivos en fase líquida (mantenerlos así, requiere medidas muy precisas) llenando uno a uno un cuerpo metálico, por capas. Y luego sellarlo, ponerle espoletas, etc. eso para la munición convencional de artillería.

Para las complejas, necesitas útiles y electrónica especiales y una persona que lo ponga en su sitio y sepa cómo hacerlo...

@Jag (post #263)

No, si entiendo que debe haber unas tolerancias muy pequeñas para que tengan precisión, para que tengan la compresión adecuada en los cañones y tal. Pero compara el nivel de complejidad con un coche, sus decenas de centralitas, cableado, partes mecánicas, software, radares, tejidos, suspensiones, motor... es otro nivel y sin embargo fabricamos 11 millones al año.

Pero es lo que dices, la industria privada armamentística está adocenada y no tiene surplus de capacidad (hoyga noooo que le pierdo!), algo que los rusos si tienen, con sus miles de fábricas soviéticas en ruinas con gente arrastrando los pies y malviviendo con 100€ al mes de salario. Es lo que puse ayer en el artículo de la muerte por mil cortes de la economía rusa. Ahora bien, porque tienen excedente de capacidad, pero van a tocar techo y a tomar por culo.

Vamos, no puedo estar más de acuerdo que la privatización ha sido el mayor robo de la historia y no solo en dinero, sino en capacidad. Suecia se está yendo a la mierda entre otras cosas por eso

@lowfour (post #264)

Solo tienes que mirar la anglosfera y el triunfo de la privatización que para formar médicos los estudiantes tienen que endeudarse de por vida, porque las matrículas son de 30k-60k al año

Y aquí empezamos a copiar ese modelo con carreras técnicas superiores que te cuestan del orden de 10-15k si vas a máster y la humillación del doctorado, y si vas a lo privado el doble o más

Pero claro, ya no se trata de sacarte el título, sino de hacer networking, de hacer contactos para los trapicheos con los que serán políticos de tu promoción y tal

Y mientras se llenan las muñecas de pulseritas rojigualdas, pasa eso que describes, y añade lo del cayetanismo extractivo parasitario que nos empobrece a todos para que 4 tengan su cayenne o el coche hortera de moda

Yo no sé cómo se puede dar la vuelta a esto, porque la sociedad anda convencida de que lo público es comunismo y eso es el mal o algo así. Acordaos la inquina que tienen los ciberputis a los funcionarios. Que claro, todo cuadra si se trata de hundir a un país, le dejas sin músculo funcionarial y la gente se arruina en seguros privados y tal

Es como lo del brexit, nos han vendido que nos hará más ricos que el vecino y los mezquinos codiciosos que aspiran a ser rentistas o criptobros y vivir de las rentas, se lo han comprado, y ahora no van a reconocer que se equivocaron porque son como cinta, han construido su mundo a base de disonancia cognitiva y no tienen remedio

@lowfour (post #264)

No me he explicado bien, es como tener a un tío dentro de una gigapress de tesla rellena de explosivo líquido (que es como una crema de calabaza en cuanto a consistencia y color y tiene un olor muy ....característico) rellenando cuerpos metálicos vacíos de una tolva que le suministra el líquido. Si señores, son empresas privadas que siguen haciendo así las cosas, no hay otra forma de hacerlo, y hay unos riesgos grotescos..... No es lo mismo que producir en cadena coches, o hacer chorizos.... de acuerdo que esas fábricas son la leche, pero es que la producción está actualizada porque se compran coches (o se compraban hasta hace nada)..... las fábricas de obuses no se han actualizado, porque para lo que había que vender se podía seguir con el sistema de hace 35 años cambiando sensores, pero sin actualizar ni invertir en nuevas plantas de producción..... es el mercado amigos!!!!!

Otra cosa es la electrónica, radares, etc. Eso si que está actualizado, pero porque las empresas no necesitan tanta infraestructura para modernizar la producción.

Cuánto lleva Europa sin hacer una inversión estratégica (hablo de miles de millones) en producción de armamento?? Eso no queda bien en un mundo pacífico verdad? resta votos, no es políticamente correcto..... hasta que te ves en el momento de necesitarlo.......

https://www.europapress.es/videos/video-eeuu-afirma-otan-vera-arrastrada-guerra-rusia-si-ucrania-cae-20240301095925.html

Otro video muy interesante de Vlad Vexler que desentraña el double speak de Putin en su alocución

1) 70% del discurso fue business as usual, managerial speak, hablando de la economía y cosas terrenales y prometiendo el oro y el moro a distintos grupos

2) 30% del discurso fue "La Guerra es Todo".

3) En una frase dice "El Oeste es ridículo diciendo que queremos atacar a la OTAN" y en la siguiente dijo "las consecuencias de cualquier agresión será que les vamos a mandar las bombas nucleares". Armas nucleares en el epicentro de su diplomacia (coño, como el gordo fanegas de Korea).

4) Vlad acojonado porque Putin realmente cree que esta guerra fue una guerra defensiva. Que se está defendiendo. Ha perdido el contacto con la realidad.

Punto 1 y 2 reafirman lo que Vlad siempre dice. La política Surkoviana oscila entre politizar y despolitizar a la población.

Vlad concluye que la política rusa va a dar un giro al oscurantismo total y que a partir de las elecciones la realidad de "La Guerra Es Todo" va a pasar al primer plano.

Vamos que viene un guano muy serio.

@lowfour (post #268)

a ver, si macron dice lo que dice, la von der leyen y tal, en general todos apuntando a lo mismo (y aquí no decimos nada, porque estamos mirándonos el puto ombligo con los lazis y ahora los soplapollas del caso "koldo" que no ven ni por donde meter la cuña para dinamitar al gobierno (que por otro lado cada día es más frágil, no descartemos elecciones a final de año, que es cuando legalmente se podrían convocar, no antes), es porque agua lleva...

y nos enteramos de la misa la mitad, aunque mejor media misa que ninguna misa, pero fijo que andan los submarinos ruskis dando el coñazo con sus nukes y esas cosas que comentábamos el año pasado sobre cortar cables subnarinos, quitar sensores o balizas, etc etc

por no hablar de movimientos de tropas (no hacia ucrania, sino desde ucrania a... moldavia?? letonia??) o activación de "civiles" tipo cinta para airear mierdas y desestabilizar a saco (como hace belarra, pero a otro nivel, claro)

por ejemplo, esta tarde decían en la radio que han llegado a canarias 12k negros, el año pasado, mismas fechas, 2k

qué ha pasado? pues wagner apoyando sublevaciones y warlords en senegal, nigeria y demás africa occidental

lo cual genera exiliados que se montan en patera hasta canarias

y eso hace que los proxi-minions tipo abascal (orban no tanto, porque el flujo de negros le pilla más lejos, pero también) anden con el mazo dando porque "nos invaden"

de hecho, ayer mismo el trump dijo que "nos invaden" y que los inmis son el mayor problema y amenaza para los maga y tal

>

@elarquibis (post #265) y ahora no van a reconocer que se equivocaron porque son como cinta, han construido su mundo a base de disonancia cognitiva y no tienen remedio

No proyectes como una TLP sin medicar, aquí el que está metido en eso eres tú que eres incapaz de reconocer que te has equivocado ni una sola vez en nada, nunca jamás.

CIEN MIL @"elarquitecto"#3 , C-I-E-N M-I-L al año.