elarquitecto
Leí una entrevista de un suizo/alemán un poco sobrado ayer, un Experto en defensa del ZTH de Zürich. Y el tipo decía que la mierda que va a salir con políticos untados por Rusia en la EU va a ser brutal y van a acabar en La Haya. Me lo creo. Lo de la Macarrona a ver si va a ser una escapada in extremis del marrón que se van a comer los de la legión de pacotilla.
El tipo era un sobrado, pero básicamente decía que Rusia ya había perdido, que los iban a reventar antes de que acabe el año.
https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/marcus-keupp-deswegen-sage-ich-russland-wird-den-krieg-im-oktober-verloren-haben-ld.1731488
"That is why I say: Russia will have lost the war in October".
Mr Keupp, how would you describe the current war situation in Ukraine? What is the situation in the embattled Bakhmut?
We are now on day 386 of the three-day "special operation" by Russian forces. Seriously, we have been seeing in the Donbass since January probably the last Russian initiative that is still possible in this war. This initiative is doomed to fail because the Russians are gradually running out of material and people. Moreover, the situation around Bakhmut has no strategic significance for the course of the front as a whole. Ukraine is just now finishing training its tank crews in Germany and Poland. This means that we can expect a Ukrainian counter-offensive with Western tanks in mid-April.
What will this look like?
Ukraine will probably advance from Zaporizhia via Melitopol to the Black Sea coast and thus split the front in two. With a swing to the west, they could then encircle the Russian formations between Melitopol and Nova Kakhovka. In addition, they could then place Himars missile systems on the coast and thus bring the military installations in Crimea under fire as well as disrupt logistics. That will then be the moment when Russian defeat becomes apparent. That is my prediction. That is why I also said: Russia will have lost the war militarily in October. The military situation will be comparable to 1944, when the European war was lost for the Axis powers.
You rely mainly on figures: They say that up to 600 Russian soldiers are killed every day. Every day, the Russians lose 5 tanks and 6 armoured personnel carriers. Where did you get these figures?
I'll give you the example of the tanks. There are good estimates. One is from the Swedish defence agency FOI. The other is the estimate of the IISS from London. These institutes estimate that there are about 2900 operational Russian battle tanks. Now you have to contrast that with the loss rate. For that I'll take the Oryx blog. Here we are today at 1845 tanks lost by Russia - so about 5 per day of war. So the remaining reserve of 1055 is enough for a maximum of 211 days of war. And that doesn't even include the technology effect - Russia is mobilising ever older tanks, while Ukraine is receiving modern Western systems.
And where does the Oryx data come from?
Oryx is a collective that analyses Russian losses. It is the best source of data on Russian losses there is. Behind it are various people who sit and count in Poland and Turkey. This source is probably still conservative because it only counts what is actually proven in pictures or video geolocated.
And suppose Russia does have more reserves after all?
What can the Russians have left? They have the myth of an alleged miracle weapon: the Armata T-14 main battle tank, which we have not seen on the battlefield to this day. In the spring offensive, we will see pictures of Western Leopard-2 and Challenger-2 tanks, which shoot much further than Russian tanks and can therefore eliminate them from a distance. When you add up the technology boost to the Ukrainians and the Russian loss rate and depleting resources, there is really no other course conceivable than a Russian defeat.
You believe that Russia will not use nuclear weapons. How can you be sure of this?
Nuclear weapons are a psychological weapon that Putin uses deliberately. Especially in Germany it has an effect. The mere mention of it creates this typical German fear discourse. I don't need to explain to you that a nuclear war cannot be won. Any nuclear use immediately leads to escalation, also in conventional terms. Putin can have no interest in that.
Nevertheless, the war is marked by many imponderables: Weather, morale of the soldiers, material, not least also political decisions. Don't you have any doubts?
You can verify these figures. There is a large open-source intelligence community, of which I am a member, that gets satellite images, for example, or asks other people what was observed on the ground. We have images from the population and data from subject matter experts. War analytics has changed radically. Previously, we had military experts who claimed something. Or we had formulas or theoretical models that were used to calculate something. Today you see almost in real time what is happening at the front. This war is the best documented war in all of human history, not least because of social networks.
How transparent can figures on Russian reserves be?
There are all kinds of propaganda figures floating around: 12,000 to 15,000 operational Russian tanks. I have looked at this and come up with a figure of about 3,000 operational tanks at the time of the 2022 invasion. There can't be more than that. After all, why would the Russians reactivate obsolete equipment like T-62s and T-55s now when they have much better tanks in their garage? It makes no sense.
Would China be able to arm Russia in the short term?
How would that work? The war material would have to be transported to the front by train. Just for a Russian fire frequency of 50,000 artillery shells per day along the entire front - as in the summer of 2022 - you would need a goods train of 1600 tonnes per day via the Trans-Siberian Railway. Not only would this be logistically very difficult, one would also immediately see these trains on the satellite photos and then impose secondary sanctions against China.
And yet we are always surprised, not least after the Russian invasion began. When was the last time you were in Ukraine and saw the situation on the ground?
Since 2012, I have been dealing with Russia, the Russian army, the arms industry there and especially the Northeast Passage, and I also published a book on this in 2015. Since then, I have refrained from travelling to Russia because it was clear to me since the invasion of the Donbass in the summer of 2014 that the Putin regime no longer has any regard for law and order.
Do you speak Russian?
I speak a little Russian for everyday use, but I certainly wouldn't call myself an expert on Eastern Europe or Russia. There are others who know much more about civil society than I do. I am primarily interested in an economic and military classification of the situation.
If your forecasts are correct, then the Russians should also be aware of the impending defeat. Why do they continue the war anyway? Are they guided by an irrational belief in victory?
Putin has unleashed dynamics that he can no longer control. It is very important in the Russian culture of interaction that strength is shown to the outside world. Otherwise they are quickly questioned. What Putin is doing in the war actually has nothing to do with the war at all, but with securing his internal system of rule.
How can you rule out that the special forces financed by oligarchs continue their wars with or without Putin and destabilise the region? So there would be no end to the war as you predict, let alone an orderly withdrawal.
I can't rule that out, on the contrary. After all, there is not only the Wagner force. There is still the Slavonian Corps - from which Wagner emerged - and Patriot - Shoygu's private force. Gazprom has also just founded its own private army, "Staf-Tsentr". In addition, there are four or five others. It is no coincidence that air defence systems are currently being installed everywhere in Moscow. This is preparation for internal conflicts.
What scenarios are you thinking of?
Russian oligarchs or military leaders could well come up with the idea of knocking Putin out with a few targeted ballistic missiles and taking power themselves. But: If Putin wants to prevent that, he would have to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine in order to secure the internal stability of his regime by force. In this way, too, the end of the war could come sooner than expected. So it is not a contradiction.
The Russian side is often said to be inscrutable. Does this give the Russians a strategic advantage?
On the propaganda front, it gives them a massive advantage. They falsify statistics, tell fairy tales. Russia has done this very successfully for twenty years now. Someone like me who soberly observes this is now perceived as an exotic or a speculator. From this you can see how deeply Russian propaganda has seeped into Europe.
If the propaganda supposedly catches on so well, could it not also be that politicians in the West are losing patience, seeking an early peace and thus thwarting your military scenario of a Russian defeat?
The military situation documents a brutal, objective reality that does not submit to political discourse. The balance of power is negotiated on the battlefield. The result is measured in destroyed systems and dead people. It sounds cruel, but that's how it is. It doesn't depend on the Germans or the French, at least not in the political sense. Both Scholz and Macron come from a long tradition of friendship with Russia, even though both states now support Ukraine with weapons. I don't even listen to the political discourse any more. What counts for me are the objective facts. And I observe them in the actual struggle. There are no indications at all that the West's military support would diminish, even if the appeasers are disproportionately received in the media.
In this interview, you give the impression that Europe is very Russia-friendly. But it's the other way round: large majorities in the West are behind Ukraine.
Not yet in Germany and France. But one should not overestimate this, because Germany is not a militarily decisive power. On the contrary. Germany would do best to hand over its weapons systems in their entirety to Ukraine. Then Russian aggression would be neutralised in reverse, and an army for the 21st century could be built out of today's ailing Bundeswehr. Fortunately, Europe's security does not depend on Germany, otherwise we would have long been part of the neo-Russian empire.
Do you see yourself as an outsider in Germany?
Fortunately, I can say that I haven't spent most of my adult life in Germany and am therefore immune to the strangely emotional discussion culture there. I am alternately called a hyper-realist and a Nato warmonger. I can live with that. I think that in twenty years we will look back with horror at some German politicians and the Schröder and Merkel governments. We will shudder and say, "Thank God that didn't happen.
What do you mean exactly?
Just think what would have happened if the war had only come in ten years: even more Russian money in Europe, Nord Stream 2 completed, Germany getting 70 per cent of its energy from Russia. Would the Germans still have supported Ukraine then? It sounds cynical, but fortunately this war is happening now.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on 24 February. The former German brigadier general Erich Vad said on TV that Putin would win this war, that the thing would last "a few days and no more". Ex-US general Ben Hodges predicted the war would end in the summer of 2022. What did you think when you heard that?
I assume that many members of the former political and military elites in Germany have worked for Russian interests or are still lobbying for them. This will be a very interesting topic for the war crimes tribunal in The Hague, because economic or propaganda support for war crimes is also punishable. When a German officer retires, he no longer has a duty of so-called good conduct. He may then criticise the government, he may criticise the Bundeswehr, he may make prognoses and value judgements. But the oath he takes to the Federal Republic is for life.
Are you also annoyed by these colleagues because they damage the reputation of your discipline?
I'm annoyed because - consciously or out of naivety - they spread the Kremlin's narratives and allow themselves to be guided by emotional moods instead of orienting themselves to historical and military facts. There are quite reasonable military experts, for example Markus Reisner or Gustav Gressel in Austria, who see the course of the war more conservatively or pessimistically than I do. I can live with that. History will judge us. Let us see in October whether what I have said is true. Let them look at me in ten years' time, with historical distance.
Does the thought make you nervous that the war might not be ready in the autumn? Then your expertise, your calculation system would have failed.
No, because I don't believe in the Russian propaganda narrative. I look at: What does Russia really look like? Don't go to Moscow, go to Smolensk or to Pskov. That already tells you a lot about Russian reality. If you have seen these places, then you no longer believe in Russian strength.
In your interviews, you give journalists and the public exactly what they want to hear: The war will end soon, the Ukrainians will win, the Russians will leave. This scenario is seductive because it corresponds to our wishes. How do you immunise yourself against wishful thinking?
I am not so sure that everyone really wishes for this outcome. But I have constantly adjusted my assessment to the situation. And I always ask myself the same question: Is what I say still true? I was not as optimistic as I am now at the beginning of this war. As recently as the summer of 2022, I said: Ukraine is successfully resisting the invasion, but it is far too early to claim that it could win. One must remain critical of oneself. I make an effort to read and analyse material for several hours every day. I have a reputation to lose as a scientist.
Exactly. You are a military economist at the ETH, you train Swiss officers. Why do you risk your reputation with risky forecasts?
We have a historic hour in which you cannot stand aside. Either you oppose this regime or you become a collaborator with it. I asked myself in February 2022: Are you going to say something or are you not going to say anything? And I made up my mind then: I will not tolerate that this empire continues to project its power to the West, to the Caucasus, to Central Asia, and that might shall rule over right again. I will use my analytical skills to accompany this war as objectively and fact-based as possible. And that means, in particular, addressing the Kremlin's imperialist policy, because this is ultimately aimed against the West. You don't do that without danger.
What do you mean?
If something were to happen to me, it would be the crowning achievement of an analyst's life. Don't think Switzerland is a safe space. Geneva is full of Russian agents, as are Vienna and Berlin. Officially, of course, they are "cultural attachés". I can't emphasise it often enough: The only thing the Russians respect is strength. So you can either collaborate - even by tacit acquiescence - or resist.
That means there is also an emotional component in your commitment.
I don't care if historians laugh at me in ten years' time. Maybe the war will be over in August. Then the trolls on the internet will say: He was far too conservative. But I cannot remain silent in this hour.
Military expert and artist
Marcus Matthias Keupp has been teaching at the Military Academy of the ETH Zurich, the training school for professional officers of the Swiss Armed Forces, since 2013. After graduating from high school, he did his civilian service and studied business administration at the University of Mannheim from 1997 to 2003, including a year abroad at the University of Warwick in England. From 2004, he worked as a research assistant at the Institute for Technology Management at the University of St. Gallen. In addition to his professional activities, Keupp is artistically involved with graphics, visual poetry and modular systems.
