Os traigo el guano. Seguro que esto ayuda a que los pisos suban, especialmente en las bálticas y Polonia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024
ISW: Economic, military indicators suggest Russia is preparing for large-scale war with NATO
Os dejo lo relevante aqui:
Several Russian financial, economic, and military indicators suggest that Russia is preparing for a large-scale conventional conflict with NATO, not imminently but likely on a shorter timeline than what some Western analysts have initially posited. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the leaders of Russian State Duma factions on March 19 and outlined priorities for his fifth presidential term.[1] Putin emphasized the importance of developing the Russian economy and expanding the social programs announced in his February 29 address to the Federation Council.[2] Putin claimed on March 19 that he personally witnessed how corporate interests fueled appointments to legislative bodies while he was working in Leningrad and later St Petersburg, although he himself likely made substantial commissions from illegally endorsed contracts and licenses while serving as St. Petersburg Deputy Mayor and Head of Committee.[3] Putin urged the Russian State Duma faction leaders to act in the interest of the state instead of corporations or parties and emphasized the importance of appointing people based on skill and competence. Putin similarly criticized the Russian “elite” in his February 29 Federation Council address by claiming that the individuals who “lined their pockets” in the 1990s are not the elite, but that the “real elite” are workers and military servicemen who proved their loyalty to Russia.[4]
Putin is likely attempting to set conditions to stabilize Russia’s long-term financial position at a higher level of government expenditure and is signaling that Russia’s long-term financial stability will require imposing at least some pain on some wealthy industrialist siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence). Putin likely understands that financial crackdowns against industrialist siloviki could risk the political rapport Putin has built with them and is trying to mitigate those consequences. Russia does not appear to be facing imminent financial crisis, and increased military spending has been the most significant change in Russian budgetary policy, so efforts to secure Russia’s financial future are much more likely intended to set long-term conditions than to address immediate financial concerns.[5] Russia continues efforts to circumvent international sanctions, and the International Monetary Fund assessed that Russia’s GDP will grow by 2.6 percent in 2024 and reported that Russia’s GDP grew faster than all Group of Seven (G7) countries’ economies in 2023.[6]
Polish President Andrzej Duda emphasized in a March 20 interview with CNBC that Putin is intensifying efforts to shift Russia to a war economy with the intention of being able to attack NATO as early as 2026 or 2027, citing unspecified German research.[7] Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated on February 9 that new intelligence indicates that Russia may attempt to attack a NATO country within three to five years, an accelerated timeline from NATO’s reported assessment in 2023.[8] The timeline for the reconstitution of a significant Russian conventional military threat depends heavily on the financial resources Putin is willing to put against military efforts. In the absence of other explanations for Putin’s apparent preparations to risk damaging his relationship with wealthy Russian clients and in the context of continuing announcements of plans to expand the Russian military considered below, Putin’s attempts to set conditions to stabilize Russia’s economy and finances are most likely part of Russian financial and domestic preparations for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO and not just for a protracted war in Ukraine.
The Russian military continues to undertake structural reforms to simultaneously support the war in Ukraine while expanding Russia’s conventional capabilities in the long term in preparation for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu addressed the Russian MoD board on March 20 and discussed ongoing Russian military reforms intended to increase the Russian military’s combat capabilities.[9] Shoigu reported that Russia has formed the “Dnepr River Flotilla” and a “brigade” of boats as part of the flotilla. The Dnepr River Flotilla is the historical name of various special military river units that were active during the Russo-Turkish wars in 1735-1739 and 1787-1792, the Russian Civil War, and World War II, but this is the first time that Russian military officials have confirmed the formation of the Dnepr River Flotilla in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine.[10] The Dnepr River Flotilla would most likely be deployed along with the Dnepr Grouping of Forces in Kherson Oblast and will likely defend against Ukrainian cross-river raids and counteract Ukrainian efforts to sustain a limited presence in left (east) bank Kherson Oblast. The size and level of equipment of the Dnepr River Flotilla remains unclear, but the Russian military command may also intend to use it to support Russian cross-river raids and attempts to land in Ukrainian-controlled west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces were able to conduct a limited raid and temporarily land in west bank Kherson Oblast on March 13, and the Dnepr River Flotilla could feasibly support further such cross-river attempts.[11] It is unlikely that the Dnepr River Flotilla has the manpower and equipment necessary to establish an enduring large-scale Russian presence in west bank Kherson Oblast or credibly threaten to re-occupy significant territory in Kherson Oblast at this time, but the presence of a new formation in this area may force Ukraine to commit manpower and scarce materiel to an axis that has been relatively inactive since November 2022. The deployment of the Dnepr River Flotilla may force the Ukrainian command to make challenging decisions about resource attribution as it husbands limited stores of artillery ammunition and other critical military equipment.
Shoigu outlined several ongoing efforts to bolster Russia’s conventional military capabilities, more likely as part of Russia’s long-term effort to prepare for a potential conventional war with NATO than as part of the war against Ukraine. Shoigu stated that Russia has formed an army corps (AC) (likely either in reference to the AC currently forming in Karelia or to the 40th AC, which has deployed to Kherson Oblast) and a motorized rifle division (potentially in reference to the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, which is committed to the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast line as part of the new 25th Combined Arms Army).[12] Shoigu also claimed that the Russian military plans to form two combined arms armies (CAAs) and 14 divisions, and 16 brigades by the end of 2024. Russia formed two new CAAs — the 25th and the 18th — in 2023, and it is unclear if Shoigu is suggesting that Russia intends to stand up two additional CAAs over the course of 2024.[13] Shoigu initially announced in January 2023 that Russia would also create three new motorized rifle divisions, two new air assault divisions, and reorganize seven motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions, and Shoigu’s March 20 speech did not differentiate between air assault and motorized rifle divisions, so it is likely that Shoigu is suggesting that Russia will stand up two new divisions in 2024 in addition to the 12 divisions (air assault and motorized rifle, inclusive) he announced in January 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russia currently lacks the manpower, military infrastructure, and training capacity to properly staff several entirely new divisions to army-level formations to full end strength in the immediate to medium term.[14] Such reforms, however, are more likely intended to build out Russia’s long-term military capabilities vis-a-vis NATO, as opposed to immediately creating and staffing new formations up to the army level.
Ongoing personnel changes within the Russian MoD may be further indicators of Russia’s preparations for a conflict in the long term. Shoigu introduced Lieutenant General Andrei Bulyga as the Deputy Defense Minister for logistics support during the MoD address on March 20, confirming the Russian MoD’s initial announcement of Bulyga’s appointment on March 11.[15] The Russian Armed Forces Headquarters of Logistics Support, which Bulyga now heads, is intended to organize and coordinate logistical support for Russian troops in both peacetime and wartime.[16] Bulyga’s appointment is unlikely to remedy logistics and support issues faced by Russian troops in Ukraine in the immediate term, but Bulyga may spearhead reforms to the logistics headquarters that will have more noticeable impacts in the medium to long term. Bulyga will likely task his department with addressing logistical issues to support the ongoing conventional military reforms, setting conditions for longer-term efforts to build out Russia’s conventional capabilities.
