y ahora, una pausa para el entretenimiento (y aprendizaje)
We ought to be seeing an increasing number of night time "truck plinking" Bayraktar TB2 strike videos soon.
Algo pasa con la ofensiva rusa. Está atascada
lowfour
Started 2022-04-20
4339 posts
Edited 2022-07-20
esto no lo estoy entendiendo
mandan f-16 porque se están dando cuenta de que con himars y drones no necesitan f-35?? que son el doble de caros y hacen lo mismo?
Edited 2022-07-20
es temporada de petar depósitos de municiones
menudo mesecito llevan...
Ser puente es profesión de riesgo en Ucrania ahora mismo
Edited 2022-07-21
Al parecer UA tiene ahora mismo 12 HIMARS y les van a mandar 4 más hasta 16.
The U.S. is sending more rocket launchers that Ukraine says are key to fighting Russia.
As Russia’s foreign minister made clear that Moscow’s territorial ambitions extend beyond Ukraine’s eastern territories, the United States said on Wednesday that it would send four more advanced multiple-rocket launch vehicles to Ukraine.
The rocket launchers, which can unleash salvos that rival the devastating effect of an airstrike from a jet loaded with precision-guided bombs, are part of a raft of new longer-range weapons that the United States has been providing to the outgunned Ukrainian military. They underline Washington’s resolve to help counter Russian military might and President Vladimir V. Putin’s goal of subjugating Ukraine, a sovereign country.
But with Russia until recently making incremental but steady gains on the battlefield and with Ukraine’s Western allies struggling to keep up with Ukraine’s seemingly insatiable appetite for weapons, Ukraine faces an uphill struggle to gain battlefield parity. And there are disagreements between Ukrainian and American officials over what that would take.
Briefing reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said the four more advanced multiple-rocket launch vehicles would bring the total number provided by the United States to 16.
Video
0:54
Austin Says U.S. Will Send More Military Equipment to Ukraine
Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced that the U.S. military would send additional advanced rocket systems to help Ukraine defend itself.CreditCredit...Alex Brandon/Associated Press
Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, said in June that Ukraine needed 300 multiple-launch rocket systems and 500 tanks, among other things, to better compete with the forces Russia can field. That is several times more than what Ukraine has been promised.
Michael G. Vickers, the Pentagon’s former top civilian official for counterinsurgency strategy, said this month that the Ukrainians needed at least 60, and perhaps as many as 100, HIMARS or other multiple-launch rocket systems, to win the artillery battle.
Also looming over the weapons transfers is the question of how long American resolve will last amid high gasoline prices and increasing demands for national sacrifice in Europe and the United States. The Biden administration has also been hesitant to provide arms that could reach into Russian territory and, potentially, touch off a broader war.
The dozen M142 HIMARS — an acronym for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems — already provided from Pentagon stockpiles have already made a difference on the battlefield, Mr. Austin said. Ukrainian soldiers have used them to destroy Russian command-and-control centers and ammunition depots. Each M142 HIMARS truck carries six guided rockets loaded with 200 pounds of high explosives that can hit targets 50 miles away.
“That affects the tempo of the fight, and potentially creates some opportunities here,” Mr. Austin said. “There’s a lot more to be done — the HIMARS alone will not change, or win or lose a fight.”
Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksii Reznikov, said this week Ukraine’s military needed at least 100 of the American launchers for them to “become a game changer on the battlefield.” The HIMARS and other rocket launchers already shipped to Ukraine have helped destroy about 30 Russian command stations and ammunition storage units, he said.
“This has significantly slowed down the Russian advance and dramatically decreased the intensity of their artillery shelling,” Mr. Reznikov said in an online interview on Tuesday for the Atlantic Council, a Washington research group. “So it’s working.”
As debate continues in the West over what is needed to rein in Russian forces, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, said on Wednesday that Russia’s ambitions in Ukraine now stretched beyond the country’s eastern territories, a departure from the Kremlin’s earlier claims that it is not waging a war of imperial expansion.
As Ukraine has stepped up attacks on Russian forces in southern Ukraine in a possible prelude to a large-scale counteroffensive, Mr. Lavrov said that Moscow was also eyeing the Kherson and Zaporizka regions of Ukraine’s south, parts of which are occupied by the Russian forces, as well as “a number of other territories.”
Edited 2022-07-21
En el NYT
Russia Restarts Gas Flow, Easing Immediate Fears in Europe
Gazprom sent natural gas through Nord Stream 1 on Thursday after 10 days of planned maintenance. The reliance of Germany, and much of the rest of Europe, on Russian energy has come to haunt officials.
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/07/21/world/ukraine-war-russia/gazprom-germany-gas?smid=url-share
@elarquitecto (post #1233) en el ejército de los USA hay bastante competencia entre armas. La USAF está viendo que los HIMARS les están quitando presencia pública y posiblemente presupuesto en un futuro ya que enviar uno de estos cohetes cuesta una fracción que poner una bomba guiada en un F35.
Necesitan una operación de marketing buena donde salga el F16 o cualquier avión para volver a ganarse los corazones del público, del senado y justificar el coste de la aviación moderna.
@lowfour (post #1235)
lo cachondo es que podrán pasar coches, pero no tanques o armamento pesado (a no ser que reparen o refuercen)
no saben na los ucranianos, eh?
@Ungaunga (post #1238)
ostia!! pues ni tan mal para los ucranianos
me parto con los contratos de defensa, aviones gratis que hay que hacer publicidad!! 🤣
@lowfour (post #1237)
a ver, ha abierto el grifo al 30%
pero tiene pinta de que es más para joder que otra cosa
ahora te abro, ahora no, ahora te meto solo la puntita... (que así pillo pasta, que no viene mal)
y mientras nos damos tortas porque unos quieren medidas agresivas anti-putin y otros quieren lamerfalos putinescos
No solo quieren más HIMARS, sino que sean de esos de 300km.
@lowfour (post #1242)
según trent, el alcance es ampliado con drones a los 150km
not bad
mejor 300km, claro, pero ya a 150km los rusos no tienen capacidad de responder
y viendo como se zumbaron al moska, igual tampoco tienen una defensa antimisiles adecuada
mucho misilito hipersonico y tal, pero al final les petan los depósitos de municiones y los barcos y tal
aguantan por masa crítica, pero ya les empiezan a faltar tanques, munición y de todo
@lowfour (post #1244) si no fuera porque muere gente hasta daría risa
que putos locos 🤬
Edited 2022-07-22
As Russia openly announced its plan to seize more Ukrainian land on Wednesday, a Russian soldier was caught spilling to relatives back home that Vladimir Putin’s troops are “losing,” according to Ukrainian intelligence.
Audio shared by Ukraine’s Security Service is said to capture an intercepted phone call between a soldier based in the Kharkiv region and a female relative outside Moscow. It was not immediately clear when the conversation took place, but the unnamed man’s complaints appear to echo those heard repeatedly from Russian troops throughout nearly five months of the war.
“We’re losing now,” the purported soldier says, prompting an indignant response from his female relative, who replies, “Well it’s you guys who are losing there, but they are winning everywhere [else].”
“That’s the picture they paint for you on television, but in reality it’s drastically different here,” he says. “They will never show you this on television, they will never tell you the truth. We’re losing.”
Taken aback by the confession, the woman asks him to explain how Russian troops could be losing—and there seems to be no shortage of answers.
“We should have about 90 tanks left, and you know how many we have left? We have probably 14 tanks left,” the man says.
“You don’t have artillery?”
“We do, but it’s so curved you can measure the [target] misses in kilometers,” he says, adding that “Everything’s sad.”
Even as his admission surfaced, Ukrainian authorities said Russian troops continue to bomb residential areas—a tactic they say is out of rage at so many military setbacks.
In the latest attack Wednesday, authorities said at least three people were killed when strikes hit a bus stop in Saltivka, in the Kharkiv region. A young boy was reported among the dead.
El audio de la llamada (sin traduccion)
>
https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/videos/1093467458194904
En reddit commentan:
>So they've fired so many shells (1000-2000 per gun) that the barrels are becoming worn and ineffective, and accuracy is completely gone now. Normally, you'd have spare barrels to refit, which is complex but doable. So either they don't have the replacement barrels or they can't get them to the front lines.
>Related stories today and yesterday cite reports that few replacements are coming, and the barrels themselves are failing at far, far faster rates than expected. The users suspect poor steel at the factory.
Nos perdimos este video del gran Simon Ostrovsky, que cubrió de forma espectacular de la guerra en el Donbas para Vice y ahora hace piezas para el NYT. Así deportan a los Ukranianos.
@lowfour (post #1249) creo que vi un hilo del trent en tuiter diciendo que los obuses petan al cabo de nosecuantos disparos
que si los cuidas, aguantan más, pero parece que los rusos no los cuidan (porque no pueden o no quieren o algo así) y a la carestía de tanques se le va a unir la de obuses en breve
por mucha munición que tengan, al final no pueden dispararla (y fijo que ya andan inventando algo, como los del lanza cohetes ese que en lugar de tener un camión de 12 o 24 lanzadores, iban con uno de mano, tiraban a bulto y a correr que les petan los de la contra-artillería ucra)
claro que han perdido, lo sabemos todos
algunos lo sabemos desde el momento en que se intentó tomar kiev y se vio que no iba a ser posible
a ver si tiran nukes, porque es lo único que les falta por tirar (y seguirán sin ganar)
Edited 2022-07-22
@lowfour (post #1250)
viste lo de la familia que se pilla un lada con la pasta de la indemnización por el hijo muerto en combate??
luego dices que son como nosotros, europeos, pero me da que algo se distorsiona más allá de los alpes o algo así
iba a decir algo del mediterraneo, pero el mediterraneo-sur anda también raruno (puto islam... nah, puta religión integrista)
en fin, que son malos tiempos (y calurosos)
pues este lo ve todo como a largo plazo
viendo la que han liado con 3 himars, si les dan otros 15 lo mismo en navidad...
Quién lo iba a decir que Rusia tendría más políticos comprados en Alemania de 2022 que casi en tiempos de la DDR. Merkel que es hija ilegítima de un oficial del KGB y fue adiestrada por ellos, Schroeder que lleva años ganando el premio a empleado del mes en Gazprom, el muñeco que ha dejado Merkel en su lugar cuando tuvo que abdicar... qué asco.
No me creo que estos personajes no tuvieran información sobre los planes de Rusia para darle al botón de convertirse de nuevo en la URSS como en el episodio de los Simpson. Cuando pasaron de recibir del orden del 30% del gas de Rusia a más del 60% tenían que saber lo que se hacían.
Que los ucranianos les importan una mierda ha quedado demostrado, pero joder ¿cual era el plan a largo plazo? ¿Otro pacto Ribbentrop-Molotov? De haberles salido bien la "operación militar muy especial en la que metemos al 75% del ejército pero que ojo, que no es una guerra", habrían seguido con Transnistria, después Georgia, después anexionarse Bielorrusia para amenazar directamente a Polonia y los Bálticos etc...
Edited 2022-07-23
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/
Actually, the Russian Economy Is Imploding
Nine myths about the effects of sanctions and business retreats, debunked.
Five months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there remains a startling lack of understanding by many Western policymakers and commentators of the economic dimensions of President Vladimir Putin’s invasion and what it has meant for Russia’s economic positioning both domestically and globally.
Far from being ineffective or disappointing, as many have argued, international sanctions and voluntary business retreats have exerted a devastating effect over Russia’s economy. The deteriorating economy has served as a powerful if underappreciated complement to the deteriorating political landscape facing Putin.
That these misunderstandings persist is not entirely surprising given the lack of available economic data. In fact, many of the excessively sanguine Russian economic analyses, forecasts, and projections that have proliferated in recent months share a crucial methodological flaw: These analyses draw most, if not all, of their underlying evidence from periodic economic releases by the Russian government itself. Numbers released by the Kremlin have long been held to be largely if not always credible, but there are certain problems.
First, the Kremlin’s economic releases are becoming increasingly cherry-picked—partial and incomplete, selectively tossing out unfavorable metrics. The Russian government has progressively withheld an increasing number of key statistics that, prior to the war, were updated on a monthly basis, including all foreign trade data. Among these are statistics relating to exports and imports, particularly with Europe; oil and gas monthly output data; commodity export quantities; capital inflows and outflows; financial statements of major companies, which used to be released on a mandatory basis by companies themselves; central bank monetary base data; foreign direct investment data; lending and loan origination data; and other data related to the availability of credit. Even Rosaviatsiya, the federal air transport agency, abruptly ceased publishing data on airline and airport passenger volumes.
Since the Kremlin stopped releasing updated numbers, constraining the availability of economic data for researchers to draw upon, many excessively rosy economic forecasts have irrationally extrapolated economic releases from the early days of the invasion, when sanctions and the business retreat had not taken full effect. Even those favorable statistics that have been released are dubious, given the political pressure the Kremlin has exerted to corrupt statistical integrity.
Mindful of the dangers of accepting Kremlin statistics at face value, our team of experts, using private Russian-language and direct data sources including high-frequency consumer data, cross-channel checks, releases from Russia’s international trade partners, and data mining of complex shipping data, have released one of the first comprehensive economic analyses measuring Russian current economic activity five months into the invasion, with contributions from Franek Sokolowski, Michal Wyrebkowski, Mateusz Kasprowicz, Michal Boron, Yash Bhansali, and Ryan Vakil. From our analysis, it becomes clear: Business retreats and sanctions are crushing the Russian economy in the short term and the long term. Based on our research, we are able to challenge nine widely held but misleading myths about Russia’s supposed economic resilience.
Myth 1: Russia can redirect its gas exports and sell to Asia in lieu of Europe.
This is one of Putin’s favorite and most misleading talking points, doubling down on a much-hyped pivot to the east. But natural gas is not a fungible export for Russia. Less than 10 percent of Russia’s gas capacity is liquefied natural gas, so Russian gas exports remain reliant on a system of fixed pipelines carrying piped gas. The vast majority of Russia’s pipelines flow toward Europe; those pipelines, which originate in western Russia, are not connectable to a separate nascent network of pipelines that link Eastern Siberia to Asia, which contains only 10 percent of the capacity of the European pipeline network. Indeed, the 16.5 billion cubic meters of gas exported by Russia to China last year represented less than 10 percent of the 170 billion cubic meters of natural gas sent by Russia to Europe.
Long-planned Asian pipeline projects currently under construction are still years away from becoming operational, much less hastily initiated new projects, and financing of these costly gas pipeline projects also now puts Russia at a significant disadvantage.
Overall, Russia needs world markets far more than the world needs Russian supplies; Europe received 83 percent of Russian gas exports but drew only 46 percent of its own supply from Russia in 2021. With limited pipeline connectivity to Asia, more Russian gas stays in the ground; indeed, the Russian state energy company Gazprom’s published data shows production is already down more than 35 percent year-on-year this month. For all Putin’s energy blackmail of Europe, he is doing so at significant financial cost to his own coffers.
Myth 2: Since oil is more fungible than gas, Putin can just sell more to Asia.
Russian oil exports now also reflect Putin’s diminished economic and geopolitical clout. Recognizing that Russia has nowhere else to turn, and mindful that they have more purchasing options than Russia has buyers, China and India are driving an unprecedented approximately $35 discount on Russian Urals oil purchases, even though the historical spread has never ranged beyond $5—not even during the 2014 Crimean crisis—and at times Russian oil has actually sold at a premium to Brent and WTI oil. Furthermore, it takes Russian oil tankers an average of 35 days to reach East Asia, versus two to seven days to reach Europe, which is why historically only 39 percent of Russian oil has gone to Asia versus the 53 percent destined for Europe.
This margin pressure is felt keenly by Russia, as it remains a relatively high-cost producer relative to the other major oil producers, with some of the highest break-evens of any producing country. The Russian upstream industry has also long been reliant on Western technology, which combined with the loss of both Russia’s erstwhile primary market and Russia’s diminished economic clout leads to even the Russian energy ministry revising its projections of long-term oil output downward. There is no doubt that, as many energy experts predicted, Russia is losing its status as an energy superpower, with an irrevocable deterioration in its strategic economic positioning as an erstwhile reliable supplier of commodities.
Myth 3: Russia is making up for lost Western businesses and imports by replacing them with imports from Asia.
Imports play an important role within Russia’s domestic economy, consisting of about 20 percent of Russian GDP, and, despite Putin’s bellicose delusions of total self-sufficiency, the country needs crucial inputs, parts, and technology from hesitant trade partners. Despite some lingering supply chain leakiness, Russian imports have collapsed by over 50 percent in recent months.
China has not moved into the Russian market to the extent that many feared; in fact, according to the most recent monthly releases from the Chinese General Administration of Customs, Chinese exports to Russia plummeted by more than 50 percent from the start of the year to April, falling from over $8.1 billion monthly to $3.8 billion. Considering China exports seven times as much to the United States than Russia, it appears that even Chinese companies are more concerned about running afoul of U.S. sanctions than of losing marginal positions in the Russian market, reflecting Russia’s weak economic hand with its global trade partners.
Myth 4: Russian domestic consumption and consumer health remain strong.
Some of the sectors most dependent on international supply chains have been hit with debilitating inflation around 40-60 percent—on extremely low sales volumes. For example, foreign car sales in Russia fell by an average of 95 percent across major car companies, with sales ground to a complete halt.
Amid supply shortages, soaring prices, and fading consumer sentiment, it is hardly surprising that Russian Purchasing Managers’ Index readings—which capture how purchasing managers are viewing the economy—have plunged, particularly for new orders, alongside plunges in consumer spending and retail sales data by around 20 percent year-over-year. Other readings of high-frequency data such as e-commerce sales within Yandex and same-store traffic at retail sites across Moscow reinforce steep declines in consumer spending and sales, no matter what the Kremlin says.
Myth 5: Global businesses have not really pulled out of Russia, and business, capital, and talent flight from Russia are overstated.
Global businesses represent around 12 percent of Russia’s workforce (5 million workers), and, as a result of the business retreat, over 1,000 companies representing around 40 percent of Russia’s GDP have curtailed operations in the country, reversing three decades’ worth of foreign investment and buttressing unprecedented simultaneous capital and talent flight in a mass exodus of 500,000 individuals, many of whom are exactly the highly educated, technically skilled workers Russia cannot afford to lose. Even the mayor of Moscow has acknowledged an expected massive loss of jobs as businesses go through the process of fully exiting.
Myth 6: Putin is running a budget surplus thanks to high energy prices.
Russia is actually on pace to run a budget deficit this year equivalent to 2 percent of GDP, according to its own finance minister—one of the only times the budget has been in deficit in years, despite high energy prices—thanks to Putin’s unsustainable spending spree; on top of dramatic increases in military spending, Putin is resorting to patently unsustainable, dramatic fiscal and monetary intervention, including a laundry list of Kremlin pet projects, all of which have contributed to the money supply nearly doubling in Russia since the invasion began. Putin’s reckless spending is clearly putting Kremlin finances under strain.
Myth 7: Putin has hundreds of billions of dollars in rainy day funds, so the Kremlin’s finances are unlikely to be strained anytime soon.
The most obvious challenge facing Putin’s rainy day funds is the fact that of his around $600 billion in foreign exchange reserves, accumulated from years’ worth of oil and gas revenues, $300 billion is frozen and out of reach with allied countries across the United States, Europe, and Japan restricting access. There have been some calls to seize this $300 billion to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine.
Putin’s remaining foreign exchange reserves are decreasing at an alarming rate, by around $75 billion since the start of the war. Critics point out that official foreign exchange reserves of the central bank technically can only decrease due to international sanctions placed on the central bank, and they suggest that nonsanctioned financial institutions such as Gazprombank could still accumulate such reserves in place of the central bank. While this may be technically true, there is simultaneously no evidence to suggest that Gazprombank is actually accumulating any reserves given sizable strain on its own loan book.
Furthermore, although the finance ministry had planned to reinstate a long-standing Russian budgetary rule that surplus revenue from oil and gas sales should be channeled into the sovereign wealth fund, Putin axed this proposal as well as accompanying guidelines directing how and where the National Wealth Fund can be spent—as Finance Minister Anton Siluanov floated the idea of withdrawing funds from the National Wealth Fund equivalent to a third of the entire fund to pay for this deficit this year. If Russia is running a budget deficit requiring the drawdown of a third of its sovereign wealth fund when oil and gas revenues are still relatively strong, all signs indicate a Kremlin that may be running out of money much faster than conventionally appreciated.
Myth 8: The ruble is the world’s strongest-performing currency this year.
One of Putin’s favorite propaganda talking points, the appreciation of the ruble is an artificial reflection of unprecedented, draconian capital control—which rank among the most restrictive of any in the world. The restrictions make it effectively impossible for any Russian to legally purchase dollars or even access a majority of their dollar deposits, while artificially inflating demand through forced purchases by major exporters—all of which remain largely in place today.
The official exchange rate is misleading, anyhow, as the ruble is, unsurprisingly, trading at dramatically diminished volumes compared to before the invasion on low liquidity. By many reports, much of this erstwhile trading has migrated to unofficial ruble black markets. Even the Bank of Russia has admitted that the exchange rate is a reflection more of government policies and a blunt expression of the country’s trade balance rather than freely tradeable liquid foreign exchange markets.
Myth 9: The implementation of sanctions and business retreats are now largely done, and no more economic pressure is needed.
Russia’s economy has been severely damaged, but the business retreats and sanctions applied against Russia are incomplete. Even with the deterioration in Russia’s exports positioning, it continues to draw too much oil and gas revenue from the sanctions carveout, which sustains Putin’s extravagant domestic spending and obfuscates structural economic weaknesses. The Kyiv School of Economics and Yermak-McFaul International Working Group have led the way in proposing additional sanctions measures across individual sanctions, energy sanctions, and financial sanctions, led by former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul and the experts Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, and Andriy Boytsun. Looking ahead, there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia.
Defeatist headlines arguing that Russia’s economy has bounced back are simply not factual—the facts are that, by any metric and on any level, the Russian economy is reeling, and now is not the time to step on the brakes.
@lowfour (post #1258)
no se podía saber, eh?
pues todavía hay peña diciendo que las sanciones no funcionan... putos spamers...
@lowfour (post #1258)
Myth 1: Russia can redirect its gas exports and sell to Asia in lieu of Europe.
Myth 2: Since oil is more fungible than gas, Putin can just sell more to Asia.
Myth 3: Russia is making up for lost Western businesses and imports by replacing them with imports from Asia.
Myth 4: Russian domestic consumption and consumer health remain strong.
Myth 5: Global businesses have not really pulled out of Russia, and business, capital, and talent flight from Russia are overstated.
Myth 6: Putin is running a budget surplus thanks to high energy prices.
Myth 7: Putin has hundreds of billions of dollars in rainy day funds, so the Kremlin’s finances are unlikely to be strained anytime soon.
Myth 8: The ruble is the world’s strongest-performing currency this year.
Myth 9: The implementation of sanctions and business retreats are now largely done, and no more economic pressure is needed.
¿cuál es tu favorito?
yo creo que el 8 y el 3
bueno, y el 4 es un clásico (terracitas llenas y tal)
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