Source; Chatgepeto
Urgente: Guerra abierta Israel Palestina
lowfour
Started 2023-10-07
1567 posts
Showing 19 posts (posts 1561-1580) of 1567 total
@lowfour wrote in post #1561:
Source; Chatgepeto
esto es clave
genocidio es lo que figura en el tribunal penal internacional, limpieza étnica NO
pero es que el foco es "grupo" vs "territorio"
israel claramente se centra en "territorio", solo que en el proceso se cisca en el "grupo"
además, como no da alternativas al "grupo", el resultado no es que desaparece el grupo del territorio, sino que desaparece sin más... o al menos esa sería la consecuencia lógica
pero si tomas el artículo concreto del estatuto de roma (el del tribunal internacional), la cosa se pone en "genocidio" desde el momento en que destruyes barrios enteros y sometes al "grupo" a condiciones de existencia "letales" (sin casa y sin comida, o con escasa comida y escaso refugio, les niegas hospitales, les niegas tener hijos porque es penosísimo, etc, vamos, genocidio)
pues ya estaría, no?
me tiene un poco loco que los del tribunal internacional no hagan la acusación, igual ya les llega con haber lanzado la orden de detención internacional por crímenes de guerra y lesa humanidad y luego ya si eso amplían...
pero me da que todo esto ya va de dejarse de "campañitas" y palabras de programación neurolingüistica, porque entonces te conviertes de alguna manera en "trucho"
o sea, si "trucho" es forzar a la realidad a tu relato-spam (o sea, llamar genocidio a lo que no es, por "agenda política"), negar ahora que se está sometiendo a una población a condiciones de existencia "letales" solo por ser de un barrio es un poco éso, forzar un relato
me parece curioso que el debate sobre eurovisión haya acabado en si la suspensión ayer de la etapa final y que no hubiera podio y tal, ha sido una meada fuera del tiesto por parte de los "belarros" (no los han llamado belarros, que yo creo que es lo que más les jode, es como si ha sido una algarada "espontánea", me lol)
el pp a contracorriento por "truchismo"
se van a dar una ostia demoscópica que ni rita barbera
es que están aplanando la franja, nomejodas, es lo que comentábamos ayer, si limpieza étnica se "focaliza" en el territorio, y el genocidio en el grupo, aquí tendrías una limpieza étnica si no fuera porque el grupo no tiene dónde ir, no les estás echando de casa, les estás destruyendo las casas y les impides desplazarse a lugares seguros...
que ya es grave una limpieza étnica, pero esto ya no tiene otro nombre
estamos así porque los belarros (apoyados por hamas y sus redes de spam) lanzaron la campaña "genocidio" de forma "trucha"
ahora el truchismo es negarlo
@elarquitecto wrote in post #1563:
pues ya estaría, no?me tiene un poco loco que los del tribunal internacional no hagan la acusación, igual ya les llega con haber lanzado la orden de detención internacional por crímenes de guerra y l...
Lo estoy analizando precisamente ahora con ChatGEPETO.
Edited 12h ago
EL CONTENIDO
Absolutely—here’s a crisp, bullet-point summary of the UN Commission of Inquiry conference room paper A/HRC/60/CRP.3 (16 Sept 2025). I’ll keep it punchy and forward-looking:
Scope & method
Focus: Gaza only, from 7 Oct 2023 to 31 Jul 2025; addresses state responsibility under the Genocide Convention (not individual criminal liability). Standard of proof: “reasonable grounds to conclude.”
Headline conclusion
The Commission concludes Israel has committed—and continues to commit—four underlying acts of genocide in Gaza:
(i) killing; (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm; (iii) deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction; (iv) imposing measures intended to prevent births.
Mens rea (dolus specialis)
Genocidal intent is found through:
Direct evidence: statements by Israeli officials; and
Circumstantial evidence: a pattern of conduct during operations.
The Commission concludes genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference from the totality of evidence.
Incitement
Finds direct and public incitement to commit genocide by President Isaac Herzog, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and then–Defence Minister Yoav Gallant; notes other senior officials should also be assessed.
Illustrative evidence the Commission relies on
Deaths & demographic impact: 60,199 Palestinians killed (18,430 children; 9,735 women) through 31 Jul 2025; life expectancy reportedly fell from 75.5 to 40.5 in the first 12 months.
Killing pathways:
strikes on homes/healthcare where civilians were present;
targeting civilians during evacuation/“safe zones”/shelters;
deaths from deliberate deprivation (blocking medicine, aid).
Conclusion: actus reus & mens rea for killing established.
Serious bodily/mental harm: widespread injuries, torture/ill-treatment, repeated displacement, and systematic sexual and gender-based violence; conclusion: actus reus & mens rea for serious harm established.
Conditions of life: “Total siege” (from 9 Oct 2023) restricting food, water, fuel, electricity; massive destruction of homes, agriculture, cultural/religious/educational sites; impacts on women and children; conclusion: actus reus & mens rea for conditions of life established.
Education as a target/identity erasure: destruction of schools/universities both removes shelter for displaced people and undermines continuity and identity; counted under conditions-of-life analysis.
Prevention of births: cites the Al-Basma IVF clinic destruction (loss of ~5,000 reproductive specimens) as part of measures intended to prevent births; concludes actus reus & mens rea for this underlying act established.
State responsibility findings
Israel bears responsibility for: failing to prevent, committing, and failing to punish genocide in Gaza.
Responsibility attaches to state organs (including military units and officials); lack of genuine investigations noted.
Obligations of other States
All States (whether or not parties) have erga omnes obligations to prevent and punish genocide. ICJ provisional measures (Jan/Mar/May 2024) put States on notice of a serious risk, triggering the duty to prevent.
Key recommendations
To Israel:
Immediately end genocidal acts; permanent ceasefire; full compliance with ICJ orders; restore unhindered humanitarian access (UN-led); allow medical evacuations and emergency teams; allow Commission access; investigate and punish genocide/incitement.
To all Member States:
Use all reasonably available means to prevent genocide; cease arms/jet-fuel transfers that risk facilitating genocidal acts; investigate/prosecute aiding/assisting or incitement; cooperate with the ICC; consider sanctions and legal action.
To the ICC Prosecutor:
Examine genocide charges for amendment/addition to arrest-warrant applications in the Palestine situation.
Context & caveats
The report stresses Gaza events are situated within decades of occupation and repression and raises concern that genocidal intent may extend to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and periods before 7 Oct 2023 (outside this paper’s scope).
If you’d like, I can condense this further into a one-pager or pull out just the action-oriented recommendations for policymakers or advocates.
LOS AUTORES
Navi Pillay
Origin / Career Highlights
South African jurist, born in 1941 in Durban, South Africa, of Indian Tamil heritage. (Wikipedia)
Studied law at University of Natal (BA, LLB); later earned LLM and Doctor of Juridical Science from Harvard. (Wikipedia)
Became a lawyer during apartheid; she worked on defence of political prisoners, human rights issues, exposing torture, etc. (Wikipedia)
After apartheid fell, she served as a judge in South Africa’s High Court in 1995, the first non-white woman in that role. (Wikipedia)
International roles:
Controversies & Criticisms
She has been accused by various state actors and NGOs of a bias against Israel. Criticism focuses on her comments and reports noting alleged human rights violations, military operations, etc. (Wikipedia)
Specific episodes:
Criticism by the US, UK, Germany, Australia among others about the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry she chairs, especially its open-ended nature and perceived focus. (UN Watch)
Accusations that statements made by the Commission are one-sided or taken out of context. For instance, during Gaza conflicts, she has been vocal about civilian casualties, etc., which has sparked pushback. (Wikipedia)
Miloon Kothari
Origin / Career Highlights
From India; trained originally as an architect. (Geneva Academy)
Education includes Maharaja Sayajirao University (India), Pratt Institute, Columbia University in New York. (Geneva Academy)
Was the first UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing (2000-2008). (Wikipedia)
Founder and Executive Director of the Housing and Land Rights Network (India). (Graduate Institute)
Active in civil society work, research and training, especially on issues around evictions, displacement, urban planning & social policy, etc. (Geneva Academy)
Controversies & Criticisms
Some of his public statements have been criticised as controversial, especially in relation to Israel. For example, in a 2022 interview, Kothari questioned Israel’s right to membership in the UN and referred to “the Jewish lobby controlling social media.” These comments led to criticism by states including Israel, and calls for clarification. (Wikipedia)
These criticisms include allegations of antisemitism or bias. In some cases, his words have been defended as being taken out of context. (UN Watch)
Chris Sidoti
Origin / Career Highlights
From Australia. Long career as human rights lawyer, advocate, consultant. (Wikipedia)
Held domestic roles: Australian Law Reform Commissioner (1992-95), Australian Human Rights Commissioner (1995-2000). (Diplomacy Training Program)
Academic and civil society involvement: adjunct positions in several Australian universities; involved with national human rights institutions; international human rights mechanisms. (Wikipedia)
Co-led UN fact-finding mission on Myanmar (2017-2019) concerning alleged human rights violations. (Wikipedia)
Controversies & Criticisms
Less publicly controversial than Kothari, but criticisms exist, sometimes jointly with other commissioners, about possible partiality or associations:
He has been accused by critics of being affiliated with NGOs or organisations that are perceived as critical of Israel, or of supporting the BDS movement. (ngomonitor)
In one instance, Sidoti reportedly made the remark that “accusations of antisemitism are thrown around like rice at a wedding,” which some have seen as dismissive of the seriousness of antisemitism claims. (B’nai B’rith International)
Summary & Reflection
Each of the three has a long history in human rights law and international justice. Their expertise is broad: civil, political, economic/social/housing, displacement, etc.
Each has also been subject to criticism, especially around perceived bias against Israel or statements that some consider antisemitic or problematic.
Some of those criticisms come from governments, NGOs, media outlets; others arise from how their statements are interpreted or contextualised. In many cases the commissioners or the Commission leadership argue that remarks were mischaracterized or taken out of context.
Son especialistas en genocidios desde un punto de vista legal?
Yes — but with some differences in depth and focus between them:
Navi Pillay (South Africa) – Yes, a legal specialist. She is a trained jurist and judge with advanced law degrees (Harvard SJD), a long legal career, and direct experience in international criminal law (ICTR, ICC). She’s the only one of the three with a professional background squarely in criminal and international law, and she has adjudicated genocide cases.
Chris Sidoti (Australia) – Yes, but more policy-oriented. He’s a lawyer by training and has worked as a human rights commissioner and law reform commissioner. His expertise is more in human rights law, national institutions, and governance, rather than courtroom litigation or criminal law.
Miloon Kothari (India) – Not a lawyer. His background is in architecture, urban planning, and housing rights. His expertise is in economic, social, and cultural rights (housing, land, displacement), not in legal practice.
So, in terms of legal specialisation:
Pillay = high-level legal expert in international criminal and human rights law.
Sidoti = legal training, applied in human rights and policy frameworks.
Kothari = not a lawyer, but a social rights specialist.
👉 Would you like me to also explain why UN commissions of inquiry often mix lawyers and non-lawyers — and what that means for how their reports are framed?
AQUI VIENE LO GORDO: LAS FUENTES
Excellent point — the credibility of a Commission of Inquiry hinges a lot on where the numbers come from.
From the Gaza genocide report (A/HRC/60/CRP.3) and earlier reports of the Commission, here’s how the sourcing works:
Main Sources Used
UN agencies on the ground (especially OCHA, WHO, UNRWA, UNICEF). These are the primary compilers of casualty, displacement, and humanitarian-impact data.
Palestinian Ministry of Health (Gaza) – the Commission explicitly uses these figures for death tolls and injuries, often cross-checking with UN agencies. The MoH is Gaza-based and reports numbers daily.
Humanitarian NGOs and rights groups – both international (Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch) and local (Palestinian human rights organisations, legal aid groups).
Satellite imagery & forensic analysis – destruction of housing, agriculture, and infrastructure is often confirmed this way.
Eyewitness testimony – collected directly by the Commission, including displaced civilians, aid workers, and sometimes Israeli victims/sources.
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) – geolocated videos, photos, and social media content, which they cross-verify.
Independence of Sources
The Palestinian Ministry of Health has historically been the fastest source for casualty data, but it is based in Gaza, which is under Hamas’ de facto control. Israel and some governments argue this makes it unreliable or “Hamas-linked.”
The UN position (including WHO and OCHA) has been that MoH casualty figures in Gaza have historically proven to be broadly accurate when later cross-checked against independent investigations.
To reduce dependence on any one source, the Commission:
Cross-checks MoH numbers with UN agency data, satellite evidence, and NGOs.
Notes that the sheer scale of deaths is consistent with observable destruction and humanitarian conditions.
Example from this report
The report cites 60,199 Palestinians killed as of 31 July 2025. That figure comes directly from the Gaza Ministry of Health, but the Commission stresses it is verified by UN agencies and consistent with external monitoring.
For demographic impacts (like drop in life expectancy), they rely on WHO and UNDP modelling, not local authorities.
For specific incidents (bombing of homes, destruction of IVF clinic), they use witness testimony, NGO reports, and satellite imagery.
What UN / Reliable Sources Say
The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reports: at least 12,654 civilians killed, and 29,392 injured since 24 Feb 2022. UN Human Rights Ukraine
OHCHR / UN has also verified 13,883 civilians killed and 35,548 injured by 31 July 2025. Wikipedia+2UN Human Rights Ukraine+2
Key Caveats & Context
These numbers are confirmed / verified cases. The real total is very likely higher, because many areas are contested or under occupation, where gathering verification is extremely difficult. Wikipedia+1
The figures include civilians killed by explosive weapons, missiles, shelling, etc. They often do not (or cannot) reliably include deaths due to deprivation (lack of medical care, water, etc), or unreported missing persons. Wikipedia+1
La verdad es que es preocupante que las fuentes sean el propio ministerio Palestino, y quienes lo ratifican organizaciones de la ONU que ya vimos como iban y ONG's de todo pelo donde habrá cosas fiables y chiringuitos a saber como.
Esto es el informe a día de hoy, donde si que estamos viendo cosas que no veíamos a finales de 2023. Está claro que la retórnica y las acciones juden se han multiplicado.
Veremos donde acaba todo esto.
Análsis en profundidad de la fiabilidad de los datos.
Love the rigor—let’s pressure-test the Gaza casualty numbers and the credibility of the main data pipelines, including the UN actors people often worry about.
TL;DR (verdict)
Order of magnitude: Credible. WHO and major media analyses say Gaza MoH totals broadly reflect reality, and several independent studies suggest undercounting rather than inflation. (Reuters)
Breakdowns (women/children) & day-to-day precision: Less reliable. UN revised its women/children shares in May 2024 after switching methods; composition figures remain the noisiest. (ReliefWeb)
Combatant vs. civilian: Not resolved by MoH; treat any split claims cautiously.
UN “bias/Hamas ties” concerns: A real UNRWA neutrality controversy exists (a small number of alleged staff cases), but an independent review (the Colonna report) found UNRWA’s neutrality framework largely sound and recommended improvements. This issue is separate from WHO/OCHA’s casualty-verification pipeline. (United Nations)
Where the numbers come from (in practice)
Gaza Ministry of Health (MoH) – gathers hospital/clinic reporting and, when possible, compiles identified death lists (names/IDs). UN agencies ingest these as the fastest baseline. (OCHA OPT)
UN agencies (OCHA/WHO/UNICEF) – use MoH for totals, flag caveats, and cross-check with other information flows before publishing situation updates and “impact snapshots.” (OCHA OPT)
Independent checks – major outlets and researchers verify via surveys, capture-recapture methods, satellite imagery, morgue logs, obituaries, etc. Multiple peer-reviewed and preprint studies indicate higher totals than MoH. (The Lancet)
Evidence for trustworthiness
WHO on MoH reliability: WHO publicly said there is “nothing wrong” with Gaza MoH fatality figures and that updates were converging toward confirmed losses after questions from Israel. (Reuters)
Independent studies point upward:
Nature reported the first household-survey estimate of ~84,000 deaths by early Jan 2025, exceeding MoH at that time. (Nature)
A Lancet analysis of traumatic-injury mortality concluded the true toll exceeded contemporaneous MoH counts (e.g., Oct 2024 MoH ≈41,9k → likely >70k). (The Lancet)
Major media corroboration: The Washington Post has repeatedly used MoH as baseline while documenting likely undercounts (missing under-rubble, system collapse). (The Washington Post)
What this means: For policy and historical magnitude, MoH+UN figures are a defensible baseline. For granular shares (e.g., exact % children on a given day), expect revisions.
Conflicts, revisions, and known issues
UN revision of women/children (May 2024): OCHA revised the share of women/children (from ~69–70% to ~52%) after shifting from Government Media Office snapshots to MoH’s identified-deaths lists. This was a methodological change, not a rollback of total deaths, but it damaged trust and fuels claims of bias. (ReliefWeb)
Method gaps: OCHA/WHO note periods where North Gaza wasn’t fully covered, later retroactive additions were made—another source of perceived inconsistency. (OCHA OPT)
Skeptical analyses: Think-tanks like the Henry Jackson Society and Washington Institute argue the database has technical flaws and over-counts; useful to review, but their critiques haven’t overturned the independent upward estimates above. (Henry Jackson Society)
About alleged UN “pro-Palestinian bias” or “Hamas ties”
UNRWA staff allegations (Jan 2024 onward): A small number of staff were alleged to have taken part in 7 Oct; some were terminated or cases closed; donors paused funding; independent review (Colonna) later found no evidence of systemic infiltration, while recommending neutrality upgrades. UNRWA is operationally indispensable, said the review. (UNRWA)
Relevance to casualty data: UNRWA controversies do not equal compromised mortality accounting. WHO (health) and OCHA (coordination/data) lead the casualty pipelines and explicitly source/caveat MoH numbers. Their public stance has been that MoH totals track reality, even amid breakdowns. (Reuters)
How to use these numbers responsibly (practical guidance)
Use ranges for total deaths (MoH baseline + independent upward adjustments) when precision matters. Cite both. (Nature)
Avoid precise % breakdowns (e.g., daily women/children share) unless you reference the identified-deaths list for that date and note the revision risk. (ReliefWeb)
Do not assume civilian/combatant splits from MoH data; treat third-party claims skeptically unless the method is transparent.
Flag undercount channels (under-rubble bodies, indirect deaths from hunger/disease); these are poorly captured in real-time MoH tallies. Major outlets and studies note this repeatedly. (The Washington Post)
Quick source-by-source verdict
Gaza MoH totals: Generally sound for magnitude, not good for combatant status; subject to delays/gaps; can undercount. Cross-check with later lists/models. (OCHA OPT)
OCHA/WHO summaries: Trustworthy with caveats; they disclose sourcing/method shifts and have publicly defended the core totals. (Reuters)
Independent research (Nature-covered survey, Lancet analyses): Strengthens confidence the toll is at least MoH levels, likely higher. (Nature)
Critical think-tank reports (HJS/Washington Institute): Useful to audit assumptions and spot inconsistencies; do not negate the broader convergence around high mortality. (Henry Jackson Society)
UNRWA controversy: Real but bounded; neutrality systems need improvement, yet no systemic capture found; separate from WHO/OCHA casualty compilation. (United Nations)
If you want, I can build a one-page “decision brief” that lists each source, method, last revision date, and confidence grade—handy for citing in debates or reports.
Vamos, que la principal fuente de números es el ministerio de salud palestino.
Awesome—here’s a tight, one-page decision brief you can drop into any deck or memo. It focuses on who’s counting Gaza deaths, how, what went wrong/right, and a confidence grade you can defend.
Decision brief: Gaza fatality numbers — sources, methods, trust
1) Gaza Ministry of Health (MoH – Gaza)
What it is / method: Central health authority collating facility reports + family reports, at times publishing name-listed “identified” deaths (name/age/ID). Totals include civilians and combatants; no public split. (AP News)
Why it matters: It’s the fastest baseline most actors (UN, media) begin from. (OCHA OPT)
Known issues: System collapse, delays, no combatant/civilian split, occasional duplicates; political control context. Still, WHO publicly defended the core totals (“nothing wrong”). (Reuters)
Latest reference points: Ongoing totals (e.g., >60,000 by Jul 29, 2025), with analysts and UN noting likely undercount (bodies under rubble; indirect deaths). (The Washington Post)
Confidence grade: Medium (totals’ magnitude) / Low (daily composition; combatant status).
2) OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
Role: Publishes the “Reported Impact Snapshot.” Sources MoH/GMO/Israeli authorities with clear attributions and caveats. (OCHA OPT)
Key controversy: May 2024 revision of women/children share (≈69–70% → ≈52%) after switching method to MoH identified-deaths list. Total deaths unchanged. Communication was messy; methodologically defensible. (ReliefWeb)
Confidence grade: High on transparency & method notes; Medium on day-to-day age/sex breakdowns (dependent on MoH feeds).
3) WHO (UN health agency)
Role: Technical validation and context; triangulates health-system data.
Public stance: WHO said there’s “nothing wrong” with MoH totals and that identified lists were a step forward during the May 2024 flap. (Reuters)
Confidence grade: High for methodological caution and consistency.
4) UNRWA (UN relief agency) — not a primary casualty counter
Relevance to numbers: Delivers aid/registrations; not the core pipeline for mortality stats (that’s MoH → OCHA/WHO).
Neutrality controversy: Independent “Colonna” review (Apr 20–22, 2024) found UNRWA is indispensable, neutrality systems exist and need improvements; no evidence provided by Israel for broad “terror infiltration” claims, though separate internal UN probes reviewed specific staff cases. This does not directly taint WHO/OCHA casualty accounting. (Reuters)
Confidence grade (re: casualty data): Not applicable (not a source); neutrality issue separate from the count pipeline.
5) Gaza Government Media Office (GMO)
Role: Pushed earlier women/children proportions used in headlines; later de-emphasized by OCHA in favor of MoH identified lists. (OCHA OPT)
Confidence grade: Low for demographic breakdowns; don’t use as sole source.
6) Independent academic estimates (key cross-checks)
(a) The Lancet capture-recapture (peer-reviewed, 2025): ~64,000 traumatic-injury deaths to Jun 30, 2024 → ~41% MoH under-reporting at that time; implies undercount of direct violent deaths. (The Lancet)
Confidence: Medium-High (peer-reviewed; still limited by disrupted records).
(b) Gaza Mortality Survey (medRxiv preprint; covered by Nature): ~84,000 total deaths by early Jan 2025 (violent + indirect), via household survey; points to higher-than-MoH totals. (MedRxiv)
Confidence: Medium (robust design; preprint).
7) Media & OSINT audits (useful, not official)
Associated Press: Cleaned identified-deaths tables (removed duplicates), found declining share of women/children over time; demonstrates data hygiene and trend nuance. (AP News)
Washington Post: Forensic features on “uncounted dead” (under-rubble, unregistered) and repeated notes of likely undercount. (The Washington Post)
Confidence: Medium (transparent methods; not a statistical authority).
8) Critical/skeptical think-tanks (stress-testing, not neutral)
Washington Institute Policy Notes, others, highlight method flaws, over-count risks, inconsistencies, and GMO vs MoH discrepancies. Good for audits, but they haven’t overturned the independent upward estimates. (The Washington Institute)
Confidence: Variable; use to challenge assumptions, not as sole refs.
Bottom-line guidance you can defend
Use MoH totals as a baseline for magnitude; pair with WHO/OCHA for method notes and with independent studies to capture likely undercount (bodies under rubble, indirect deaths). (Reuters)
Be cautious with daily/weekly age–sex shares (largest revisions happened there). Cite identified-deaths snapshots if you must quote a % and date-stamp it. (ReliefWeb)
Do not cite UNRWA as the mortality source (neutrality debate ≠ casualty pipeline). Anchor to OCHA/WHO + MoH; mention the Colonna review to pre-empt bias claims. (Reuters)
When challenged: reference WHO’s public defense of MoH totals and the Lancet/medRxiv findings indicating undercount. (Reuters)
Want me to turn this into a briefing note for executives (single page, with citation footers) or a talk-track you can use in a panel?
Octubre 2023: NO GENOCIDIO
Septiembre 2025: Posible Genocidio de acuerdo a este report
es verdad que la onu compró el relato "genocidio" en el minuto 1
que está trufada de mierdas de hamas y de peña pro-barbudos o algo así
que son o fueron parte del engranaje "trucho" o spam pro-hamas
es más, no parece que israel discrimine y solo bombardee casas de gazaties y deje intactas las de "cristianos" o embajadas o incluso periodistas
pero yo leo lo del estatuto de roma
incluso sin meternos en "matanzas" (que si 30k o 80k, a partir de cuánto es genocidio?)
el c es clarísimo
y el d es indirecto
se busca destruir al grupo como tal (total o parcialmente) es un poco lo que habría que dirimir, no de cuántos muertos van ya...
pero hay declaraciones de sobra a día de hoy (quizá no tanto por parte del bibi, que será narigudo, pero tonto no tanto) sobre exterminar a los palestinos por parte de miembros del gobierno israelí
para mí, el problema no es tanto si genocidio sí o no, es que en 2023 fue "meme" para mover spam, y eso ya no lo puedes despegar fácilmente, gracias belarros!
podríamos olvidarnos de "genocidio" y decir limpieza étnica (como hace ahora el cabrón de trucho truchez, se ve que ha visto que "genocidio" está quemado, lo han quemado ellos mismos) o centrarnos en los crímenes de guerra y lesa humanidad (que sí persigue de facto el tribunal penal internacional), pero estamos a vueltas con "genocidio" por lo de la "memeización" trucha que se hizo
venganomejodas, aquí discutiendo que si genocidio o no como subnormales
esto es una puta vergüenza
si lo hubiéramos visto en mariupol, qué habríamos dicho?
es verdad que hay un matid (no menor) en que rusia ya ha dicho que ucrania no existe, todo rusia (y que secuestraron niños para criarlos como rusos...que es genocidcio de-ma-nu-al)
pero ostias!!! la ciudad hecha unos zorros, cientos de miles de desplazados, esa gente NO tiene dónde ir, qué harán en el desierto? comer arena?
cuando haga frío, se tapan con matojos??
que los acoja egipto?? jordania?
va a ser un clamor esto en "occidente" (no-trucho) contra la invasión (no lo llamemos genocidio, con limpiecita étnica ya nos llega... y crímenes de guerra y de lesa humanidad)
las imágenes vienen fuertecitas, estos harían mejor decir que "limpieza étnica" INTOLERABLE (si no quieren decir genocidio, me parece legítimo, pero discutir éso a estas alturas ya no me parece normal, es trucho)
se han puesto del lado "trucho", no sé si es lo que les conviene, y lo que es peor, no sé si es lo que NOS conviene (como país y como "eu" o algo así, necesitamos una opción para la peña "conservadora" no-trucha, nomejodas)
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