Algo pasa con la ofensiva rusa. Está atascada

lowfour
lowfour
Started 2022-04-20
4339 posts
elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-26
#3871

https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20230426/presuntos-espias-rusos-embajadas-paises-nordicos/2441427.shtml

Según los servicios de Inteligencia y seguridad nórdicos, alrededor de un tercio del personal de las embajadas rusas en la región son oficiales de Inteligencia del presidente de Rusia, Vladímir Putin. De los 38 agentes identificados, 21 abandonaron los países en donde estaban destinados en 2022 y 17 continúan activos en los países nórdicos

elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-26
#3872

bueno, éso que sepamos en los "nórdicos", pero ni cotiza que en centrouropa estaba también trufao de "espías" que te invitaban a una fiestecita y tal, y al día siguiente ay! olaf!! que te han sacao fotos con pilinguis y muy jovencitas, eh??

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-26
#3873

Brutal el cabreo que tiene este ruso por estar un mes en un agujero como una cucaracha siendo bombardeado constantemente.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/12zlvvf/russiansoldierscomplainingabouttheircommand/

Me da a mi que esos no aguantan mucha contraofensiva eh? Vamos a ver desmoronamientos como hace unos meses?

elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-26
#3874

@lowfour (post #3873)

yo muchas dudas no tengo, si aguantan los ruskis es porque los ucranianos no aprietan más (porloquesea), pero no porque los ruskis estén muy por aguantar

de todos modos, lo que nos debería preocupar es qué pasa si expulsan a todos los rusos, hasta de crimea... se acaba la guerra o qué??

porque si rusia dice que esas regiones son suyas (que firmó papelitos y nosequé), lo mismo sigue en plan "intifada" o algo así, como los palestinos con israel... no es una guerra abierta, pero no es un final

yo supongo que los planes de petar moscú es un poco por esto también

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-26
#3875
Edited 2023-04-26

Están los rusos insistiendo en que Putin "No tiene dobles ni está en un bunker". LOL. Excusatio non petita....

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/12zj5sf/prigozhinwagneronthecurrentperceptionofthe/

Warlords.... van por este camino.

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elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-26
#3876

te tienes que fiar de las fechas, pero suponiendo que sea cierto...

https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1651167988089847809

los ruskis han vaciado literalmente sus arsenales (o lo que fuera eso)

elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-26
#3877

Image

el lula es pro-putin!!!

venganomejodas

bolsonaro un trumpista y lula otro (populista deloshuevos)

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-26
#3878
Edited 2023-04-26

Otra grabación muy interesante de oligarcas cagándose en los muertos de Putin y prediciendo el Mad Max Ruso inevitable. Son perfectamente conscientes.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/12ziqzb/thisisgoingtoendinhellrussianoligarchs/

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/16294

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-26
#3879

Cariño Putin lo arreglará. El estado del ejército ruso es lamentable.

elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-27
#3880

@lowfour (post #3879)

hay un momento en que se plantea si está en el lado "equivocado" porque los ucranianos serán nazis, pero los suyos...

por cierto, la media de bajas vuelve a subir

Image

se están pegando otra vez duro

la media semanal ya supera los 4500 volatilizados del frente

Image

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-27
#3881

@elarquitecto (post #3880)

La razón puede estar aquí. Los rusos ya casi tienen todo Bakhmut salvo unas zonas residenciales donde vive gente todavía. Y han empezado a bombardear con cazas, y lo mismo los ukros. Los Ukros necesitan mantener bakhmut 2 semanas más (supongo que para la contraofensiva) y no parece que vayan a poder. O si. Osea que se están jugando todo.

Varios videos brutales de tomas de trincheras por uno y otro lado. Un video ukro era brutal... se cepillan lo menos a 30-40 wagneritas en una trinchera. Una escabechina. Que nos pongan los vídeos en primera persona y en HD cambia todo para la historia, para todo.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/13082nc/26aprlastchapterdecisivebattleforthesky/

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-27
#3882

Los rusos se atrincheran encima del reactor de Zaporizha o como se escriba. Pero los de UK intel dicen.. "es un riesgo. O no. Bueno, no pasa nada porque está reforzado, pero tampoco estamos muy seguros. O a lo mejor si."

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/130dmyn/ukmodrussiandefensivepositionsconstructed/

elarquitecto
elarquitecto
2023-04-27
#3883

@lowfour (post #3881)

lo de conservar o no bajmut es casi lo de menos, ya lo hicieron en severodonets, que no se piraron hasta que dejó de salirles las cuentas o algo así

es que me da que si los ucranianos quisieran, se follaban a los rusos de bajmut, porque lo están manteniendo con 2 brigadas o algo así

aunque deben de estar gastando bastante munición y equipo, pero vamos, que han borrado a los wagner del mapa, tenían como 20k soldados y ahora no llegan a 7k o algo así eran las cuentas

lowfour
lowfour
2023-04-27
#3884

Bueno, lo que ya dijimos. Reemplazo étnico ruso.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2023

Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on April 26 that Russia is trying to change the ethnic composition of Ukraine by actively conducting a large-scale resettlement of people mainly from poorer and remote regions of Russia into Ukraine.[1] Malyar noted that the most intensive efforts are ongoing in occupied Luhansk Oblast and remarked that Russia is also deporting Ukrainians and forcibly resettling them in Russia.[2] ISW previously reported on specific instances of Russian authorities overseeing the depopulation and repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine, particularly in occupied Kherson Oblast over the course of 2022. Ukrainian sources remarked in October 2022 that Russian authorities in then-occupied parts of Kherson Oblast deported large groups of Ukrainian residents to Russia under the guise of humanitarian evacuations and then repopulated their homes with Russian soldiers.[3] Russia may hope to import Russians to fill depopulated areas of Ukraine in order to further integrate occupied areas into Russian socially, administratively, politically, and economically, thereby complicating conditions for the reintegration of these territories into Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that such depopulation and repopulation campaigns may amount to a deliberate ethnic cleansing effort and apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]

Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut. A video appeal addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin by personnel of the “Potok” PMC (reportedly one of three volunteer detachments from Russian-state owned energy company Gazprom) claims that Gazprom officials told members of “Potok” that they would be signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but then forced personnel to sign contracts with PMC “Redut.”[5] One Potok soldier claimed that Gazprom created two other units — “Fakel” and “Plamya,” which were attached to the Russian MoD.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that ”Potok“ is not a PMC, but a BARS (Combat Reserve) unit, however.[7] The ”Potok” personnel also reported poor treatment by Wagner fighters who threatened to shoot ”Potok” personnel if they withdrew from the line of contact. A Wagner fighter claimed in an interview published on April 26 that ”Potok” fighters abandoned Wagner’s flanks at night.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that “Potok” fighters abandoned their positions in Bakhmut due to a lack of ammunition.[9] ISW previously assessed that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin likely views the proliferation of PMCs around Bakhmut as competition, and it appears that the increased prevalence of other PMCs around Bakhmut may be causing substantial friction.[10]

The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression. The Russian Federation Council approved three bills on April 26 which would allow for the deprivation of Russian citizenship for discrediting the Russian Armed Forces and for actions that threaten national security, allow for life sentences for high treason, and allow for five-year sentences for those who promote the decisions of international organizations in which Russia does not participate.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has supported laws strengthening punishments for trespassing at facilities run by certain federal bodies, misappropriation of Russian military assets, and discreditation of all Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine to expand pretexts for the arrests of Russian citizens and the removal of officials who have fallen out of favor.[12] The Kremlin is likely setting numerous conditions for domestic crackdowns to give Russian officials carte blanche in prosecuting anyone perceived to be against Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s war in Ukraine. The harsh punishments stipulated by these laws likely aim to promote widespread self-censorship amongst the Russian population. ISW has also assessed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs, and Russian authorities may use these new laws to support these efforts.[13]

Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remarked on April 26 that as soon as weather conditions improve in Bakhmut, Ukraine will launch a counteroffensive, which may coincide with Russia’s May 9 Victory Day holiday (the commemoration of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945).[14] A prominent Russian milblogger insinuated that Ukraine may be planning counteroffensive actions in order to ruin May 9 celebrations in Russia.[15] The invocations of May 9 suggest that the Russian information space continues to place symbolic importance on dates associated with Russia’s Great Patriotic War, which continues to shape discourse on the prospects of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during a press conference in New York on April 25 that discussions about the potential for negotiations after a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive are ”schizophrenic.”[16] Increasingly despondent and panicked rhetoric emanating from prominent information space figures suggests that the Russian information space has not yet settled on a line about how to address significant and growing concerns about the near future.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Xi’s statement made China’s position on Ukrainian independence clear, rejecting Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye’s April 22 statements that post-Soviet states lack a basis for sovereignty.[17] Both Ukrainian and Chinese government readouts of the call mentioned a possible role China could play in negotiating nuclear issues.[18] Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova expressed broad agreement with China’s peace plan and blamed Ukraine for rejecting it.[19] The tepid Russian response to Zelensky and Xi’s call is likely further evidence of Russia’s displeasure at China's unwillingness to establish a no-limits bilateral partnership. It is not clear that Chinese actions match Chinese rhetoric, however. According to US government statements and investigative journalism reports, China may be providing non-lethal military assistance to Russia.[20]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on April 26 in which they reportedly discussed the development of the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh.[21] The brief Kremlin readout for the conversation called for strict compliance with the agreements made by Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani leaders considering the increasing tensions in the Lachin corridor.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 26 that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lentsov is the new commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh and will oversee operations at the 30 observation posts that Russian forces operate in the area.[23] The Russian MoD likely announced the appointment to signal to Armenia a commitment to meet Russia's peacekeeping responsibilities and to augment Putin’s effort to reassure Pashinyan.

The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s redeployment of elements of its peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine is likely eroding Russia’s influence with Armenia.[24] Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeeping forces of not meeting their obligations in December 2022 and stated on March 16, 2023, that Armenia should appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) if Russia is unable to uphold the November 9, 2020, ceasefire agreement.[25] The Kremlin's efforts are likely failing to convince Armenia that it will uphold its obligations under the ceasefire agreement, and Russia’s potential inability to do so may severely degrade Russia’s standing with other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. The Russian State Duma approved on April 4 the first draft of a bill that would allow all Russian personnel, including conscripts, to participate in Russian peacekeeping operations, likely in an effort to send conscripts to sustain the peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.[26] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on April 24 that the Kremlin made a decision to replace the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh with a contingent of conscripts, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian conscripts serving in Nagorno-Karabakh.[27]

Key Takeaways

  • - Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians.

  • - Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut.

  • - The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression.

  • - Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions.

  • - Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, stating that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

  • - The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states.

  • - Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.

  • - Russian forces made gains within Bakhmut and north of Avdiivka.

  • - Russian milbloggers continue to argue amongst themselves about Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.

  • - Russian authorities have started sending military registration summonses that include threats of “restrictive measures.”

  • - Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented an attempted attack in Crimea.
  • elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-27
    #3886

    @lowfour (post #3885) lo vi esta mañana y bueh, anda que se lo han zumbao finamente, eh?

    entre lo que has puesto antes de la limpieza étnica y esto, se está quedando un tufillo de ex-yugoslavia...

    ya verás como empiecen los de las iglesias ortodoxas a decir que ellos son más mejor que los otros (que también son ortodoxos pero de otra "nación")

    elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-27
    #3887
    Edited 2023-04-27

    che, fijaos el movidón que es lo de los himars

    Image

    de somosierra a madrid-puerta-del-sol hay 80km (bueno, 81 ma o meno) que es el rango himars "máximo" (por ahí dicen que pueden llegar a 100km y alguno más si el cohete tiene combustible o algo así)

    o sea, estás en pedraza o en segovia, y cascas arsenales en madrid, cómo te quedas?

    desde toledo vas sobrao

    ahora vamos a valencia, pues desde castellón lo petas (o viceversa)

    por el sur, pues desde denia llegas

    Image

    pam! lanzas, recoges en 4-5min y para cuando el ruski te ha detectado estás lejos del sitio de lanzamiento

    lowfour
    lowfour
    2023-04-28
    #3889
    Edited 2023-04-28

    Limpieza étnica sin rubor alguno. Por eso se llevan tan bien los serbios y los rusos. Tienen los mismos hobbies.

    https://reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/131f83c/putinsignsintolawdecisiontodeport/

    lowfour
    lowfour
    2023-04-29
    #3891

    Tenemos cazas volando por encima de Estocolmo ayer y ahora mismo.

    elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-29
    #3892

    @lowfour (post #3891)

    estarán de maniobras, o qué?

    os han avisado de que lo mismo pintan bastos??

    elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-29
    #3893

    https://twitter.com/GalileoArms/status/1652206679734333442

    petardazo en sebastopol, unos depósitos de combustible

    es por lo de los misiles ruskis de ayer que mataron a 20 civiles

    lowfour
    lowfour
    2023-04-29
    #3894

    @elarquitecto (post #3892)

    Ayer eran cazas de entrenamiento (no eran gripen) pero hoy no los he visto, pero han estado dando vueltas un rato. Es extraño a no ser que haya un desfile o algo.

    lowfour
    lowfour
    2023-04-29
    #3895

    @elarquitecto (post #3892)

    Ayer eran cazas de entrenamiento (no eran gripen) pero hoy no los he visto, pero han estado dando vueltas un rato. Es extraño a no ser que haya un desfile o algo.

    lowfour
    lowfour
    2023-04-29
    #3896

    Han empezado a llover drones en Mikolaiv o como se llame.

    elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-29
    #3897
    Edited 2023-04-29

    @lowfour (post #3896)

    Image

    el pie de foto tendría que ser algo así: que no ha sido un cigarro, eh?? que me tenéis harto con la bromita...

    o también; oye dimitri, dile a mi mujer que no me espere a cenar que tenemos lío aquí... no lo sabes tú bien...

    elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-29
    #3898

    Image

    ahí pone, le hemos mandao un par de himars y les hemos reventado unos bidones... (bueno, en inventao, pero me parece que pone sebastopol... o cebactononl, qué manía tienen con cambiar las letras, eh? es como si tuvieran el teclao mal puesto)

    lowfour
    lowfour
    2023-04-29
    #3899

    @elarquitecto (post #3898)

    Pero han sido drones no? Los Himars no llegan tan lejos. Pues no se, podría ser que la contraofensiva empiece pronto.

    elarquitecto
    elarquitecto
    2023-04-29
    #3900

    @lowfour (post #3899)

    que he traducido "inventao", sí que han sido drones (o eso dicen)

    pero tú cómo lees lo de YMAHb ?! (lo de 3A será que han tirado 3 o algo así)

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