Les das unos brochazos de pintura y COMO NUEVOS oye. Joder, si lo hacen en el mil anuncios con un Seat Ibiza del año la tana no lo van a hacer los rusos....
Algo pasa con la ofensiva rusa. Está atascada
lowfour
Started 2022-04-20
4339 posts
@lowfour (post #3691) fijo que impiden el avance de los leopardos un par de segundos
cada segundo cuenta.. o algo así...
@elarquitecto (post #3692)
Táctica Kursk? Cuando los soviéticos pararon los Tiger germanos con número? Es decir, sus tanques eran claramente inferiores, así que lanzaban 6-8 tanques por tiger, e iban a empotrarse contra ellos, agotarles la munición e intentar inmobilizarlos rompiendo cadenas con el impacto, etc.
A ver si vamos a ver algún intento así........ Aunque los tanques modernos rusos los van a volatilizar a kms de distancia antes de que lleguen.
@Jag (post #3693)
obvio que es esto, meter morralla para colapsar el frente con chatarra y agotarles la munición o algo así
que no tiene puto sentido?? seguro, pero a ver cómo se lo explicas a la cadena de mando rusa... que debe de ser un sindios que ríete de darth vader asesinando a subalternos porque salen del hiperspacio antes de tiempo...
@lowfour (post #3695) y los leopardos, tienes que ir con javelins o alguna cosa así, porque si vas con el t-72 te lo desguaza en cero coma mientras apuntas
igual con 4-5 t-72 a la vez... pero la doctrina otan es ir con infantería, el leopard se folla a uno o dos tanques y la infantería al resto
Edited 2023-03-23
Los segarrillos rusos, que prenden que da gustooooo hoyga.
@lowfour (post #3695)
Si si, por eso digo que hasta los tanques modernos rusos se los funden a distancia, así que eso de atacar en pelotón de poco les va a servir esta vez, salvo para desgastar munición a los tanques y que se piren tras cascarse 20-30 blancos vacíos. Si un Leopard, M1 o un Bradley con un TOW, se crga un T72 desde 5 km de distancia, los rusos no tienen nada que hacer salvo avanzar sin cabeza y masivamente enfrentando pérdidas graves y esperar a que los Ucras no les de tiempo a disparar todo y retroceder. Saturación, lo que hacen con tropas, pero con tanques.
El Medvedev soltando mongoladas como de costumbre. Empiezan a entender que Putin ya es hombre muerto para occidente y no es más que la putita de los chinos en estos momentos.
JUGADA MAESTRA del gnomo.
Solomillov cabreao como una mona porque ya no puede ir de vacaciones al Lago Di Como. Jajajaja
OCCIDENTE ENS ROBA!
Cada día son más como los Lazis. CALLIIIIIII; CALLLIIIIIIIII
@lowfour (post #3702)
jugadón maestro lo de invadir ucrania porque la otan está muy cerca... pues toma otan en la frontera
Madre mía, el metraje que está llegando de esta guerra no se ha visto antes. Los vídeos de los últimos días han sido extremos. Me parece bien que salgan a la luz, para que nadie idealice la guerra. es una puta mierda máxima, un horror, tristísimo todo. El infierno en la tierra.
Hasta ahora nos llegaban escasos metrajes, a menudo censurados. O publireportajes de los usanos o tal. Pero la llegada de los drones y de las GoPro han convertido esto en un espectáculo en primera persona. Espero que haya gente recopilando todo esto para la historia. Se debería poner en todas las teles en prime time a todas horas, sin censura.
Este vídeo es intenso pero no es demasiado gore.
Los rusos pidiendo que entrenen a sus tropas en Bielorusia porque su ejército está totalmente desvencijado y ROTO por los cuatro costados.
@lowfour (post #3705)
iba a decir que se han zumbao a los sargentos (los rusos creo que no tienen) que entrenaban tropas y lo dicen los anglos, que los tienen desplegados en el frente y claro, no pueden entrenar a nadie
qué puto roto les ha hecho la guerra a los rusos, eh??
de esta no se recuperan
Edited 2023-03-25
Pues nada, la masacre rusa en Bakhmut ha culminado y no lo han tomado a pesar del medievalismo atroz que han practicado. Es IMPOSIBLE que las víctimas ukras estén al mismo nivel que las rusas. Me juego que ha sido 5:1 o 7:1. Esas oleadas sin sentido campo a través han sido auténticas masacres.
Pues nada, creo que en muy breve vamos a ver cosas ukras.
LAS GUERRAS DRONES
Russia Braces For Attack By 50,000 Ukrainian Kamikaze Drones, Seeks Shotguns
Russian social media on the Ukraine war is buzzing with fear of an imminent attack by thousands of small kamikaze drones that could overwhelm their front lines.
Posts by a blogger using the handle Russian Engineer usually get a few thousand views, but one of his latest entries has now been seen 1.9 million times. Ukrainian military and political observer Alexei Arestovich says they are preparing a drone offensive, and in January Ukrainian General Command announced the formation of new tactical drone assault units. Russian Engineer has put these together with information from other sources to predict an onslaught of miniature attack drones.
“Recently, it has become known that, in terms of drones, buyers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have bought up almost the entire market of FPV drone components in China, according to indirect estimates, by 50-100 thousand units,” writes Russian Engineer. “They have already trained more than a thousand operators of these models. They make them into kamikaze with a shaped charge warhead from RPG RPG +0.5%-7, or with a fragmentation grenade. And they have accumulated all this before the offensive.”
Racing drones, also known as FPV or First Person View drones, are smaller than standard quadcopters but have powerful motors giving speeds of 120 mph or more. They lack the sophisticated electronics for steady hover and smooth flight for good camerawork. Instead they are designed for high-speed, seat-of-the-pants flying around demanding courses, piloted using video goggles. Drone racing is a popular sport in many countries.
The powerful motors mean that, at some loss of speed and endurance, an FPV drone can carry a heavy payload, including an anti-tank RPG warhead or RKG-3 grenade, though it may need extra batteries. While this arrangement may not look airworthy, FPV drones are lethally effective weapons.
Ukrainian forces carried out their first improvised FPV drone attack in July, with the quadcopter diving through an open doorway into a building occupied by Russian troops before exploding.
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Since then, FPV attacks have proliferated, with numerous videos of strikes on trenches, tanks, personnel carriers and other targets. One compilation video shows a series of FPV drones diving into the open hatches of Russian tanks; another shows a Russian tank sheltering under a bridge before FPV drones stalk and strike. The success rate is usually quoted at something over 50%.
The key point about the FPV attack drones is that, compared to other guided weapons and loitering munitions, they are cheap and easily available. In a previous blog post, Russian Engineer listed the components needed to assemble an FPV attack drone, with a total cost of $355, or $421 with digital communications rather than analog. Others quote similar prices in the range of hundreds of dollars depending on the exact specification – notably less than the $2,000+ price tag for a Mavic 3 Pro quadcopter.
Many Ukrainian groups have been raising funds to build large numbers of such drones, like internet provocateurs NAFO, who are collecting funds for 240 attack drones for $700 each, and activist Serhii Sternenko, who is funding 500 drones at $350 apiece. Russian forces have also been using such drones, but complain about the difficulties with bureaucracy and lack of official support.
While there are certainly hundreds or even thousands of FPV attack drones in play, 50,000 would mean attacks on an unprecedented scale. As Russian Engineer notes, the need for one operator per drone, and the fact that there are only so many control channels available, means that there would only be a few drones per kilometer of front at a time – but waves of them could keep coming until they destroyed every target.
Russian Engineer ponders how to counter the kamikazes. Radio jamming is the obvious methods, but this has so far not been effective against FPV drones.
“Our EW [Electronic Warfare] installations have many drawbacks - there are not many of them, they are large, and are in themselves interesting targets. You need a lot of small EW installations so that they are everywhere,” writes Russian Engineer, noting that this would take time and money, which the Russians do not have. He also mentions the shortage of portable anti-drone guns which also jam the drones’ control signals.
Something more basic might be necessary.
“According to the feedback from the fighters, a shotgun helps specifically against such FPV, specifically the Saiga-12,” writes Russian Engineer. “They fly at low altitudes, and a good shooter may well shoot down this drone.”
The Saiga-12 is a Russian military shotgun, a semi-automatic 12-gauge design based on the Kalashnikov AK design. While a shooter with a steady nerve and good aim might be able to hit a small FPV drone coming in at 100 mph, this is a game where anything less than a perfect score is likely to mean instant death. No images of drones brought down by shotgun have yet appeared.
(The need for one controller per drone will limit the number of drones in each wave. This limit will end when Ukraine starts using swarming drones, which work together so one operator controls a whole swarm.)
Russian Engineer also talks about the value of camouflage and protective bunkers, and the limited range of the FPV drones – he suggests 5 kilometers – which means that equipment pulled back far enough from the front line should be safe. In a follow-up post this morning Russian Engineer mentions that he has received a number of suggestions which he will be passing on to the military.
Samuel Bendett, an expert on Russian drones and adviser to both the CNA and CNAS think tanks, says it is hard to assess Russian Engineers’ specific claim about 50-100,000 drones, but the threat is real enough.
“Everyone is assembling these FPVs at a fast pace now,” Bendett told me. “But even if the threat is in many thousands it sounds legitimate.”
Bendett says tackling so many incoming drones would require an integrated CUAS or counter-uncrewed aerial system defense. This would typically involve sensors to detect drones, command and control, and a variety of means to bring them down from jammers to missiles to automatic cannon.
“This CUAS approach must be a military-wide concept if it were to work as described by the Russian Engineer - which isn’t likely in the Russian military in the short-term, given where they are now in defending against such FPV drones,” says Bendett.
Russian Engineer thinks the mass drone attack will be a one-off, and, as he sees it, Ukraine’s last chance to force negotiations before it crumbles (a view unlikely to be shared with observers outside Russia). However, the racing drone industry produces something like 100,000 FPV drones a month, which would cost something like $50 million in total. The last batch of military equipment alone from the U.S. was valued at $400m so hundreds of thousands more FPVs are affordable and probably available.
Whether or not the mass attack envisaged by Russian Engineer materializes, one thing is clear. A lot more Russians are going to be targeted by ‘toy’ drones packed with explosives in the coming months.
@lowfour (post #3707)
lo acabo de ver en lo del isw, que dicen eso, los ruskis culminando y ahora la contraofensiva ucraniana en marcha (o ultimando preparativos)
y bueno, esto
si mueven nukes a bielorusia es que ya andan muy muy desesperados, querrán usarlas antes de que los patriots o loquesea las peten
y usan bielorusia para crear un proxi al que echarle el muerto y no tener que escalar la nuke-rización del conflicto
putos ruskis
@elarquitecto (post #3709) 
luka jugando con fuego, eh?
Planazo para el finde eh? Buah… y el Prigozhin negando que haya ni NATO ni nazis en Ucrania, construyéndose un relato para la era post-Putin que llega ya. Esta claro, si Putin tuviera tanto poder el cerdo del Prigozhin no abría la bocaza esa que tiene.
ni en pintura quieren ver a un ruso
bueno, imagino que la gente sabe distinguir entre putin y "ruso", pero siempre hay joputas que se empeñan en mezclarlo todo, como cuando ser vasco era ser eta o incluso ser del pseo es ser amigos de etarras o algo así
pero en las bálticas es peor, porque hay rusos y no pocos ahí desde tiempos de krushev y tal
y bueno, básicamente parece que se estaría revirtiendo el "lazismo" ruski en las ex-repúblicas
Asimismo, la Iglesia católica ucraniana anunció el año pasado que adoptará un nuevo calendario en el que la Navidad se celebrará el 25 de diciembre en lugar del 7 de enero, en un esfuerzo de las instituciones ucranianas por romper los vínculos culturales con Rusia.
y en georgia y tal, están igual... pero a ellos ya les cae más lejos el paraguas de la otan y la ue... de momento...
La fuente no es muy allá pero es altamente plausible. Y ya lo dijimos casi al principio.
Este update de ISW es MUY interesante porque dice que Putin se niega a reconocer la realidad de la batalla y que no quiere parar ni negociar. Que la única opción seria para Ucrania y occidente es una gran contraofensiva que eche a los rusos fuera.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2023
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 26. This report discusses Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued efforts to seek complete victory in Ukraine, which he appears confident that he can attain over time. Putin seems to reject the idea increasingly prevalent in Western discourse that the current military realities require or support a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Neither Ukraine nor the West has persuaded him that he must consider accepting any sort of off-ramp or compromise settlement. Putin instead remains focused on achieving his initial war aims through protracted conflict in which he wins either by imposing his will on Ukraine by force or by breaking Ukraine’s will following the West’s abandonment of Kyiv. Multiple successful Ukrainian counter-offensives are almost certainly necessary but not sufficient either to persuade Putin to negotiate on acceptable terms or to create military conditions on the ground favorable enough to Ukraine and the West that continued or renewed Russian attacks pose acceptable threats to Ukraine or NATO.
The outcomes of wars often are, in fact, determined on the battlefield with negotiations that merely ratify military realities. Putin likely has one such example vividly in his mind—World War II in Europe. That war ended only when Allied forces had completely defeated the German military and Soviet troops stood in the wreckage of Berlin. Japan surrendered a few months later after the US had demonstrated what appeared to be the ability to destroy the country completely—and only after the Japanese military had lost the ability to do more than impose casualties on the US in the process of losing. Going further back in history the peaces that ended the three Wars of German Unification, the American Civil War, and the Napoleonic Wars also merely ratified realities created by decisive military victories. Even the most recently ended war adhered to this pattern. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan was followed by a decisive Taliban military victory that has ended that conflict (for now) without any formal treaty or accord ratifying this outcome. History offers many counter-examples, to be sure, including the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian conflict and the resolution of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. But it is simply not the case that all wars end in negotiated settlements, particularly if by “negotiated settlements” is meant mutual recognition of the impossibility of achieving desired aims through military force.
Putin initiated the current war and is the key actor who must decide that he cannot achieve his aims by military power and must instead engage in a negotiated resolution of the conflict if the war is to end in this fashion. The war will protract as long as Putin believes that he can impose his will on Ukraine by fighting or by breaking the Ukrainians’ will to fight following their abandonment by the West.
Putin continues to make clear by word and deed that he has come to no such conclusion yet despite the failures of his major military efforts this winter. His efforts to freeze Ukraine and Europe into surrendering over the winter came to nothing, and the Russian winter-spring offensives that were supposed to secure the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are culminating.[1] The Russian military has committed the overwhelming majority of the reportedly 300,000 reservists mobilized in Fall 2022 as well as the 40,000 convicts recruited into the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) into a multi-divisional offensive all along the line in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[2] The results of that effort are deeply unimpressive. Russian forces gained no significant terrain in Luhansk. Wagner troops have taken part of Bakhmut City and conducted an incomplete turning movement that has so far failed to persuade Ukrainian commanders to withdraw from the Bakhmut pocket.[3] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces, now reinforced by conventional Russian troops, have conducted a similarly incomplete turning movement around Avdiivka.[4] Offensives against Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast have made effectively no gains at staggering costs in manpower and materiel.[5] The Russian milblogger space and Russian, Ukrainian, and Western media are full of discussions of the upcoming Ukrainian counter-offensive, about which the only real questions appear to be when and where it will occur.[6] This would be an appropriate moment for Putin to conclude that Russia cannot impose its will on Ukraine by force and that he must seek a compromise settlement. He has clearly come to no such conclusion, however.
Putin is instead doubling down on his commitment to overpower Ukraine militarily and/or protract the war by mobilizing Russia’s defense industrial base and renewing various crypto-mobilization schemes to generate renewed combat power. Putin’s March 25 speech continued a months-long effort to mobilize Russian military industry for a protracted war.[7] That effort and his speech also aim to portray Russia (falsely) as the modern incarnation of Stalin’s Soviet Union able to overwhelm its enemies with unstoppable masses of men and materiel despite Putin’s manifest unwillingness actually to put Russia fully on a war footing. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu began this effort at the end of 2022 and has continued it through this year, and Putin has been amplifying it.[8] The Russians clearly are attempting to mobilize their military industry and will surely generate some improvements. The exaggerated claims and unrealistic goals that Putin and Shoigu have made and set are intended in part to portray greater strength and potential than Russia has. They do not, however, reflect the challenges Russia faces in acquiring essential war materiel in the face of Western sanctions and in shortages of skilled labor. The latter challenge is made more acute by the need for Russia to balance mobilizing young men to fight and keeping them in the workforce.[9] That Putin should be mobilizing Russia’s defense industry now is surprising only in that it took him this long to start. The fact that he is not accompanying this mobilization with any suggestion that he would consider a compromise peace—particularly after Chinese Premier Xi Jinping appeared to offer to help negotiate one during a high-profile and dramatic visit to Moscow—indicates that Putin remains committed to achieving his aims by force.[10]
The continuing of Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut and Avdiivka, as well as along the Luhansk and western Donetsk front lines, is a further indicator that Putin remains committed to victory in a protracted war whose outcome is determined in large part by military realities on the ground. These attacks have now become not merely pointless, but actually harmful to Russian preparations for the next phase of this war, which will revolve around the upcoming Ukrainian counter-offensive. Russian forces may or may not be able to drive Ukrainian troops out of Avdiivka or Bakhmut, but they will gain no significant operational advantage from doing either because they lack the ability to exploit such advances. The Russians appear to have little likelihood of making any gains that are even tactically significant in western Donetsk or on most of the Luhansk line—yet attacks in all these areas continue.
Putin’s continuation of these Russian offensive operations in the current operational and strategic context amounts to strategic malfeasance. It expends scarce Russian combat power in pursuit of operationally meaningless gains rather than setting conditions to receive and defeat a Ukrainian counter-offensive that everyone appears to expect imminently.
Putin’s stubbornness in clinging to these offensive operations could make sense, however, in a protracted conflict during which Western support for Ukraine wanes or ends. Putin might even mean these operations to set conditions for a negotiated settlement on terms he has already articulated that include international recognition of Russia’s annexation of all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Ukrainian “neutrality;” the “de-militarization” of Ukraine; and the “de-Nazification” of the Ukrainian government. He may be pressing his commanders to continue attacks that are increasingly pointless in the short term because he recognizes that he can only hope to make good his claims to unoccupied areas of the four oblasts he has annexed if his forces actually take them. He may, in this sense, indeed be seeking to set conditions for a negotiated settlement. In that case, however, it becomes apparent that he must still believe that he can impose his desired resolution of the conflict on Ukraine and the West by military force—or by convincing Ukraine to surrender—and that he is unwilling to accept a resolution short of his stated aims (which include territories that Russian forces do not yet control) at this time.
A successful series of Ukrainian counter-offensives, not just one, is thus almost certainly necessary but not sufficient to persuade Putin to enter negotiations on terms other than the achievement of all of his stated objectives. Ukrainian forces must show that they can do what Russian forces cannot, namely change the realities on the ground through military action. They must further damage Russian military power in Ukraine to the point at which it becomes clear to Putin and the inner circle that supports him in this war that the Russian armed forces cannot hope to improve the outcome of the war by continued fighting. Multiple major Ukrainian operational-level victories are therefore likely essential to creating any prospect of a negotiated settlement of the current conflict or forcing Putin to accept unfavorable military realities absent a formal settlement.
There is reason to expect that Ukrainian forces can, in fact, make gains through counter-offensives. Ukraine has launched two major counter-offensive operations in this war, not counting the voluntary withdrawal of Russian forces from around Kyiv. Both were successful in retaking large areas, first in Kharkiv and then in western Kherson.[11] Various analysts have expressed various opinions about whether Ukrainian forces can penetrate prepared Russian defensive positions and raised other concerns about the prospects for Ukrainian successes. It remains the case, however, that whereas Russian force have demonstrated that they cannot make significant gains at this stage of the war, Ukrainian forces have yet to fail in such an attempt.
It is far from clear that Putin ever will accept these military realities, however. He may resolve to continue fighting, with or without a pause, as long as it takes to achieve all his aims. His rhetoric and actions, as well as his past patterns, certainly suggest this possibility. A negotiated settlement may therefore be unattainable because Putin will not accept the reality that he cannot actually conquer Ukraine.
Ukraine and the West will have to create military realities that permit a cessation of hostilities on terms that they can effectively impose on Putin in that case. Ukrainian forces, properly supported by the collective West, can retake the terrain that is strategically vital to Ukraine’s military and economic survival and that would be essential for renewed Russian offensives on terms favorable to Moscow. ISW has assessed the operational and strategic significance of various parts of occupied Ukrainian territory and stands by that assessment.[12] There likely is a line short of the full restoration of Ukrainian control over all of occupied Ukrainian territory that could be the basis for a protracted cessation of hostilities on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the West—but that line is not close to where the current front lines stand.
It is not a given, nevertheless, that Putin will continue fighting regardless of cost until the day he dies. He has ostentatiously and surprisingly refrained from going all-in on this war from its inception. One can dismiss his failure fully to mobilize and prepare his military before the invasion because he clearly believed that the Ukrainians would not or could not fight. He has passed by multiple moments when moving to fuller mobilization had become necessary, has delayed decisions to implement even partial mobilization for far too long from Russia’s perspective, and even when he has made such decisions has sought to limit their impact on the Russian society and economy.[13] Putin’s Stalinist rhetoric aside, he has shown remarkable concern about the danger of pushing Russia too far and generating a threat to the stability of his regime. Ukraine and the West should not count on Putin’s will breaking by any means, but neither should they dismiss the possibility that he might at some point decide that the costs and risks of continuing the fight are no longer justified by the potential gains.
Putin is nevertheless putting no terms for negotiation on the table now other than Russia’s total success. He is not taking the military measures that would be prudent were he serious about seeking some negotiated off-ramp or compromise settlement. The current frontlines would set highly favorable conditions for renewed Russian invasions if Putin were offering to accept them as a ceasefire boundary—but he clearly is unwilling to do so.
The choices before Ukraine and its Western backers at this time are thus relatively straightforward. Ukraine can unilaterally cease fighting even as Russian attacks by ground and air continue, which would lead to disastrous defeat (and which almost no one is advocating). Ukrainian forces can continue fighting in a very constrained way seeking only to hold what they now have, which will encourage Putin to continue his efforts to pursue outright military victory. Or they can launch successive counter-offensive operations with the twin aims of persuading Putin to accept a negotiated compromise or of creating military realities sufficiently favorable to Ukraine that Kyiv and its Western allies can then effectively freeze the conflict on their own regardless of Putin’s decisions. Those are the options facing Ukraine and the West as long as Putin continues to believe that he can impose his will by force of Russian arms over however long a period he is willing to fight.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on March 26:
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar called for informational silence regarding a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.[14]
Russian milbloggers largely amplified and praised Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 25 information operations.[15] One milblogger claimed that the deployment of nuclear weapons does not change Russia’s military situation in Ukraine or need to defend against a future Ukrainian counteroffensive, however.[16]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[17] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces fought 10 battles in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[18]
Russian forces continued attacking Bakhmut and its environs and made marginal gains within the city.[19] Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group forces cleared the AZOM plant in northern Bakhmut.[20]
Russian forces continued attacking along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains within Marinka.[21] Ukrainian intelligence stated that Wagner Group forces may arrive in the Avdiivka direction.[22]
Russian forces continued routine fire against areas in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[23] Head of the Ukrainian United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces in southern Ukraine lack adequate supplies of missiles and drones.[24]
Russian sources reported the formation of the “Uragan” volunteer battalion of the irregular formation 1st “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade, which operates in the Avdiivka area.[25]
United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak announced the proposal of a draft law on March 24 that would allow families of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) who died in the war to be eligible to receive a one-time housing payment.[26]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities in Berdyansk in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast are requiring locals to obtain passes from the occupation administration by April 1 in order to move around occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[27]
>@lowfour (post #3716) Putin’s March 25 speech continued a months-long effort to mobilize Russian military industry for a protracted war. That effort and his speech also aim to portray Russia (falsely) as the modern incarnation of Stalin’s Soviet Union able to overwhelm its enemies with unstoppable masses of men and materiel despite Putin’s manifest unwillingness actually to put Russia fully on a war footing.
esta es un poco la cosa, vale que rusia no tiene resultados esperados cuando manda 300k al frente, pero es que ucrania tampoco ha recuperado terreno (más allá de las retiradas "estratégicas" rusas de jarkov y jerson, claro)
o sea, de algún modo "funciona"
tampoco está militarizando rusia a muerte, no está en modo movilizacion total, que podría ser un "as en la manga" o algo así...
pero es que debe de pensar que tiene industria o chinos o koreanos o algo, que le suministre material para parar a los 4 aparatos que mande la otan de segunda mano y viejos
luego nosotros vemos tanques volando con solo un javelin...
cuando pongan en marcha los abrams o los challenger o los leopardos y los ruskis no puedan pararles con rpg o con el equivalente ruso del javelin, pero de hace 50 años, igual empieza a entender lo que es combatir en analógico contra un ejército "digitalizado"
ya algo tienen que sospechar con los obuses y demás autopropulsados o no, que con 4 disparos les hacen un destrozo, mientras los ruskis tienen que poner baterías enteras a tirar munición un poco a bulto
la calidad frente a la cantidad...
rendirse o negociar, sería un fracaso tan inasumible para putin que ni lo plantea
fijo que lo cuelgan o algo así, y ya va esquivando minas, como para atraer más
Edited 2023-03-28
Este vídeo, de ser cierto, es muy revelador. Son dos oligarcas que viven en Londres y se cagan en la puta madre de Putin y sus secuaces porque les ha jodido el chiringuito y para largo.
Puede ser mera propaganda, un fake o que ni si quiera sean oligarcas... pero la conversación me resulta plausible.
Farkhad Akhmedov
Iosif Prigozhin
>"On 11 March 2014 Iosif Prigozhin signed the appeal of cultural figures of the Russian Federation in support of the policies of the Russian President Vladimir Putin for the annexation of Crimea and war in Ukraine.[5]"
>On 26 March 2023, an alleged leaked recording of a telephone conversion between Iosif Prigozhin and oligarch Farkhad Akhmedov, in which Vladimir Putin was insulted, made news. Prigozhin allegedly exclaims, “Basically, he buried the Russian nation,” in reference to the state of the Russian economy and military under the current leadership. Iosif Prigozhin denied the audio was authentic following its publication, stating that it was produced by a neural network. Founder of the Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin commented on the audio, calling Iosif Prigozhin, “impudent, aggressive, and quick-tempered.”[7]
Ya lo dije yo. En las mafias se puede hacer cualquier cosa menos TOCAR LA PELA. Y Putin ha tirado un misil hipersónico en la pela de todos los que tienen pasta en Rusia, salvo los que se dediquen al armamento y tal.
Estoy seguro que hasta el Solomillov está cabreado como una mona con el Putin porque le ha hecho perder sus casas de lujo en Italia.
@lowfour (post #3719)
están enchironando a gente por cosas más suaves, eh?
acuérdate del pavo ese que sacaba un papel en blanco y detuvieron al pavo y a otra que estaba al lado criticándole y riéndose... que fue como ver una parodia de los monty phyton o algo así, pero en real
si tienen que implementar tal grado de "control" social, es que tu control no es tal, es represión pura y dura
así que no me extraña que dijera aquello de que los oligarcas montasen sus propias milicias, porque eso del "balconin" ruso no es casual
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Por qué construir más no hará que bajen los precios
Rendición imposible: el callejón sin salida de la guerra en Irán
Trump exige la capitulación total de Teherán. Pero un régimen que sabe que rendirse es jugarse su continuidad existencial no puede rendirse. Al mismo tiempo, una superpotencia que no puede definir la victoria tampoco puede retirarse, y esa administración empieza a desintegrarse desde dentro quizás no llegue a tener que decidirlo.