This article talks about a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute{0} which describes how in their opinion Ukraine currently has the will to achieve an operational defeat of Russia, but that the conflict is increasingly becoming attritional, which will in the medium-long term favor Russia.
The article starts by describing a recent visit of the author to Ukraine where he notes that losses are steep. It then digs into the report, starting by talking about how in the early stages of Russia's invasion their strategy was poor and that now it has changed. Russia's main strategy is now heavy usage of artillery to eliminate or degrade Ukrainian defensive positions and then come in with large groups of infantry and armor and take over the bombarded areas by brute force and overwhelming numbers. It goes in a slow and steady pace where they pick a localised target and take over it before moving onto the next one. As a result the Ukrainian military can only slow down the Russian offensive, as they are outnumbered both in troops and artillery.
The articles notes this is becoming an attritional conflict which favors Russia. This is because Russia has large stockpiles of artillery weapons and ammunition, and because Russia can strike Ukrainian defence infrastructure anywhere in Ukraine, which is not something Ukraine can do to Russia. It then moves on to Western support for Ukraine, which, while very helpful, is insufficient in quantity to turn the tide of the battle. In addition, drawing from diverse stocks means that compatibility and maintenance become issues too. The article also notes that while Ukraine has sufficient military personal, the longer the war drags on the more skilled personal are being killed, which limits Ukrainian military operations, although I personally believe this is likely true in Russia too.
It goes on to say overemphasis on Ukraine victories at the start of the war, when Russian military strategy was very poor, has feed complacency in the West. In particular it notes that taking back and holding territory that Russia has taken will be very difficult. Overall the outcome of the war is still uncertain, but for Ukraine to last Western support must remain unwavering. It is here the article says that is where Putin has the advantage. Europe, particularly Germany, is still heavily reliant on gas imports from Russia and without them the German economy will suffer heavily and it remains to be seen how this will effect the political situation there.
However the long-awaited Western artillery systems are finally starting to arrive and have an effect on the battlefield, and a slow Ukrainian counter-attack in the areas near Kherson can be seen as some positive outlook. However the article notes the scale of Ukrainian support needed is far more than what has been given, and that Western stockpiles of weapons are not enough, the West needs to mobilize their own weapons production capabilities not only to help Ukraine but to replenish their own stocks. The article notes that there are very few such calls to action, let alone action to actually deal with this. Going back to the political situation in Western countries, the US, which is the only Western country with sufficient armament facilities, is likely to head into a volatile political period. Biden's administration is likely to suffer significant losses in the upcoming midterm elections in the US and the far-right wings of the Republican party, which stands to gain, are ironically supportive of Putin, not to mention others in the foreign policy establishment who are more interested in the strategic threat of China rather than Russia.
The article ends by again describing the author's experience while traveling in Ukraine, and about how the outlook for Ukraine is not good unless Western nations massively increase their military support for Ukraine not in words as is currently done but in actions, as misplaced optimism will hurt Ukraine's ability to fight back in the war by making Westerners believe that Ukraine's strategic picture is far rosier than is actually is.
{0}: https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202207-ukraine-final-web.pdf
The key question here I believe is whether Western military support will increase to the necessary levels or whether it will stay the same? Currently I see very little talk about the kind of increase in production levels required, which is funny because some have said the reason the West isn't suing for peace is because war is more profitable, which is true, but if that was the main goal you would expect them to take advantage of Ukraine's lack of capabilities and massively increase their own production levels for profit, which isn't happening.
With regards to the above, if Putin sees that Western military support does not increase, when will he conclude the war? Total speculation by me but if Western support did increase Putin might decide to take control of the rest of the Donbass region and hold their other territories then try settle, otherwise if he can see nothing changing from the current position he might think he can try take more regions from Ukraine and we'll be back where we were at the start of the war asking whether he will go to Kiev and try take over again.
This might border on the more political side, but could there potentially be some change in the US position depending on how the political situation there pans out?
Algo pasa con la ofensiva rusa. Está atascada



Vaya. Limpieza étnica bien planificadita de antemano. Y si se los llevan a “cerca de Japón” tiene que ser 100% donde yo vivía, Sakhalin. Una isla que ya fue cárcel y gulag para coréanos y tal y de la que ya escribió Chekhov.
Hace 20 años estaba retozando con rusas y bailando tATu y ahora esto… deprimente es poco, ademas de increíble.
The United States has identified at least 18 sites set up by Russia to detain and forcibly deport Ukrainian civilians to Russia
The United States has identified at least 18 sites set up by Russia to detain and forcibly deport Ukrainian civilians to Russia, an American diplomat said this week, adding that Moscow appeared to have made preparations for the so-called filtration camps even before its forces invaded the country.
Courtney Austrian, the deputy head of the U.S. mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said that Russian officials — with the help of proxy groups — had set up “filtration camps” in schools, sports centers and cultural institutions in parts of Ukraine recently seized by their forces.
“At least 18 filtration locations along both sides of the Ukraine-Russia border have been identified thus far,” she said in a speech on Thursday to members of the organization, an international security monitoring group in Vienna.
Testimonies given to The New York Times and other news outlets by people who have escaped Russia after their “filtration” have included accounts of interrogations, of beatings and torture of people deemed to have ties to Ukraine’s armed forces, and of disappearances. After the filtration camps, Ukrainians have been sent on to cities across Russia — often to regions near China or Japan, according to the testimonies.
Ms. Austrian said U.S. assessments indicated that Russian officials were preparing for filtration procedures even before starting their invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24. “Russian officials likely created lists of Ukrainian civilians deemed threatening to Russia’s control of Ukraine, including anyone with pro-Ukraine views, such as political figures and activists, as well as security personnel, for detention and filtration,” she said.
She called the filtrations a “Stalinistic process,” adding that they were “the latest in a long Russian history of using mass deportation and depopulation to try to subjugate and control people.”
Ukraine’s government has said that about 1.6 million people have been forcibly relocated to Russia — including about 250,000 children. Those numbers are impossible to independently verify.
“There is no public register; there are no hotlines that can be called; there is no accountability,” Ms. Austrian said.
She cited interviews that escapees from filtration camps have given to the news media describing how their passports had been confiscated and how some of those fleeing had been encouraged to apply for Russian citizenship.
Pushing for an international effort to help document these cases, Ms. Austrian suggested that Washington would seek prosecution of those involved. “Let me be clear: All those responsible for forced transfers of Ukrainian civilians to Russia will be identified and held to account for violations of international law,” she said.

@lowfour (post #1142)
los que iban a desnazificar
joder, pero qué quiere putin? que veamos a los rusos como el nuevo isis??

bueno, éso y que lo mismo los ruskis se deciden a tirar nukes
viendo el "cariño" extremo con el que van conquistando, si les empiezan a "desconquistar", igual lo de tierra quemada pasa a ser, tierra vaporizada y radiactiva
los del alto mando fijo que saben algo o se lo temen, no es solo que vayan a caer chuzos (que ya caen diariamente)
esto es del jueves
no sé qué puede pasar más de lo que ya está pasando (bueno, sí, nukes)

Cuidao que ya llegan los refuerzos

italiano contesta a los del genocidame deluxe



Dios mío que degeneración. Llamada muy fuerte!!!


A ver si esto cambia un poco las tornas.

Esta horterada de video cuenta algo más sobre los HIMARS
La cabina está presurizada para que no los reviente el disparo imagino.

@lowfour (post #1147) la pausa táctica es una pausa técnica por falta de munición (y porque el personal anda ya rebotao... bueno, el que queda en pie)

@lowfour (post #1153)
esto te lo niega un putiner en cero coma
el mito de los 1000 tanques lo llaman ya
debe de ser como el mito de que las vacunas son efectivas, porque hay imágenes para aburrir de tanques vaporizados

@lowfour (post #1154) la cosa es que aunque tengan lanzaderas (y no se las peten), los misiles esos cuestan un cojón y no tienen tantos
pero bueno, aunque sean 100, son 100 objetivos menos, si se es un poco fino, puede significar una gran diferencia
le añades los obuses otan que petan más y desde más lejos y algo tiene que notarse
de hecho, rusia dice que para, que no puede más (y lo sabemos todos, 35 batallones para tomar severodonets y tal, eso son 35 mil soldados, suponiendo que sean batallones completos, o sea, unos 300 tanques y tal)

la Germania sta bloccando il pacchetto da 9 miliardi di euro di aiuti che dovrebbe rappresentare la principale forma di sostegno dell’Unione europea all’Ucraina.
zelensky ha llamado al embajador en berlin
por eso y por esto otro:
il sospetto che il governo di Berlino si prepari a violare di fatto alcune sanzioni contro Mosca pur di recuperare le forniture di gas russo attraverso le condutture di Nord Stream.
ojocuidao, porque ahora a rusia le puede venir bien una guerra larga, siempre que ucrania no se venga arriba
pero si alemania va a pasarse por alto los convenios y encima nos bloquea (que será el precio por el gas, o sea, traición doble) la cosa se pondrá malita a este lado del "frente"

No tienen soldados y tienen que hacer filigranas los ruskyis
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/10/world/europe/russia-recruits-ukraine-war.html
Desperate for Recruits, Russia Launches a ‘Stealth Mobilization’
Leery of a national draft for the Ukraine war, the Kremlin is offering cash bonuses and employing strong arm tactics.
Four Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine recently published short videos online to complain about what they called their shabby treatment after returning to the Russian region of Chechnya, after six weeks on the battlefield.
One claimed to have been denied a promised payment of nearly $2,000. Another grumbled that a local hospital declined to remove shrapnel lodged in his body.
Their public pleas for help got results, but not the kind they were hoping for. Instead, an aide to Ramzan Kadyrov, the autocrat who runs Chechnya, berated them at length on television as ingrates and forced them to recant. “I was paid much more than they promised,” said Nikolai Lipa, the young Russian who had claimed that he had been cheated.
Ordinarily, these sort of complaints might be ignored, but the swift rebuke underscores how Russian officials want to stamp out any criticism about military service in Ukraine. They need more soldiers, desperately, and are already using what some analysts call a ‘‘stealth mobilization’’ to bring in new recruits without resorting to a politically risky national draft.
To make up the manpower shortfall, the Kremlin is relying on a combination of impoverished ethnic minorities, Ukrainians from the separatist territories, mercenaries and militarized National Guard units to fight the war, and promising hefty cash incentives for volunteers.
“Russia has a problem with recruitment and mobilization,” said Kamil Galeev, an independent Russian analyst and former fellow at The Wilson Center in Washington. “It is basically desperate to get more men using any means possible.”
The numbers of battlefield dead and wounded are closely held secrets on both sides. The British military recently estimated the number of dead Russians at 25,000, with tens of thousands more wounded, out of an invasion force of 300,000, including support units.
Yet, President Vladimir V. Putin hobbled the mobilization effort from the beginning, experts said, by refusing to put Russia on a war footing that would have allowed the military to start calling up reserves. Hence, the Kremlin has tried to glue together replacement battalions through other means.
Avoiding a draft for all adult males allows the Kremlin to maintain the fiction that the war is a limited “special military operation,” while also minimizing the risk of the kind of public backlash that spurred the end of previous Russian military debacles, like the one in Afghanistan and the first Chechen war.
The public outcry after Chechnya prompted Russia to ban the use on the battlefield of raw recruits, men aged 18-27 who are required to complete a year of mandatory military service. The revelations that hundreds were deployed in Ukraine anyway, including some of the sailors who died when the Ukrainians sank the Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, prompted the very outrage from parents that the Kremlin had sought to avoid.
Numerous analysts have raised doubts about how long Russia can sustain its offensive in Ukraine without a general mobilization. Igor Girkin, a military analyst and a frequent critic of the Ukraine strategy, has said that Russia cannot possibly conquer the entire country without one.
But the Kremlin seems determined to avoid taking such a drastic step. Instead, recruitment offices have resorted to calling reservists repeatedly to offer cash incentives for short deployments. Online want ads placed by the regional recruitment offices of the Ministry of Defense also overflow with thousands of postings for those with military specialties. Recent listings on global job sites like Head Hunter included units looking for combat engineers, anyone who could operate a grenade launcher and even the commander for a parachute squadron.
The salaries offered to some volunteers, which can range between $2,000 and $6,000 a month, are far more than the average monthly salary in Russia of about $700. Prewar contracts for privates sometimes were as paltry as around $200 a month.
Enthusiasm for the war inspires some volunteers, experts noted, while workers in industrial regions hit by factory closings because of sanctions might also find the money attractive.
“Mostly, of course, it is a way of earning money,” said Sergei Krivenko, director of the Russian human rights organization Citizen Army Law. Many, especially older volunteers, have substantial debts, he and others said. A May law scrapped the age limit of 40 for contract soldiers.
The online Russian ads avoid mentioning Ukraine, and the short-term offers, often three months, are meant to play down the risks of never coming home. “It may be that it is necessary to get them into the army, and when they are already in the army, figure out what to do,” said Mr. Galeev.
The high death toll among soldiers from poorer republics populated by ethnic minorities, like Dagestan in the Caucasus and Buryatia in southern Siberia, indicate that they fill the front ranks in disproportionate numbers. Statistics, compiled by MediaZona, an independent news outlet, from public sources, show 225 dead in Dagestan through June, along with 185 in Buryatia, compared to nine from Moscow and 30 from St. Petersburg.
Minority conscripts in particular are pressured to sign contracts. “They tell them that if they return to their hometown, they will not find any job, so it is better to stay in the army to earn money,” said Vladimir Budaev, a spokesman for the Free Buryatia Foundation, an antiwar group abroad for the Buryats, an Indigenous minority.
Units from Rosgvardia, the militarized National Guard, have been deployed to Ukraine, and it apparently has sufficient numbers for rotations. But there do not seem to be enough regular soldiers for rotations. A group of about 15 women from Buryatia recently posted a video online complaining that their male relatives and friends had been deployed without leave since January.
In 2013, Mr. Kadyrov, Chechnya’s strongman ruler, established a private training institute now called the Russian University of Special Forces. Given his role in helping to defeat Chechen separatists, Mr. Kadyrov has long been granted wider latitude than any other regional leader to field his own armed men. Since the war, he has used his training center as a vehicle to recruit not just Chechens, but men throughout Russia.
Reports have also emerged from Chechnya that war critics or men arrested for petty crimes are often beaten, then forced to either sign a contract to fight in Ukraine or pay a bribe.
Mr. Kadyrov has pledged to pay almost $6,000 to volunteers who sign a three-month contract, supplementing the $53 a day promised by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Mr. Kadyrov’s aide, Mogamed Daudov, while berating the four men who produced the video complaining about their treatment, claimed that they were the only four who expressed dissatisfaction out of what he said were more than 3,200 volunteers deployed to Ukraine from Chechnya.
Other volunteers featured on Chechen television have praised exercises in shooting, urban warfare and other techniques. By all accounts, however, the training lasts about a week, which analysts consider woefully inadequate.
One longstanding taboo is being tossed aside in the quest for soldiers.
The authorities in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia have announced that they will form regiments made up entirely of men from the region, apparently in hopes that local nationalism would inspire more volunteers. The military has avoided that kind of recruitment since czarist times out of fear of fostering separatist movements.
In the battle for Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, the Russian military has done away with niceties like cash bonuses. Conscription is mandatory for men aged between 18 and 65 in areas under Russian control, and frontline fighters there are mainly local conscripts.
Since they are Ukrainian citizens, the thousands of dead and wounded have minimal impact in Russia, so the Kremlin is particularly cavalier about their casualties, experts say.
Some have been grabbed right off the streets and dispatched to the trenches with little or no training and vintage guns, military analysts and relatives have said. “It is the colonial model of locals being used as cannon fodder,” Mr. Galeev said.
The ombudsman for the Donetsk People’s Republic, a pseudo-statelet created by Russia, wrote on his Telegram channel in early June that 2,061 of its men had been killed and 8,509 wounded from a force of 20,000 at the start of the invasion, a staggering percentage.
The numbers of battlefield dead and wounded are closely held secrets on both sides. The British military recently estimated the number of dead Russians at 25,000, with tens of thousands more wounded.
The numbers of battlefield dead and wounded are closely held secrets on both sides. The British military recently estimated the number of dead Russians at 25,000, with tens of thousands more wounded.Credit...Daniel Berehulak for The New York Times
The riskiest technical operations on the battlefield are often assigned to experienced mercenaries under contract to Wagner or similar private commercial operations, analysts said. Wagner gained prominence as the organization deployed to help implement Russian foreign policy goals in Syria and various African nations.
It too has reportedly been casting about for willing recruits. In St. Petersburg, Wagner convinced several dozen prisoners to sign six-month contracts to fight in exchange for about $4,000 and amnesty if they come back alive, according to the independent news outlet Important Stories.
The armies of many countries faced with similar gaps in manpower and other problems might have collapsed, said Johan Norberg, one of the authors of a recent report on the war called “A Rude Awakening,” by the Swedish Defense Research Agency.
“All these groups are unlikely to contribute to a decisive Russian win,” he said, referring to those recruited. “But they can help maintain Russia’s current positions and possibly allow for some minor tactical advances, for example, in Donbas.”



llevan semanas (bueno, casi desde el principio) diciendo que iban a tener ataques desde bielorusia
no ha sucedido nada, de momento
igual putin les está apretando y ya les va a dar igual un poco todo y atacan, pero si no lo han hecho antes es porque me da que se arriesgan a una guerra civil interna o algo así

Cuidao que los rusos han sacado ya las wunder-armas

Himars repartiendo paz entre los orcos

Voluntarios extranjeros. Valientes y tronados

Voladura controlada de puente por los Ukros. Menudo petardazo. Cortan el camino a otra ciudad al lado de Severodonestk y la otra. Tras las lineas enemigas, porque está todo tomado por los rusos.


@lowfour (post #1168) joder, vaya ostia mete la onda expansiva

Ojo que han atacado a una plataforma rusa
Vaya tela
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