la ofensiva está atascada, ahora hilo para anticipar "contraofensivas".
@lowfour (post #1262)
supongo que esperan conseguir resultados distintos haciendo lo mismo por algún tipo de milagro, no??
Russia lost 521 tanks in October 2023 - a record number for the whole war. APC losses (843) were the highest since March 2022 and rank 3rd overall.
Russia also lost its 300,000 soldier two days ago. On 19/20 October, russia lost 1380 soldiers within 24 hours - a new record.
Furthermore, there currently is a lull in the use of cruise missiles by the russians. They are probably saving them up for their winter campaign.
The diagrams are all created by me for this subreddit directly from the data provided in the daily updates of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Data sources:
En las gráficas se ve clarísimo. La táctica es recentarles camiones de combustible, antiaereos, artillería y equipamiento especial (guerra electrónica, radars y tal, imagino). Es un trabajo de laminado brutal.
>@lowfour (post #1266) Russia lost 521 tanks in October 2023
ostia, pero qué cojones??!!!
eso tiene que estar mal
son como 24 diarios, descansando findes...
que como poder, puede, materialmente (se zumbaron 21helicópteros con los atacms esos en una noche)
pero no sé, digo yo que al día 4 o al 9 o por ahí, algún ruski ataría cabos y diría, nens, açó va malament...
en fin, son sus costumbres y tal
el año pasado decían que estaban enviando la morralla para desgastar las defensas ukr, pero ahora?? es que no sé qué tanques les puede quedar ya a los ruskis en reserva (me refiero a modernos, no de hace 60 años)
@elarquitecto (post #1268)
Leí anoche que Rusia produce 20 tanques al mes, pero que muchos componentes occidentales ya les faltan (ópticas y yo que se). Pero luego leí que el ritmo de producir Leopard 2 es de ... atiende, DOS AL MES.
Joder. Pues vamos bien. Supongo que Europa puede producir más tanques si hiciese falta no?
Oryx reporta que Rusia se ha zumbado 23 tanques Leopard 2, un 20% de los recibidos.
**10 Leopard 2A4**: (1, destroyed) (2, destroyed) (3, destroyed) (4, destroyed) (5, destroyed) (6, destroyed) (1, damaged) (2, damaged) (3, damaged) (4, damaged)
**10 Leopard 2A6**: (1, destroyed) (2, destroyed) (3, destroyed) (1, damaged) (2, damaged) (3, damaged) (1, damaged and abandoned) (2, damaged and abandoned) (3, damaged and abandoned) (4, damaged and abandoned)
**3 Stridsvagn 12**2: (1, damaged and abandoned) (2, damaged and abandoned) (3, damaged and abandoned)
@lowfour (post #1269)
pues yo creo haber leído que rusia tenía capacidad para producir 100 al año, no cuadra con los 20 al mes
pero bueno, supongo que dependerá del modelo y las prestaciones que le quieras añadir, igual son 100 "full equip", pero 200 "serie basica" o algo así
y bueno, leopardos 2 al mes?? me parecen pocos también, yo supongo que podrían ponerse en 5 sin mucho estres en la cadena de producción...
de todos modos, de estas cifras hay que creerse la mitad, porque igual son cuestiones de esas "secretas" que no conviene airear mucho o algo así
>@lowfour (post #1269) Pero luego leí que el ritmo de producir Leopard 2 es de ... atiende, DOS AL MES.
>
>Joder. Pues vamos bien. Supongo que Europa puede producir más tanques si hiciese falta no?
He leído que Suiza ha bloqueado o restringido componentes para tanques que fabrican allí, no quieren que los usen contra Rusia ya que quieren seguir siendo los banqueros de los oligarcas rusos.
La industria europea sigue en plan mascarillas para el covid (que lo fabriquen en el tercer mundo y luego ya si eso se lo compramos con nuestros euros calentitos recién impresos), y especialmente la industria militar es un comedero de enchufados donde lo de menos es el trabajo real, viven de las rentas de la guerra fría. Como haya una guerra gorda va a volver a pasar lo del covid con las mascarillas, el "just in time" ("lo compro todo por aliexpress in me llega just in time) es el Fin de la Historia.
Pues parece que hay una campaña "pesimista" para apurar a los Yankees a que manden todo lo que tienen, porque la guerra se ha estancado y Rusia no va a parar.
Primero esta pieza:
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ramping-up-war-production/32658857.html
Satellite Images Suggest Russia Is Ramping Up Production Capacity For Its War Against Ukraine
An analysis of satellite images by Schemes, RFE/RL's Ukrainian investigative unit, suggests that Russia is actively building up its capacity for weapons production and developing new factories as its full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its 21st month with no sign of an end in sight.
From warplanes to combat helicopters to military drones and guided munitions, the facilities are a mix of state-run military factories, public-private partnerships, and civilian-operated dual-use enterprises that manufacture and repair equipment and ammunition for Moscow’s grinding war effort.
In reviewing satellite images provided by Planet Labs, Airbus, and Maxar Technologies, Schemes found several new structures, including hangars and manufacturing plants, that have rapidly expanded or been built from scratch since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In September, the Russian government announced its proposed budget for 2024 and -- for the first time in modern history -- the country is set to spend 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on its military, with defense spending exceeding social spending.
Mykhaylo Zhyrokhov, a Ukrainian military analyst who authored a book about artillery combat in the war that broke out between Kyiv and Moscow-backed forces in the Donbas in 2014, said the rapid development of such military facilities across the country indicates that the Kremlin has no intention of ending its war against Ukraine anytime soon.
"Russia is preparing to 'play the long game' in this war, and is not going to stop anything," Zhyrokhov told Schemes.
Kazan Aviation Plant
The first facility identified is an aviation plant run by the Russian state military company Rostec that is located near the civilian Borisoglebskoye Airfield in Kazan, some 830 kilometers from Moscow.
Schemes tracked the process of construction of this hangar on the plant's plot of land with the help of the satellite images. The images indicate that ground was first broken in 2018 but that construction moved slowly until Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Work then accelerated, and recent images show that the hangar is nearly complete.
The plant has a long history as a site for repairing civilian and military aircraft and manufacturing parts. The complex was also “one of the most important strategic facilities” in the Soviet era, Anatoliy Khrapchynskiy, an expert on Soviet and Russian aircraft, told Schemes. He said it served as a vital link in the production of military aircraft, particularly bombers, such as the Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-160, and all of their variations.
In June, the Russian state TV channel Rossia-1 aired a report on the plant, the new hangar, and its history when it was visited by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. The report said that the new hangar is 300 meters long and that the plant is used for the production of the Tu-214, a passenger aircraft.
According to Khrapchynskiy, the plant has always had the capacity to work on strategic aircraft, with many Soviet models still in use by the Russian Air Force. He said the satellite images point to new capabilities in repairing and modernizing older aircraft needed for use in Ukraine, such as the Tu-22M3 and Tu-160.
Irkutsk Aviation Plant
Another state-owned aircraft factory, this aviation plant located in Irkutsk, a city in Siberia roughly 5,000 kilometers from Moscow, appears to be increasing its capacity to produce parts for the Su-30 fighter jet.
The Su-30 is widely used by the Russian Air Force, and the plant in Irkutsk is known as a leading repair site in the country and has been active amid the war in Ukraine.
Satellite images indicate that two new buildings have been constructed recently along with a taxiway that leads to one of them, which resembles a hangar.
Khrapchynskiy, who reviewed the images, said that such facilities are typically used for small aircraft and that the buildings look like the type used "for routine maintenance and minor repairs" for smaller civilian aircraft and military ones like the Su-30.
Ural Civilian Aviation Plant
Although its name says that it deals with civilian aircraft, the facilities are also involved in repairing engines and gearboxes that can also be used in military helicopters such as the Mi-2, Mi-8, Mi-24, and Ka-52. All these helicopters are actively used by the Russian military in the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Production at the plant in the Urals city of Yekaterinburg appears to have been stepped up recently. In September, several local publications based in the area published articles about a shortage of staff at the plant, mentioning that increased production needs have left a personnel shortage.
Satellite images show that construction began on a new workshop structure on the premises in 2021. The building was completed this year following what appears to be faster-paced construction since the war began.
Dubna Machine-Building Plant And Kronstadt
Situated in the city of Dubna, north of Moscow, this plant is operated by Raduga, which is under the umbrella of the Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation, a Russian state-owned defense company specializing in missile production.
This company is responsible for making missiles like the Kh-22, Kh-55, and Kh-101 -- all of which Russia has used extensively, including in attacks that have hit energy infrastructure, residential buildings, and other civilian facilities.
Comparison of satellite images of the plant from 2021-23 shows that a large new building has been erected next to the plant, with construction appearing to begin in 2021 and completed this year. Two helipads are also situated nearby and the building shares an access road with the Dubna Machine-Building Plant.
According to public records, the new factory is privately owned by Kronstadt, a company that is involved in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The company specializes in producing military drones, including the Orion and Helios models that are used for reconnaissance and strikes.
Kronstadt was previously owned by AFK-Sistema, a large Russian conglomerate founded by Vladimir Yevtushenkov, a prominent tycoon. AFK-Sistema sold its stake in Kronstadt in May 2022, around the same time that Yevtushenkov gave up formal shareholder control of the conglomerate by transferring a 10 percent stake to his son after the United Kingdom imposed sanctions over Russia’s war in Ukraine.
According to the Russian register of legal entities, AFK-Systema still holds a 49.6 percent stake in KT-Unmanned Systems, a Kronstadt subsidiary that, according to the company's website, cooperates with the Russian Defense Ministry and the Federal Security Service.
In June 2022, months into the full-scale invasion, Aleksei Belykh, Kronstadt's deputy director, said that the company was recruiting staff to run the new facility in Dubna.
"The new plant for the production of [UAVs] will soon switch to three shifts in order to fulfill the orders received. In connection with this, the Kronstadt company continues to recruit personnel," the Russian military news site Top War reported.
The 'Italmas' Plant
In January, it was first reported that drone developer Zala Aero had purchased a shopping center in Izhevsk and converted it into a drone production plant for the Russian-made Italmas drone. In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a televised visit to the facility.
ala Aero is a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Group, the arms manufacturer that produces 95 percent of Russia's small arms. The Italmas drones are a new long-range attack UAV that are similar to the Iranian-made Shahed drones that were extensively used on Ukrainian cities last winter, but are lighter and cheaper to manufacture.
The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War has reported that documented Italmas drones are already in use against Ukrainian targets and said that their development is part of a broader Russian strategy to diversify and preserve its munitions as it continues to dig in for a long-running conflict with Ukraine.
Pero esta es la pieza más interesante. Una entrevista en Economist con el Comandante en Jefe de las fuerzas armadas Ukra donde dice que
Technology is the key as the war becomes “positional”
Os pongo el texto entero
Five months into its counter-offensive, Ukraine has managed to advance by just 17 kilometres. Russia fought for ten months around Bakhmut in the east “to take a town six by six kilometres”. Sharing his first comprehensive assessment of the campaign with The Economist in an interview this week, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, says the battlefield reminds him of the great conflict of a century ago. “Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he says. The general concludes that it would take a massive technological leap to break the deadlock. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
**The course of the counter-offensive has undermined Western hopes that Ukraine could use it to demonstrate that the war is unwinnable–and thus change Vladimir Putin’s calculations, forcing the Russian president to negotiate. It has also undercut General Zaluzhny’s assumption that he could stop Russia by bleeding its troops. “That was my mistake. Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war.” But not in Russia, where life is cheap and where Mr Putin’s reference points are in the first and second world wars in which Russia lost tens of millions.**
An army of Ukraine’s standard ought to have been able to move at a speed of 30km a day as it breached Russian defensive lines. “If you look at nato’s text books and at the maths which we did [in planning the counter-offensive], four months should have been enough time for us to have reached Crimea, to have fought in Crimea, to return from Crimea and to have gone back in and out again,” General Zaluzhny says sardonically. Instead he watched his troops and equipment get stuck in minefields on the approaches to Bakhmut in the east, his Western-supplied equipment getting pummelled by Russian artillery and drones. The same story unfolded on the offensive’s main thrust, in the south, where newly formed and inexperienced brigades, despite being equipped with modern Western kit, immediately ran into trouble.
**“First I thought there was something wrong with our commanders, so I changed some of them. Then I thought maybe our soldiers are not fit for purpose, so I moved soldiers in some brigades,” says General Zaluzhny. When those changes failed to make a difference, the commander told his staff to dig out a book he once saw as a student in a military academy in Ukraine. Its title was “Breaching Fortified Defence Lines”. It was published in 1941 by a Soviet major-general, P. S. Smirnov, who analysed the battles of the first world war. “And before I got even halfway through it, I realised that is exactly where we are because just like then, the level of our technological development today has put both us and our enemies in a stupor.”**
That thesis, he says, was borne out as he went to the front line in Avdiivka, also in the east, where Russia has recently advanced by a few hundred metres over several weeks by throwing in two of its armies. “On our monitor screens the day I was there we saw 140 Russian machines ablaze—destroyed within four hours of coming within firing range of our artillery.” Those fleeing were chased by “first-person-view” drones, remote-controlled and carrying explosive charges that their operators simply crash into the enemy. The same picture unfolds when Ukrainian troops try to advance. General Zaluzhny describes a battlefield in which modern sensors can identify any concentration of forces, and modern precision weapons can destroy it. **“The simple fact is that we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing. In order for us to break this deadlock we need something new, like the gunpowder which the Chinese invented and which we are still using to kill each other,”** he says.
**This time, however, the decisive factor will be not a single new invention, but by combining all the technical solutions that already exist,** he says. In an article written for The Economist by General Zaluzhny (see here), as well as in a full-length essay shared with the newspaper, he urges innovation in drones, electronic warfare, anti-artillery capabilities and de-mining equipment, including new robotic solutions. “We need to ride the power embedded in new technologies,” says the general.
Western allies have been overly cautious in supplying Ukraine with their latest technology and more powerful weapons. Joe Biden, America’s president, set objectives at the start of Russia’s invasion: to ensure that Ukraine was not defeated and that America was not dragged into confrontation with Russia. This means that arms supplied by the West have been sufficient in sustaining Ukraine in the war, but not enough to allow it to win. General Zaluzhny is not complaining: “They are not obliged to give us anything, and we are grateful for what we have got, but I am simply stating the facts.”
**But by holding back the supply of long-range missile systems and tanks, the West allowed Russia to regroup and build up its defences in the aftermath of a sudden breakthrough in Kharkiv region in the north and in Kherson in the south late in 2022. “These systems were most relevant to us last year, but they only arrived this year,” he says. Similarly, f-16 jets, due next year, are now less helpful, suggests the general, in part because Russia has improved its air defences: an experimental version of the s-400 missile system can reach beyond the city of Dnipro, he warns.**
Yet the delay in arms deliveries, though frustrating, is not the main cause of Ukraine’s predicament, according to General Zaluzhny. “It is important to understand that this war cannot be won with the weapons of the past generation and outdated methods,” he insists. “They will inevitably lead to delay and, as a consequence, defeat.” It is, instead, technology that will be decisive, he argues. The general is enthused by recent conversations with Eric Schmidt, the former chief executive of Google, and stressed the decisive role of drones, and of electronic warfare which can prevent them from flying.
General Zaluzhny’s assessment is sobering: there is no sign that a revolutionary technological breakthrough, whether in drones or in electronic warfare, is around the corner. And technology has its limits. Even in the first world war, the arrival of tanks, in 1917, was not sufficient to break the deadlock on the battlefield: it took a suite of technologies, and more than a decade of tactical innovation, to produce the German blitzkrieg in May 1940. The implication is that Ukraine is stuck in a long war—one in which he acknowledges Russia has the advantage. Nevertheless, he insists that Ukraine has no choice but to keep the initiative by remaining on the offensive, even if it only moves by a few metres a day.
Crimea, he believes, remains Mr Putin’s greatest vulnerability. It is the linchpin of his imperial restoration project, and his legitimacy rests on having brought it back to Russia. Over the past few months, Ukraine has taken the war into the peninsula Mr Putin annexed in 2014 and which remains critical to the logistics of his war. “It must know that it is part of Ukraine and that this war is happening there.” On October 30th Ukraine struck Crimea with American-supplied long-range atacms missiles for the first time.
General Zaluzhny is desperately trying to prevent the war from settling into the trenches. “The biggest risk of an attritional trench war is that it can drag on for years and wear down the Ukrainian state,” he says. In the first world war, mutinies interfered before technology could make a difference. Four empires collapsed and a revolution broke out in Russia.
A collapse in Ukrainian morale and Western support is precisely what Mr Putin is counting on. There is no question in General Zaluzhny’s mind that a long war favours Russia, a country with a population three times and an economy ten times the size of Ukraine’s. “Let’s be honest, it’s a feudal state where the cheapest resource is human life. And for us…the most expensive thing we have is our people,” he says. For now, General Zaluzhny says, he has enough soldiers. But the longer the war goes on, the harder it will be to sustain. “We need to look for this solution, we need to find this gunpowder, quickly master it and use it for a speedy victory. Because sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight.”
Yo creo que en esa línea está la clave
>This time, however, the decisive factor will be not a single new invention, but by combining all the technical solutions that already exist
Integración, que es lo que los F16 van a permitir, y lo que los Ukros han trabajado de forma cada vez más sobresaliente. Coordinación entre diferentes piezas.
Al parecer la llegada de los F16 y los Abrams van a activar la posibilidad de usar todo el arsenal OTAN, tanto por comunicaciones como por posibilidad de ser lanzado desde aviones sin adaptaciones en plan ñapa. Por aquí va la cosa.
Creo que estos comentarios intentan poner en la mente de los yankees y europeos la posibilidad real de que o nos espabilamos o Ucrania puede perder, y qué significa eso a corto, medio y largo plazo. Si siguen con la dialéctica triunfalista pues es probable que dejen de mandar más cosas.
En otras noticias esta semana está lo de los tipos en Rusia al 15%. Eso NO puede ser bueno.
@lowfour (post #1275)
Es que no debemos bajar la guardia, tenemos que poner todo en el asador. Nuestro colchón es Ucrania, lo mismo que pese lo que nos pese es Marruecos por otro lado.
O dejamos una Ucrania fuerte (y viva) frente a Rusia, o en una decenas de años los rusos ya llaman a la UE.
@lowfour (post #1275)
es que lo de integrar sistemas es un "básico"
no es lo mismo tener una cadena logística para reparar 2-3 modelos de tanques, que tenerla para 10 o 15 modelos (y totalmente diferentes, no es que la tuerca de uno le sirva a otro o algo así)
lo mismo pasa con las municiones, si tienes 20 modelos de ametralladoras, con 20 calibres diferentes (bueno, ya serán 3 o 4, que tampoco estamos para ir "innovando" a cada modelo) pues ya me dirás el lío como te llegue munición de 0,48mm y no de 0,49mm (o algo así... yo es que de calibres poco, pero supongo que 1mm te jode poder disparar o no)
@elarquitecto (post #1278)
Las municiones OTAN y las del Pacto de Varsovia, no tienen NADA que ver entre sí.
Yo creo que se hicieron así ex professo, para que no fuesen intercambiables en caso de conflicto.
AHora los Ucranianos tienen un maravilloso percal logístico, para efectivamente alimentar ametralladoras, fusiles, tanques y artillería (y en breve aviación).
Yo creoq ue debn tener dos líneas de abastecimiento paralellas, una con material OTAN y otro con material Pacto de Varsovia.
Con el tiempo loq ue he visto es que Ucrania está fomentando su paso a estándar OTAN, y están empezando a producir localmente armamento ligero OTAN (cuando ya tenían sus líneas de fabricación de armamento y munición ligeros del Pacto de Varsovia, en plan AKs y demás).
@Jag (post #1279)
es que no es solo munición, es también repuestos para los blindados y mantenimiento
porque tu mecánico controla de t-90 o t-72 y tal, pero de leopards? de abrams?? de challengers? de... a cada tanque distinto que metes, vas con el servicio técnico detrás? o cómo haces?
lo mismo con los aviones
ya no es solo que los pilotos tengan que "reciclarse" a otras cabinas y tal, el personal de tierra también (y eso no es un cursito de 40h... o sí, no sé, lo mismo no tiene tanto misterio)
y no solo a nivel "hardware", es que tienes otros tantos "software" que manejar (y vamos a suponer que todos controlan inglés y no hay problema con eso)
oye dimitri, que se me enciende este chivato... pues dale un golpe a ver si se apaga... ah, no espera, es que está en reserva el tanque, vamos a parar en una tanquelinera...
>@Jag (post #1279) Las municiones OTAN y las del Pacto de Varsovia, no tienen NADA que ver entre sí.
>
>Yo creo que se hicieron así ex professo, para que no fuesen intercambiables en caso de conflicto.
Las municiones no suelen tener nada que ver unas con otras, incluso dentro de un mismo fabricante, como para que fueran compatibles entre los dos bloques de la guerra fría. De hecho la obsesión con la universalidad de todo es actual, resultado de la globalización mercantil.
Lo mismo con los suministros de los vehículos militares, cada uno era totalmente diferente hasta la era del Powerpoint en la que queda muy bonito el .ppt en el que todo se fabrica a base de 4 bloques como si la vida real fuera como Lego.
han cazado a otro chisme de esos para joder gps y tal, estos ruskis... yo no sé si no sería mejor que se rindieran antes de que queden completamente "medievalizados"
es que no les dejan ni un camión sano
Rusia tiene otro submarino. Corveta de 2021. Boom
@lowfour (post #1283)
las defensas AA rusas son lo mejor del mercado, te hago descuento por ser tú... llévate 2 y te doy un sub... una corveta de regalo! hay que hacerle alguna ñapa, pero funciona... más o menos...
vuelven a estrategia bajmut, mandar mobiks para "desgastar" a las defensas ukr o algo así
hombre, tal y como les fue en bajmut, mala idea no es, sobre todo si puedes prescindir de 40k hombres o algo así
@elarquitecto (post #1287)
Si, oleadas humanas. Es que se la suda completamente todo a Putin.
Bradley repartiendo paz y amor
Boom. y parecía que lo de ser piloto de drones era un chollo
Please log in to reply to this discussion.
Log In