https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troll-factory-hacking/31076160.html The money wasn’t bad, but the work was demanding: posting up to 120 comments a day, over an 11-hour shift -- in chat rooms, on websites, and in social-media profiles belonging to specific Russian-language news outlets such as the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta and RFE/RL’s Russian Service. “There were people who really flew at [the work] with enthusiasm, and then some who came to work just realizing that all they were doing was nonsense,” Sergei K., a former employee of a Russian company that became known as the “Russian troll factory,” told RFE/RL in an interview. Such was life at the St. Petersburg firm whose registered name used to be the Internet Research Agency and which earned its moniker by pumping out conspiracy theories, half-truths, trolling social-media posts, and other misinformation. Owned by a St. Petersburg businessman named Yevgeny Prigozhin, the operation gained international infamy when it was specifically identified in the 2017 U.S. intelligence report on Russian efforts to interfere in the previous year’s presidential election. “ Masquerading as Americans, these operatives used targeted advertisements, intentionally falsified news articles, self-generated content, and social-media platform tools to interact with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social-media users in the United States ,” a follow-up report by the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee said. U.S. Cyber Command, one of the U.S. government’s main cyberagencies, claimed it knocked the “troll factory” off-line during the 2018 U.S. congressional elections. The company is still in operation, and media reports and other investigations have documented how Prigozhin has diversified his efforts to include funding private military mercenary companies, setting up operations in Africa and elsewhere. The “troll factory,” however, has seen its influence wane as social-media companies like Facebook and Twitter have gotten more sophisticated about blocking and removing anonymous accounts deemed to be trolls. Even before the findings of the U.S. intelligence community, its influence had been diluted as ex-employees of the company spoke out about the firm and what they did there. In 2015, a man named Marat Burkhard told RFE/RL’s Russian Service how the work was conducted. One Russian journalist went undercover to get a job at the operation and was later fired and filed a lawsuit claiming the working conditions and her contract violated labor law. She ended up winning her case and was awarded 1 ruble in a symbolic victory. 'I Thought It Was A Dystopia' Prigozhin has seemingly sought to conceal the legal ownership of the company , changing its name and registration every few years. At the time that Sergei K. worked for an outlet called the Federal News Agency (FAN), the company's name was Mixinfo. FAN, which has multiple links to Prigozhin and the Internet Research Agency, has dismissed the notion that it is part of a "troll factory." In a lengthy interview last week via the Telegram messaging app, Sergei K. told RFE/RL’s Russian Service he took the job in 2018 after a suggestion from a friend. It was easy money , he said, asking that his full name not be used to avoid legal repercussions from his former employer. “ I met people there who were convinced that the problem wasn’t that everything was awful in [Russia], but rather in the U.S. State Department and with the eye in the pyramid” he said, referring to a symbol used on one side of the U.S. dollar bill that is often a fixation for conspiracy theorists. Qualifications for being hired weren’t demanding, he said, just a high-school diploma. But there were some people who had advanced degrees, including doctorates. All had to undergo a background check, he said; he was forced to sign a nondisclosure agreement. He said most people were paid around 40,000 rubles a month ($524); he made 45,000; others who worked longer and harder got paid more. The expectation, he said, was he would make about 120 comments during his shift. The “factory” had many different departments, each comprising around 15 people and each dealing with a different external Internet or social-media company. One dealt with YouTube, he said, another with Facebook, and another with the Russian social network VK, which is widely used there. His team’s focus was comments on posts made by media outlets including RFE/RL. One department was responsible for compiling databases with biographies of people deemed to be political enemies and then making a list of targets, he said: " There's a list of media outlets that, pardon the expression, need to be shit upon -- Radio Svoboda (RFE/RL's Russian Service) and Novaya Gazeta are at the top." Another department created memes, including pornographic ones. These were sent around via messages and the trolls would then publish them in various places, Sergei said. “At first, when I got there, I didn’t quite believe that it was real at all. I had a kind of culture shock. Orwell described how it works. I thought it was a dystopia, but in fact this is how it works, ” he told RFE/RL. In his department, Sergei said, they coordinated work via Telеgram and decided where to direct their efforts. “ You don’t just sit around gathering dust there; you bang on the keys, the same nonsense for 11 hours, ” he said. He said he and his colleagues would set up fake accounts -- for example, on VK -- and use a huge stack of cell-phone SIM cards in order to authenticate your account when you first set it up. People would create fake names and steal photographs from other social-media accounts on social networks such as Odnoklassniki, another popular Russian site. Sometimes, the photographs were taken from people who had died, he said. Then, they would edit the photographs slightly -- make them black-and-white, or flip them 180 degrees -- so as to throw off search engines, he said. In all, he probably worked with more than 100 fake accounts, Sergei said. The fake accounts were used strategically: Having a teenage girl commenting on a nuclear arms treaty would look suspicious , he said. There are fears that recent legal measures in Russia will have a chilling effect on the activities of civil society. (file photo) People would also use virtual private networks -- VPNs -- to disguise their real location: A commenter could appear to be in Mozambique, for example, when in fact he was sitting in St. Petersburg. Under the websites or social-media accounts of Russia Today, which is now known as RT, the “trolls” would post comments that were either pro-Russian or anti-Western. “ Go to a RT group on any social network. Day after day, they’re fighting for Mother Russia. Under any news, whether it’s about missiles, or the United States, or Putin, they’re everywhere, like cockroaches, ” he said. Sometimes “trolls” would be expected to respond to another “troll’s” comments or post, to give the appearance of a discussion involving two unconnected users, he said. My Karma Is Ruined Sergei told RFE/RL that Prigozhin himself never came to the building that houses the “troll factory,” but that his assistant did: “A bald man, 45-50 years old.” In 2019, about a year after working there, Sergei said he began to get disillusioned. “ At first it was even funny. In our group, people openly mocked Putin himself, and almost everyone understood the absurdity of what we were doing,” he said. “It's like doctors who work with corpses, over time they begin to joke, relax, defuse the situation.” But after a while, he said, his conscience began to eat at him; he was constantly stressed and had migraine headaches. Asked why he decided to speak out about his former employer, he suggested it was something of an effort at atonement -- for the trolling he did and the lies he spread. “I turned to [RFE/RL], because, having seen the kitchen of state propaganda from the inside, I understood why they [tried to] shut you up and spread rot so much, ” he said. “ They lie everywhere. Now, television makes me sick, and my karma is ruined for three lives into the future. ”

lowfour The money wasn’t bad, but the work was demanding: posting up to 120 comments a day, over an 11-hour shift así que ya sabemos por qué cinta viene a contarnos sus mentiras aquí, para completar la cuota de comentarios ciberputis. ya nos vale, eh? somos 4 y uno es ciberputi, 25% de representación... fijo que le ascienden o algo cuando haga el informe mensual y diga que tiene una penetración del chorrocientos por cien en un foro o algo así, aunque como saben que se inventa todas las cifras, lo mismo le despiden y todo...

@elarquitecto Yo no trabajaría por 524 dólares de EEUU al mes y encima viviendo en San Petesburgo que tiene pinta de ser igual de caro que Moscú, que lleva décadas saliendo en todas las estadísticas de las ciudades más caras del mundo. Por menos de 50 cá no me muevo de la cama y menos ahora con la inflación que hay, que a otros el dinero se lo imprimen sin tener que trabajar.

hoy cinta ha estado echando más horas que un reloj por el video de shakira destrozando a piqué en burbuja están los machoalfitas y tal llorando como magadalenas porque la "panchita" y nosecuantas majaderías más le dedican, pues eso, le ha sacado un nuevo tema al tontolnabo de su ex están tan escocidos que más parece que la canción va por ellos que por el otro menda, se ve que hay algo insoportable en que una mujer le haga una paqui la del barrio a alguien concreto... sobre todo si ese alguien es piqué (que cinta pase a contarme qué tiene piqué que no tenga el ex, o los ex, de taylor switf) y encima aquí el moderator imperator le borra un video chungo de los suyos, mal día, eh cinta?

igual va siendo hora de hacer un "manual de resistencia ante el ciberputismo" o algo así (ahora que lo pienso, ese título no es adecuado) 1 un ciberputi mientre siempre y en todo esto parece que no tiene sentido, pero es tan contumaz, que acabas mareado y discutiendo de terraplanismo a la que te descuidas a veces, meten un dato acertado, se anclan ahí y tratan de extender esa "realidad" al resto de sus mentiras... 2 si la realidad desmiente a un ciberputi, es la realidad la que se equivoca cuando pescas a un ciberputi mintiendo como un bellaco (es sencillo, recordemos el punto anterior, siempre mienten), puede que te intente hacer la 13-14 ofreciendo datos reales contrastados, datos que son la prueba de que mienten con saña... acto seguido, harán el anclaje-contagio explicado anteriormente, y decidirán que puesto que una cosa es casi como lo que decían, el que se equivoca eres tú... tú, que has expuesto la realidad, te equivocas, o sea, la realidad se equivoca 3 ciberputi no actúa solo, sino en equipo te has fijado que hay mensajes a las 5 de la mañana? mensajes que no cuadran mucho? que se "olvidan" de conversaciones anteriores? esto es porque tras "ciberputi.ru" hay un equipo repartido en diferentes granjas a turnos, cuando acaba el turno en la zona europea, empieza en la latinoamericana (venezuela, por ejemplo), el truqui es dejar apuntado en un cuadrante lo relevante del día y anotar en las fichas a quienes hay que dar la turra y agotar la paciencia todos nosotros (salvo que seamos unas nulidades foreras) tenemos ficha abierta en ciberputi.ru y sus filiales es por esto que usan un vpn, que finalmente es detectado como "spam" y puesto en listas negras de ciberturras ahora cuadra que cinta (versión 5am) no conozca burgos, eh?? debe de ser el único madrileño que nunca ha pasado de somosierra... 4 las brigadas ciberputi no vienen a comentar nada, vienen a meter spam, "su" spam obviamente hay agenda política tras el ciberputeo, básicamente se trata de eso, de trolear, pero a veces hay campañitas y se buscan inyectar determinados mensajes... es casualidad que nuestro ciberputi de cabecera sacara lo del aborto días antes de que gallardo se sacara del culo su "protocolo" para médicos abortistas?? es casualidad que se vincule aborto - natalidad - inmigración?? pues aquí nos comimos la campañita abortar es dejar la natalidad en manos de los inmigrantes que lanzó vox a primeros de mes eso sí, nuestro ciberputi es tan tonto que se lió y tuvo que venir su supervisor a tratar de machacar con el punto 2 5 inevitablemente, el spam es neutralizado, pero no importa, quedan los restos; bienvenidos a magufoland! como la realidad está mal cuando contradice los preceptos propagandísticos del ciberputi, cuando se logra neutralizar la mentira, la realidad queda en entredicho, y ahí se cuela el magufismo, el terraplanismo, el negacionismo del virus, los antivacunas, etc porque el objetivo principal del spam ciberputi, es que desconfiemos hasta de nuestros propios ojos y oidos, de todo, y en tal desconfianza, plantan elementos disruptivos que servirán para colocar más spam, y más loco si cabe, que será más difícil de neutralizar, porque claro, lo que está mal es la realidad . estrategia anti-ciberputi descojonarse de ellos, en su cara, con sus mentiras, con sus palabras mochileras abortistas listas para irse a la india, y donde dices que hay que apuntarse?? venezolanos haciendo compras por madrid para mantener precios inmo? pues claro! en caracas hay listas de espera para comprar áticos en goya, frente al cortingles!! hombre, no lo sabías?? ps. está bien tener un ciberputi en el foro, ellos se piensan que nos trolean, que nos usan de corrector de estilo o algo así, pero en fondo los cobayas son ellos...

El que se pica, p... mastica 😛

Muy buen post Arquitecto. En realidad yo creo que la táctica es marear y generar la confrontación. Se trata de crear ruido blanco donde sea imposible hilvanar tres ideas consecutivas, y donde por supuesto se entremezclan la realidad y las mentiras más canallas, como si de un sueño se tratara. El objetivo de los ciberputis es laminar la confianza en la sociedad, en la realidad y en la democracia. Quieren convertir a sus lectores en personajes patéticos de esos que salen en el canal de youtube 1420. Pueblachos rusos de mierda infernal donde no hay ni agua corriente, las casas son auténticas madrigueras y los habitantes arrastran los pies y se encogen de hombros ante cualquier pregunta que les cuestione su escala de dogmas. Lo único que me fascina de todo esto es que haya dinero para poner a "Cintas" en un foro de mierda con cuatro personas (aunque nos leen algunos más). Pero claro, cuando henos entendido de que va la vaina Venezolana ya está todo más claro. Son hasta más baratos que un ruso de esos que arrastran los pies. Bienvenidos a la post-realidad Surkoviana. O como decía Dugin. "La realidad es lo que quieres creer". Van a empezar a caer banes como panes.

lowfour Van a empezar a caer banes como panes. No te molestes, ya me voy yo con la satisfacción de haber desacreditado a los que os creíais más listos que yo. Me da pena por @Ungaunga que es la única persona decente que hay por aquí, el resto creyendo en IAs de Rouco Varela o que un venezolano vaya a conocer España tanto como yo, o que alguien vaya a pagar un solo céntimo, bolívar, oro del World of Warcraft o lo que sea por escribir aquí... estais para encerrar. He intentado no alimentar vuestras locuras y debatir sobre los temas interesantes pero ha sido demasiado para lo que os da la cabeza. Lo bueno es que así podré concentrarme en subirme a la impresora, lo malo es que echaré de menos la satisfacción que me da dejar mal a los que se creían que me podían dejar mal a mí (no debatir ni nada parecido, sino atacar absurdamente). Así que a seguir disfrutando de la homilía del viejo funcionario y funcionario viejo, igual dentro de otros 14 años habrá acertado algo de nuevo como la última vez que fue ya en 2007. Y jodeos que yo ya apoyaba a Ucrania cuando vosotros no sabíais ni dónde estaba ☺ Adios.

Cinta_de_Carromero Venga si, nos tendremos que joder, no sea que un ciberputi que dice que el mismo sueldo en 12 pagas se cobra menos mensualmente que en 14, no nos honre con sus elaborados comentarios. Así que si, nos has dejado a todos a la altura del betún. Tendré que renunciar a mis carreras (2 licenciaturas en ingeniería) y masters (3 masters) ante tus aplastantes argumentos. Es más, debo renunciar a mi trabajo y fustigarme penitentemente hasta que tupelasso zanahoria sea reelegido de nuevo como Salvador del mundo ante tu sabiduría. Sólo te falta hacer una cosa para dejarnos a todos con la boca tapada, darte de alta en burbuja, y empezar a postear allí, a favor de Ucrania y en contra de la impresora que dices que nunca parará, pero curiosamente también a favor de mantener salarios bajos, de tupelasso y de las consignas putivoxeras.

Cinta_de_Carromero Todo correcto. Para el que lea esto. Esto ni es una caza de brujas ni nada. Simplemente tenemos más que suficientes pruebas (que no voy a detallar para no dar pistas a estos cibertrolls) que denotan una intencionalidad spammer/política clara en los posts bajo el usuario de Cinta. Nos hemos reído un rato con él, ya no tanto.

Qué decía el otro día el Cinta? Que había muchos americanos en Alemania, que eso no podía ser. Qué dice hoy Solomillov? Lo mismo. Usan el mismo argumentario.

Conozcamos cómo es el trabajo de las ciberputis

lowfour

elarquitecto

Y sabes por que no les han tenido en cuenta para lo de Ucrania? Porque se huelen el pastel de que el lazi vasco ese de Sumar igual tiene motivaciones "ruso-pacifistas". El Ken, o Exteriores ha pensado que pa que perder el tiempo, que aprueban los 1100 minoyeh y que lloren un rato. Luego si eso les dan unos caramelitos y los invitan al parque de atracciones y se les pasa.

elarquitecto

lowfour
bueno, yo creo que lo de destapar el barco con armas para ucrania ya les ha dejado fuera de juego

que vale, fueron los belarros, pero estos se subieron al carro

y claro, ahora van con que es mucha pasta:

hijoputi, mucha pasta es la que condona a la casta los ayusers y demás eliminando el impuesto de sucesiones (4000M, o sea, x4 lo de ucrania) y aquí no pasa nada...
pero ya es ayuda para ucrania y todo son reservas y vamos a debatirlo

que sí, que luego "debaten" contra la eliminación del impuesto de sucesiones y las rebajas fiscales para ricos, pero es que nomejodas, yo les veo más vehementes con esto ahora, que con aquello
o qué?

lowfour

elarquitecto

No creo que el pro.ruso sea el niño, pero que tienen agentes infiltrados ni cotiza como sueles decir tu.

Están llenos de ciberputis in real life que les van soltando el meme y lo van repitiendo y al final se convierte en política aceptada.

lowfour

Luego dice el Cinta que somos unos paranoicos. Ya ya…

Police in Belgium and France have conducted raids on properties and an office connected to an employee of the European Parliament citing indications of his "significant role" in promoting Russian propaganda, the Belgian Federal Public Prosecutor's Office reported on May 29.

The Dutch public broadcaster NOS reported that the employee under investigation works for Dutch MEP Marcel de Graaff, a representative of the far-right party Forum for Democracy (FvD) in the European Parliament.

Apparently the guy was a member for the Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen before, as well as working as an assistent for a German >AfD party member, both right wing parties. Propaganda was spread through radical right wing Voice of Europe, formerly known for paying European politicians to spread Russian popaganda. What a charm this guy, eh?

Al loro el comentario

A so-called journalist in New Zealand at a state radio broadcaster(?) was busted altering the copy of Ukraine war news stories from the likes of AP and Reuters to make them pro-russia.

@elarquitecto mira lo que sospechaba de que tienen gente en los entornos de sumar y podemos y tal. Tienen gente a todos los niveles de la comunicación dando pequeños empujones en la dirección que quieren. A todos los niveles. Desde foros a prensa, etc

elarquitecto

lowfour
claramente en podemos hay más agentes de moscú y tal, algunos ni siquiera lo saben, simplemente les adoctrinaron así y ya

pero es tremendo descubrir que no solo es cosa de RT y sputnik y tal, es que tu vecino, que era de iu, rama pce, resulta que recibe consignas de una organización (financiada por rusia) que luego difunde y tal... y resulta que tu vecino es liberado sindical y que luego va haciendo cuña pro-rusia en el sindicato y tal

de modo que tienes una "fuente" totalmente "fiable" de que lo que te cuentan los media sobre rusia es trucho o algo así, que ucrania debe rendirse y tal
que lo de gaza es genocidio
que la democracia es un mojon, mejor darle la soberanía a un "mazao" como putin
etc

elarquitecto

mirad, los agentes ruskis haciendo su trabajo de ciberputis

no sale la fecha, pero es de hoy a las 9h

a putin se le ha parado mandando javelins, mandando obuses, mandando himars, atacams, etc y luego abrams, leopards, bradleys y muchos patriots y radares y tal (que ha evitado miles de muertes, como bien se calla la agente ruski esta)

pero lo peor de todo es que NO hubo boicot alguno de nosequé acuerdo de paz
rusia solo quiso paz por territorios, o sea, rendición de ucrania, cosa que ucrania se negó (sin boicot ni gilipolleces)

estos siguen apoyando la propaganda ruski a muerte y cada vez es más evidente

no sé el cni, pero la opinión pública imagino que tomará nota, no??

elarquitecto

el zasca:

otro zasca:

y bueno, porque no ha dicho que rusia fue obligada a invadir ucrania por la otan, que eso lo fueron rulando (y casi cuela, eh?)

elarquitecto

ojo, que no solo son los populistas nazis, también los lazis de izquierda y tal, vamos, cualquier cosa anti-sistema tiene cash fresquete de noseqbemosquien (no oficialmente, que no hay transparencia, pero todos "sabemos" cosas)

o sea, si lo he entendido bien, de 150M casi 100M han ido a morrión-meloni-lepen-orban, no?

dan como fuente esto: https://www.ftm.eu/transparency-gap

ahí puedes encontrar artículos en diferentes medios (hoy publican varias cosas, el titular ese es de eldiario theguardian, pero este otro es de elpais)

esto es aterrador:

obviamente, los propios partidos no van a querer cambiar mucho eso, porque posiblemente se queden sin pasta o tengamos escándalos cojonudos

otro gráfico curioso

yo supongo que en iu hacen algo parecido al bng (parte del sueldo de los cargos electos va a parar al partido como donación), pero son los que más "donaciones" reciben
y luego vox

otro dato curioso:

a vox le metieron pasta justo cuando empezó a meterse en las instituciones (empezaron en la junta de andalucia) y luego pararon (como pasó con podemos unos años antes)

lo de iu me tiene con el culo torcio, eh??
pero es que en 2019 ya no era iu, era iu-podemos ... a ver si va a ser eso...

pero claramente hay una correlación entre pastizales recibidos y resultados electorales (o año electoral, claro)
el resto del artículo: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-europeas/2024-05-30/quien-financia-a-los-partidos-europeos-el-70-de-las-donaciones-se-ocultan-al-publico.html
(si desactivas el java, lo puedes leer)

lowfour

elarquitecto

Ostia el BNG? Todo pasta del cabron de Inditex? Quiere montar la república bananera gallega con impuestos al 3%! Como en Irlanda?

elarquitecto

elarquitecto <-- auge en financiación a partidos populistas (aka fachas)

mirad, aquí no hay un "trump" claro, pero igual la movida es la misma

dan pasta a los populistas (esas donaciones "secretas" guapas) y luego pasan cosas...

acordaos que ya el propio trump dijo que si putin se follaba un pais europeo, que miraria para otro lado (porque europa no contribuye económicamente a la otan y tal, no lo suficiente)

los belarros dicen que no hay que financiar ejércitos y tal, porque "pacifismo" y es el mismo mensaje, si putin invade, puente de plata o algo así

así que quedan los del morrión y tal, que tienen el mismo "mantra", lo patrio es lo primero y hay que ahorrar, seguro que encuentran el modo de conjugar el militarismo patriótico que les pone, con la austeridad o algo así

elarquitecto

mira @lowfour
en elpais han hecho una gráfica, pero atan cabos mal

qué pasó en octubre que, porloquesea, no sale en la gráfica esa... digamos sobre el 7 de octubre...

luego cambian un poco el eje de coordenadas y nos despistan, porque ya no empieza en enero de 2023, aquí introducen otro "evento", que bueno, sí tiene un escalón posterior, pero el inicio del ascenso es a primeros de octubre:

yo entiendo que buena parte de eso se debe más a "deméritos" de biden que no a los juicios de trump
pero manda cojones que lo que para cualquier candidato sería su muerte política brutal, aquí le de la vuelta y le ponga primero, así que cuanto más juicios tenga trump, parece que mejor le va (ya os dije esta mañana que a hitler le pasó parecido, metía su discurso nazi en los juicios y le sacaban en prensa, y claro, el nacionalismo patriotero siempre vende, así que los periódicos encantados)

de todos modos, sería muy magufo relacionar el ataque de hamas con un plan siniestro de los republicanos o algo así, pero que les vino deputamadre ni cotiza (y ni cotiza tampoco que el plan de hamas-iran era justo esto, desestabilizar a los "globalistas" y darles carnaza a los anti-sistema belarros y trumpistas)

elarquitecto

hay una campaña brutal, pero nivel dios (encuentras antes a los bots estos mierder diciendo eso que la propia noticia en sí), sobre que "los media son el mal"

en cierto modo, es como cuando cinta dice que las que abortan son "mochileras", toda mujer que aborta es por un "capricho" estúpido (y prescindible, claro), de modo que se desvía la cuestión sobre la propia libertad individual sobre el propio cuerpo y tal, hacia un "impidamos a las frívolas frivolizar con vidas humanas nonatas" o algo así...

aquí igual, la noticia sobre el atentado (lo que haya de cierto) es irrelevante, porque lo que hay que pensar es que los media son un "enemigo del pueblo"
por supuesto, para ello hay que deformar un poquito el hecho de que el acuchillado era un "ultra", no sea que el mensaje igual no llegue igual

en versión española está rulando esto (versiones similares, pero la misma imagen)

y así, queridos, es como se trata de hacernos creer que "la verdad" nos será revelada por los "ultras", porque son los únicos que señalan a los "enemigos del pueblo" o algo así

lowfour

elarquitecto

A ver, los barbudos y los ultras son la misma mierda. Déjate de complicaciones y disqusiciones.

BASURA ESPECULAR.

Pero en este caso los ultras no eran los del cuchillo. No lo olvidemos.

lowfour

Repasemos el origen de todo este enmmerdement que tenemos montado.

Vladislav Surkov: Key Points on Background, Theories, and Propaganda Strategies

Background

Early Life:
- Born on September 21, 1964, in Solntsevo, Russia.
- Studied theater direction and later attended the International University in Moscow.
Career:
- Initially worked in advertising and PR before transitioning into politics.
- Joined President Vladimir Putin's administration in 1999, eventually becoming Deputy Chief of Staff.
- Served as the First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration from 1999 to 2011.
- Held other significant positions, including Deputy Prime Minister and later aide to Putin on the relations with Ukraine.

Theories and Ideologies

Sovereign Democracy:
- Advocated for a form of democracy tailored to Russian traditions and national interests, rather than adhering to Western democratic models.
- Emphasized the need for a strong, centralized state to maintain stability and national sovereignty.
Role in Ideological Development:
- Played a key role in shaping the ideological narrative of Putin’s administration.
- Promoted the concept of "managed democracy," where democratic processes exist but are tightly controlled by the state.

Propaganda Strategies

Hybrid Warfare and Information Control:
- Pioneer in the use of hybrid warfare, combining conventional military force with cyber warfare, misinformation, and media manipulation.
- Emphasized the importance of controlling information to maintain power and influence public perception.
Managed Pluralism:
- Developed a strategy of "managed pluralism," where opposition is allowed but controlled and co-opted by the state.
- Created and supported multiple political parties and movements to give an illusion of political diversity while ensuring they remained loyal to the Kremlin.
Nonlinear Warfare:
- Promoted the idea of "nonlinear warfare," where the boundaries between war and peace, and truth and falsehood, are blurred.
- Used a variety of media and cultural channels to spread disinformation and create confusion, making it difficult for opponents to respond effectively.
Theatrical Approach to Politics:
- Applied his background in theater to politics, viewing political events as performances designed to create specific public perceptions.
- Often used dramatic and unexpected actions to keep the public and opposition off balance.
Cultural Influence:
- Engaged in cultural projects, such as funding arts and literature, to propagate his ideas and enhance Russia's soft power.
- Wrote under pseudonyms, contributing to cultural and literary discussions to shape public discourse.
Modernization and Stability:
- Advocated for a controlled modernization process to ensure stability, avoiding rapid and potentially destabilizing reforms.
- Emphasized the role of technology and media in maintaining state control over society.

Conclusion

Vladislav Surkov's influence on Russian politics is profound, marked by his theories on sovereign democracy, managed pluralism, and nonlinear warfare. His strategies in propaganda and information control have been pivotal in maintaining the power structure in Russia, blending traditional political control with modern techniques of media manipulation and cultural influence.

lowfour

Vladislav Surkov: Hybrid Warfare and Cyber Troll Brigades

Hybrid Warfare Methods

Vladislav Surkov is widely recognized for pioneering the concept of hybrid warfare, which blends traditional military tactics with non-conventional methods such as cyber warfare, disinformation, and psychological operations. Here's an expanded look at his methods and their practical application:

Disinformation and Misinformation Campaigns:
- Media Manipulation: Controlled state media and influenced private media to propagate government narratives. This included spreading false information to create confusion and doubt.
- Fake News: Disseminated fabricated news stories to mislead both domestic and international audiences. This was aimed at discrediting opponents and shaping public perception.
Cyber Warfare:
- Cyber Attacks: Employed hackers to disrupt critical infrastructure, steal sensitive information, and conduct espionage. This included attacks on government institutions, corporations, and international organizations.
- Hacking and Leaks: Stole and leaked documents to embarrass or undermine political adversaries. For example, email hacks and subsequent leaks were used to influence elections and public opinion.
Social Media Manipulation:
- Troll Farms: Established organized groups of internet trolls to flood social media with pro-government messages, harass opponents, and spread disinformation. These trolls created fake accounts to amplify their impact.
- Bot Networks: Utilized automated bot accounts to artificially inflate the popularity of certain narratives and suppress dissenting voices. Bots were also used to engage in coordinated attacks on targeted individuals or organizations.
Psychological Operations (PsyOps):
- Narrative Control: Crafted compelling narratives that resonated with the target audience’s existing beliefs and fears. This involved mixing truth with falsehoods to make the disinformation more credible.
- Creating Confusion and Division: Promoted conflicting information to create uncertainty and divide the public. This made it difficult for people to discern the truth and weakened the cohesion of opposition groups.
Proxy Forces and Irregular Warfare:
- Support to Separatist Movements: Provided covert support to separatist groups and insurgencies to destabilize regions and extend Russian influence. This included arms, training, and financial backing.
- Unconventional Military Tactics: Used non-state actors, such as private military companies and paramilitary groups, to carry out operations that the state could deny involvement in.

Practical Application and Evolution

Ukraine Crisis (2014):
- Crimea Annexation: Employed hybrid warfare to annex Crimea, combining military presence with a strong propaganda campaign that justified the action as protecting ethnic Russians.
- Donbas Conflict: Supported pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine, using a mix of military assistance and media manipulation to portray the conflict as a civil war rather than an invasion.
Interference in Foreign Elections:
- US Presidential Election (2016): Russian cyber operatives, linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), conducted extensive online campaigns to influence the outcome. This included hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and using social media to spread divisive content.
- European Elections: Engaged in similar tactics in various European countries, supporting far-right and populist candidates who were sympathetic to Russian interests.
Formation of Cyber Troll Brigades:
- Internet Research Agency (IRA): Founded in 2013, the IRA became a central hub for Russia’s online influence operations. Located in Saint Petersburg, it employed hundreds of individuals to create and manage fake online personas.
- Operational Tactics: The IRA coordinated large-scale disinformation campaigns, using fake accounts to post comments, share content, and interact with real users to amplify their messages and sow discord.

Conclusion

Vladislav Surkov's hybrid warfare strategies have been instrumental in extending Russia's influence and maintaining the power structure within the country. His methods of disinformation, cyber warfare, and social media manipulation have evolved into sophisticated operations like the cyber troll brigades, which continue to play a significant role in modern geopolitical conflicts.

lowfour

Internet Research Agency (IRA): Detailed Overview

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) is a Russian organization known for its extensive involvement in online influence operations, commonly referred to as "troll farming." Below is a comprehensive overview of the IRA, its origins, operations, and impact.

Origins and Background

Foundation:
- The IRA was founded in 2013 in Saint Petersburg, Russia.
- Often linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to President Vladimir Putin.
Purpose:
- Established to conduct online propaganda and influence operations both domestically and internationally.
- Aimed at promoting Russian government interests, undermining opponents, and shaping public opinion.

Structure and Operations

Organization:
- The IRA operates as a sophisticated and hierarchical organization with various departments.
- It employs hundreds of individuals who work in shifts to ensure 24/7 operation.
- Departments are specialized in different areas such as content creation, social media management, and data analysis.
Operational Tactics:
- Troll Farms: Groups of individuals tasked with creating and managing fake online personas to spread pro-Kremlin messages, harass opponents, and manipulate public discourse.
- Bot Networks: Automated accounts (bots) used to amplify specific messages, make topics trend, and create the illusion of widespread support or opposition.
- Content Creation: Production of articles, memes, videos, and other media content designed to influence public opinion and sow discord.
- Social Media Manipulation: Extensive use of platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and VKontakte to spread disinformation, engage with real users, and amplify divisive content.
- Comment Sections and Forums: Posting comments on news websites, blogs, and forums to shift the tone of discussions and spread targeted narratives.
Key Campaigns and Activities:
- 2016 US Presidential Election: The IRA played a significant role in attempting to influence the election by spreading disinformation, creating fake personas, and organizing political rallies.
- European Elections: Engaged in similar tactics to influence elections in various European countries, supporting far-right and populist candidates.
- Domestic Influence: Used to control and influence Russian public opinion, discredit opposition figures, and promote government policies.

Impact and Reactions

Global Influence:
- The IRA's operations have had significant impacts on political processes and public opinion worldwide.
- Their activities have contributed to increased polarization, confusion, and mistrust in democratic institutions.
Legal and Political Repercussions:
- Several countries, including the United States, have indicted IRA operatives for their roles in election interference.
- Social media platforms have taken steps to identify and remove accounts linked to the IRA, but the organization continues to adapt and evolve its tactics.
Ongoing Threat:
- The IRA remains an active player in the field of online influence operations.
- It continues to evolve its strategies to remain effective in an ever-changing digital landscape.

Conclusion

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) is a central component of Russia's strategy for conducting hybrid warfare. Its sophisticated and far-reaching operations demonstrate the significant impact that organized online influence efforts can have on global politics and public perception. Understanding the IRA's methods and activities is crucial for developing effective countermeasures against disinformation and protecting the integrity of democratic processes.

lowfour

Identifying Russian Cyber Trolls on Forums and Social Networks

Russian cyber trolls, often linked to entities like the Internet Research Agency (IRA), use sophisticated tactics to spread disinformation and fake news. Here are some key indicators and strategies to help identify them:

Common Indicators of Russian Cyber Trolls

Posting Patterns:
- High Activity Levels: Consistent posting at all hours, suggesting a coordinated effort rather than an individual user.
- Scripted Responses: Repetitive and scripted responses that seem to follow a particular narrative or talking points.
Language and Tone:
- Broken English: Often use imperfect or broken English, with grammar and syntax errors typical of non-native speakers.
- Emotional Manipulation: Posts designed to evoke strong emotional reactions, such as fear, anger, or hatred.
Content Characteristics:
- Consistent Themes: Posts frequently support Russian geopolitical interests, criticize Western governments, or spread conspiracy theories.
- Disinformation and Misinformation: Spreading easily debunked falsehoods or half-truths that can be traced back to known Russian propaganda outlets.
Behavioral Tactics:
- Astroturfing: Creating the illusion of widespread grassroots support for a particular viewpoint by using multiple fake accounts.
- Doxing and Harassment: Coordinated attacks on individuals or organizations that oppose their narratives, including doxing and harassment.

Strategies to Identify Russian Cyber Trolls

Check Account History:
- Recent Creation Date: Troll accounts often have a recent creation date and lack a consistent posting history on varied topics.
- Lack of Personal Content: Minimal personal content or interactions outside of political or divisive topics.
Analyze Posting Behavior:
- Inconsistencies in Posting Times: Posting across multiple time zones, which can indicate an organized effort.
- Automated Patterns: Rapid posting frequency that suggests the use of bots or automated scripts.
Evaluate Content Sources:
- Citing Dubious Sources: Frequent citations of known disinformation sites or obscure websites with no credible background.
- Copy-Paste Content: Identical or very similar posts across different platforms, indicating a coordinated campaign.
Cross-Reference Information:
- Fact-Checking: Use fact-checking websites to verify the information being spread. Disinformation often lacks credible verification.
- Check Network: Look at the followers and interactions of the suspected troll accounts. Troll networks often interact with each other to amplify their reach.
Engagement Patterns:
- Limited Engagement: Lack of genuine engagement or in-depth discussion on the topic. Trolls often avoid detailed debates.
- Deflection and Diversion: When challenged, trolls often deflect questions or change the topic rather than addressing the issue directly.

Tools and Resources

Bot Detection Tools:
- Use tools like Botometer or Bot Sentinel to analyze the behavior of suspected accounts for signs of automation.
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence):
- Employ OSINT techniques to investigate and gather information about the suspected troll accounts.
Social Media Analysis:
- Platforms like Twitter Analytics or third-party tools such as Hootsuite can help track and analyze the activity patterns of accounts.

Conclusion

Identifying Russian cyber trolls requires vigilance and a combination of strategies to analyze behavior, content, and network interactions. By being aware of the common tactics and characteristics of these trolls, individuals and organizations can better protect themselves from disinformation and contribute to a more informed and resilient online community.

elarquitecto

lowfour Engagement Patterns:
Limited Engagement: Lack of genuine engagement or in-depth discussion on the topic. Trolls often avoid detailed debates.
Deflection and Diversion: When challenged, trolls often deflect questions or change the topic rather than addressing the issue directly.

esto es muy interesante, porque es como la prueba del 9 o del algodon o como queramos llamarla

el "problema" es que no siempre existe una falta de "compromiso", sino falta de "argumentario", o dicho de otro modo, cuando se piden explicaciones en relación a inconsistencias (como explicas que el barco desaparece en el horizonte, señor terraplanista?) puede ser que no conozca el "contra-argumentario" al uso y pase a "deflection" o mover la portería, como tantas veces nos hacía cinta

pero si conoce los puntos turbios de antemano y su "contra-contraargumentario", te lo casca y concierta vehemencia además...
lo cual no deja de ser otro "síntoma" de que el cibertroll es más que un mero "iniciado" o algo así

lowfour

markdown
Copy code

Examples of Cyber Troll Posts

Here are three examples of cyber troll posts that might be used to spread disinformation or provoke conflict:

Example 1: Political Disinformation

User1234: The recent election results are a total fraud! There's no way the opposition could have won without cheating. Just look at the fake ballots they found! #ElectionFraud #CorruptGovernment
Characteristics:

High Emotion: Uses strong language like "total fraud" and "corrupt."
Hashtags: Employs popular hashtags to spread the message wider.
False Claims: References fake ballots without evidence to undermine trust in the electoral process.
Example 2: Social Division

Patriot567: These immigrants are ruining our country. They don't share our values and just want to live off welfare. It's time to close the borders and take care of our own! #ImmigrationCrisis #ProtectOurBorders
Characteristics:

Inflammatory Language: Uses divisive and inflammatory statements to stir up xenophobia.
Generalizations: Makes broad, unfounded generalizations about a group of people.
Hashtags: Uses hashtags to link to a broader narrative or campaign.
Example 3: Conspiracy Theory

TruthSeeker99: Did you know that the government is using 5G technology to control our minds? They've been planning this for years, and COVID-19 was just a cover to roll it out! Wake up, people! #5G #MindControl #Plandemic
Characteristics:

Conspiracy Theory: Spreads a baseless conspiracy theory linking unrelated topics.
Fear-Mongering: Attempts to create fear and mistrust towards technology and government.
Hashtags: Uses hashtags to connect with other conspiracy theorists and amplify the message.

Key Points to Note:

Emotional Manipulation: Troll posts often use emotionally charged language to provoke a strong reaction.
Unsubstantiated Claims: They frequently make bold assertions without credible evidence.
Use of Hashtags: Hashtags help them reach a wider audience and link their posts to broader campaigns.

By recognizing these patterns, you can better identify and respond to troll posts on social media and forums.

elarquitecto

lowfour

yo creo que igual sería interesante ir un poco más allá de la clasificación "ciberputi" y este trozo del gepeto tiene bastante buena pinta, no??

a falta de algún término mejor, voy a proponer:

seeder : el cintaspamer "núcleo" que es el origen del spam o muy cercano a él, es el caso de "belarra" y cuentas similares
leecher/cintaspamer : son los que hacen retuit y no se enteran de la movida, pero es importante distinguir a los "bots" de los "humanos", hay peña muy entregada difundiendo mierdas... aquí tuvimos a cinta, que posiblemente sea "camello" de la sopa ciberputi, pero sospechamos que igual estaba más cerca del "seeder" de lo que parece
magufo : los que difunden conspiranoia, son parte de la estrategia ciberputi rusa o solo unos oportunistas que se suben al carro de la difusión brutal de las granjas de bots para difundir sus neurosis? yo es que creo que esta gente es como un spin off raruno que les ha salido, y que arrastran de 4chan y tal, desde donde se expandieron
cuñao : hacemos distinción entre leechers/cintaspamers y cuñaos? o sea, entre gente activa en redes y peña que no, pero que sigue a iker jimenez y luego repite sus mierdas (pero de forma selectiva, o sea, no compra todo el pack magufo o disruptivo, no dice "genocidio" o "begoño", pero lo del cambio climático... igual es trola...) en cenas y saraos, porque no controlan de futbol o deportes y de algo tienen que hablar para darse importancia...

o sea, tenemos los "capos", los "camellos" (dealers) y los "cuñaos" que compran al camello (o al capo, pero generalmente no difunde en plan "pro", sino solo en petit-comite y tal) y luego magufos que ya van por otro rail (aunque haya magufos que no, que formen parte del entramado cibertroll)

es que claro, si oimos a errejon diciendo "genocidio", le metemos la etiqueta "ciberputi"?? o qué hacemos??
cómo clasificamos el discurso pro-ruski de agentes ruskis de los que no lo son (y no lo saben)?

cuando yolanda dice "del rio al mar", complicando las relaciones diplomáticas, blanqueando a hamas (aunque luego matice, claro) creando legitimidad para medios dudosos (terrorismo) para fines legítimos (aunque un poco lazis en el fondo, la verdad, los palestinos son xenofobos como pocos), decimos que yolanda trabaja para rusia?? o cómo hacemos??

mi duda es, todo el que difunde mensaje "ciberputi" es ciberputi? o cibertroll ruso??
o incluso, hay niveles de ruski-activismo?? desde el manipulador político directo al mero conspiranoico que no habla de inmis, pero sí de planedemia... es todo parte de lo mismo? merece la pena hacer categorías? (yo creo que sí, nos puede ayudar a analizar el asunto, la estrategia detrás y crear contramedidas más afinadas)

elarquitecto

tío, que estamos a sábado, estas son más para el domingo, no?? 🤣

nah, mañana les doy su atenta leída y tal, 🧐

lowfour

elarquitecto

Es de chatgpt

elarquitecto

dice que el 83% es por la pasta, y que los ruskis andan un poco más reclutando que hackeando, pero que la cosa pinta bastante fea, especialmente con el chat gepeto

y bueno, que lo del "nadie" es nadie, porque aunque ataque a empresas y tal, lo del phising y demás estafas a usuarios está onfire también, así que te pueden desvalijar en cualquier momento (y ni te enteras incluso)

« Previous Page Next Page »